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Palestine, the Land of Three Faiths


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Palestine, the Land of Three Faiths *by* Philip Graves

With an Introduction by
D. G. Hogarth

Jonathan Cape
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TO
MY WIFE

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Preface

IN the following chapters I have attempted to give as impartial an account as possible in brief compass of the recent history of Palestine and of the present situation in the country, with special reference to the relations between Jew and Arab. In this account I have laid especial stress on the politico-geographical importance of Palestine as one of the key-points on the line of communications between West and East and between North and South, an aspect of the Holy Land which has too often been neglected by writers, who have failed to explain why the country has been the prey or the prize of so many invaders and why its Jewish and other native kingdoms and principalities had so short and troubled a life.

I have sought—the reader can best judge with what success—to be as impartial and constructive as possible in my criticisms of the policy pursued by the British Government, by the Zionist Organization and by the Arab politicians in the Holy Land since 1917. I hope I have made my own position clear. I do not believe in political Zionism, which I interpret as an attempt to promote the artificial Judaization of the country by the importation of large numbers of Jews in the hope that this will lead to Jewish political dominance. I am equally sceptical of the ability of the Palestinian Arabs, unaided by Jewish brains and capital and by British administrators, to make anything of the country, except in a distant future for which the modern world will not wait.

Nor do I see what advantage can accrue to the British Empire from obedience to the commands of our Press Stentors, who cannot yet realize that our abandonment of Palestine would involve, not merely the abandonment of the Holy Land first to anarchy and then to the first foreign Power which desired to put an end to that

anarchy, but the loss of the bridgehead of the Suez Canal and of one of our principal stations on our Imperial Air Line to the East.

I wish to express my indebtedness to the Editor and Manager of *The Times*, who have kindly permitted me to include in this volume articles contributed by me to *The Times* in 1921 and 1922. I am also greatly indebted to Sir Henry McMahon for allowing me to make use of his letter of March 12, 1922, which refutes the contention advanced by a section of our Press—and elsewhere—that the Balfour Declaration conflicted with our previous undertaking to the King of the Hejaz. I also wish to thank Mr. Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, who, while forbearing to advise or influence, assisted me, during my visits to the Holy Land, to meet representatives of every community, of every important sect and of every variety of political opinion. My thanks are also due to Mr. H. St. J. Philby, our Representative in Transjordania, for much valuable information concerning the Ikhwan and the recent Wahabi raid upon Emir Abdallah's territory. For statistical information I have on several occasions indented upon the excellent official *Handbook of Palestine*, edited by Mr. H. C. Luke, whose knowledge of the Near East is as extensive as it is profound, and Mr. E. Keith-Roach. I also thank Colonel R. B. Holmes, General Manager of the Palestine Railways, for permission to use his excellent railway map of Palestine, and many friends, British, Zionist and Arab, for much useful and interesting information concerning the Land of Three Faiths.

Finally I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. D. G. Hogarth, C.M.G., whose knowledge of the Near East is unrivalled, for having kindly written the introduction to this book.

Introduction

MR. PHILIP GRAVES asks an introduction. He needs none. His lucid, even-tempered and obviously well documented book is its own warrant ; and among its readers there will be many aware of the author's record—Correspondent of *The Times* at Constantinople for years before 1914, staff officer in Eastern theatres of the War, member of the " Arab Bureau " and of the Arab section of the Head-quarters Staff in Palestine, Correspondent in ordinary again at Constantinople and special Correspondent in Palestine, he carries on his own deck all the guns he requires !

I can add nothing useful, for he knows more of this Zionist Question than I. On main issues we see eye to eye ; but some things I should say more decidedly than he and some things less. If the letter of the promises that we made through Hussein of Mecca to the Arabs can be forced into agreement with that of the Balfour Declaration, the spirit in which we preached Nationalism to the Arabs can not. Our excuse (and it is an accusation) must be that the Declaration was made under misconceptions about Palestine. It was not realized by our Government of 1917 how far it was a settled land in occupation of a people Arab in tradition and hope, which had not been oppressed so greatly by the Turks as to welcome liberation at the price of new subjection. If the facts had been known, extremists like Jabotinsky and Ussishkin would never have been granted opportunity to raise the flag of coming domination among a people whose ancestors were on the land before the Normans landed in England. But it would be idle to blame the extremists. They were taking the Balfour Declaration at no more than its face value, putting upon it the most reasonable and natural interpretation. What else could a " National Home " mean ? What would differentiate sufficiently the status of Jews in

Palestine after the War except predominance ? If we had explained in 1917, as we have done since (but not before 1922), that the Balfour Declaration implied no intention on our part so to favour Jews that they should become the dominant element in the population, how many Zionists would have rallied to our side ? Only after five years' experience of Arab opposition has Dr. Weizmann, like a statesman, accepted the depreciated currency which we have found the best we can offer to-day. If it should fall yet a point or two—by further diminution, for example, of the status and powers of the Jewish Council—will it be marketable at all ? Already moderate Zionists are saying it is valueless, and that their Day, after all, is not yet.

Nor again can we blame the Arabs, whose persistent opposition has depressed the Balfour Declaration to its current rate. Conscious of inability to maintain their position against Jewish immigration, unless scales be weighted in their favour, as the Ottoman Government used to weight them, they were given every reason for four long years to believe that the balance would be weighted in favour of the other side. I feel that this original and general consciousness of social inferiority is the first and last cause of their intransigence. The mistakes made by our administrators or by the Zionists would never by themselves have brought matters to the present pass. They have, indeed, been less than might have been expected in so difficult a situation.

The Balfour Declaration is as binding an engagement as Great Britain has ever been committed to. We have done our best to fulfil an unlimited obligation under it and failed. We shall do our best to fulfil it within the narrower limits of interpretation which the Zionists have now officially accepted. What are our chances of success, what the prospect of further depreciation, readers of Mr. Graves' pages will judge according to their several lights.

D. G. HOGARTH.

Contents

CHAPTER 1

PAGE

THE LAND OF THREE FAITHS 13

The Holy Land. Physical Characteristics. Plain, Plateau and Jordan Rift. The Trade Route between North and South. The Jews. "Assyria" against "Egypt" throughout the centuries. Christianity and the Roman Synthesis. The Coming of Islam. The Desert against the Sown. Arab, Crusader, Turk. The British in Egypt. Western Influences in Palestine. 1914

CHAPTER 2

ZIONISM AND THE WORLD WAR 36

The Turks attack the Suez Canal. Palestine, Egypt and the Hejaz in the World War till October, 1917. The Jews and the World War. The Agreement with the Zionists. The Balfour Declaration. The Agreement with the Grand Sherif of Mecca. Refutation of the Contention that it Conflicted with the Balfour Declaration. The Capture of Jerusalem. The Destruction of the Turkish Armies in Palestine, Syria and Arabia. The British Military Government of Palestine, the Jerusalem Riots.

CHAPTER 3

THE GRANTING OF THE MANDATE 62

A Civil Administration Established. Communist Agitation Begins. Mr. Churchill visits Palestine. The Jaffa Riots. Report of the Commission of Inquiry. The Arab Delegation in London. The Mandate in Parliament. The Papacy and the Mandate. The Mandate Granted. The Palestine Constitution. Arab Agitation. Effect of Kemal Pasha's Successes. The Arab Delegation Reappears.

CHAPTER 4

ARAB NATIONALISM AND ITS LIMITATIONS 81

Islam and Nationalism. The Beginnings of Modern Arab Nationalism. Fancies and Facts. An Arab Culture rather than an Arab Nation. The Divisions of the Arabs. Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria. Arab Nationalism in Palestine. Differences between Moslem and Christian Standpoint as Manifested in their Feasts. The Ceremony of the Holy Fire. The Nebi Musa Festivities.

CHAPTER 5

THE PALESTINE ARABS AND THEIR GRIEVANCES 99

The Arab Majority, Some Characteristics. Explosive Material. Zionist Explanations of Arab Anti-Zionism. The Real Cause. The Critics Criticized. Turkish and French Intrigues in Palestine. The Arab Christians. Lack of Arab Leadership. How the Arab Spoils his Case. The Mandate and its Effects. Pro-Zionist Arab Elements. Analysis of the Arab Attitude.

Contents

CHAPTER 6

PAGE

JEWISH IMMIGRATION 120

First sight of the Halutzim. Influx of Immigrants. "Judæo-Slavs." Arab Criticism. Fair and Unfair Attacks. Lack of Preparation. Labour Difficulties. The Case of Khedera. The Bounty System. Obstacles to Mass Immigration. More Haste, Less Speed.

CHAPTER 7

LAND, LABOUR, LANGUAGE, AND PUBLIC WORKS 134

The Arab Peasantry. Land Tenure. Jewish Agricultural Colonies. Different Systems. The German Templars. The Urban Jews and the "Haluka." Jewish Labour Parties. Coquetting with the Moscow International. The Hagana. The Use of Hebrew. Public Works. Mr. Pinhas Rutenberg and his Schemes. The Rutenberg Concession and Option. Arguments for and Against. The "Desecration" Cry.

CHAPTER 8

THE ZIONIST EXECUTIVE IN PALESTINE AND JEWISH PARTIES 161

The "Palestine Organization." The Zionist Commission Formed. Its Composition and Status. Frequent Changes of Personnel. Mr. Ussishkin. Causes of Friction with the British Authorities in Palestine and of Arab Nervousness. Jewish Criticism of the Commission (Executive). The "Beni-Benjamin." The "Agudath Yisrael" and its Grievances. Jewish Criticism outside Palestine. The Churchill Statement. The Zionist Executive's Present Policy.

CHAPTER 9

THE SPECTRE OF THE LEARNED ELDERS 186

"*Who Fills the Butchers' Shops with Large Blue Flies?*" Another Cause of Hostility to Zionism. The *Protocols* Myth. A Literary Plagiarism. Its Exposure. Continued Belief Therein in Certain Quarters. Causes of this Belief. Fulfilment of "Prophecy"? Explanation of Jewish Predominance among the Russian and Hungarian Bolshevist Leaders. Jewish Segregation in Eastern Europe. Jewish Revolutionary Messianism.

CHAPTER 10

THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN PALESTINE 198

Between Two Fires. Oriental Credulity. Criticisms of Jewish Officials. The Administration: Its Chiefs and Its Branches. Financial Difficulties. Cost of Defence. Roads, Railways and Public Works. Education. Public Health. Archæology. A Credit Balance of Achievement.

Contents

CHAPTER 11

PAGE

FRONTIERS AND NEIGHBOURS 218

The Frontiers of Palestine. The Franco-British Convention. Future Possibilities. Transjordania. A Period of Confusion. The Emir Abdallah and his Administration. Negotiations Concerning Transjordanian Independence. The Beduin Chiefs. Ibn Sa'ud and the Wahabis. The "Ikhwan." Ibn Sa'ud Occupies Wadi Sirhan. The Battle of Umm El 'Amad. Its Lessons.

CHAPTER 12

OUR PRESENT AND FUTURE POLICY IN THE HOLY LAND 233

What we have done for the Arab Peoples. Why the Balfour Declaration must Stand. Mistakes of Omission rather than of Commission. The Zionism which we can Honourably Support. Necessity of Continued Control of Immigration. Exaggerated Arab Fears. Necessity of Patience with the Arabs. Protean Anti-Semitism. Inevitable Results of Evacuation. Palestine and the Suez Canal. We must hold the Bridgehead.

APPENDIX 1

WHAT THE BALFOUR DECLARATION MEANS TO ZIONISM'S CHIEF PHILOSOPHER 249

APPENDIX 2

254

APPENDIX 3

256

APPENDIX 4

BRITISH POLICY IN PALESTINE 273

List of Illustrations

	To face page
Map of Palestine	*Frontispiece*
Makers of the New Palestine	13
Built by the Kaiser in 1910 upon the Mount of Olives as the German Protestant Hospice. Now "Government House"	26
Damianos, Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem	46
Ibrahim Shammas Effendi, one of the Christian Members of the Arab Delegation in 1922	64
The Chief Rabbi of the Sephardi Jews of Jerusalem, Jacob Meir	78
At the Church of the Holy Sepulchre	84
The Festival of the Prophet Moses, 1922	94
H. E. Musa Kazim Pasha El-Husseini, Head of the Arab Delegation	108
A Jewish Colony in the Making	126
A Jewish Colony Made	144
Ittamar Ben Avi	162
Abraham Ha-Cohen Kuk, Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazim; A Bokharan Jew in His National Dress	182
The Governor of Jerusalem, Tempy. Brig.-Gen. R. Storrs, C.M.G.	206
On the Amman Landing Ground	220
Auda Abu Tayi	226
The High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the late Grand Mufti of Palestine at Government House	240

[*Photo: American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

MAKERS OF THE NEW PALESTINE

LADY SAMUEL | FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ALLENBY OF MOUNT CARMEL | H.H. THE EMIR ABDALLAH OF TRANSJORDANIA | SIR HERBERT SAMUEL

[*Face page* 13

The Land of Three Faiths

CHAPTER 1

The Land of Three Faiths

THE HOLY LAND. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS. PLAIN, PLATEAU AND JORDAN RIFT. THE TRADE ROUTE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. THE JEWS. "ASSYRIA" AGAINST "EGYPT" THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES. CHRISTIANITY AND THE ROMAN SYNTHESIS. THE COMING OF ISLAM. THE DESERT AGAINST THE SOWN. ARAB, CRUSADER, TURK. THE BRITISH IN EGYPT. WESTERN INFLUENCES IN PALESTINE. 1914.

A TALE is told of a personage who passed as an authority on Near Eastern questions and addressed a letter to a Secretary of State which began "Palestine is an Arab province, no larger than Wales." The Secretary sent it to the Department concerned and the Department sent it back to him with the following marginal note facing the opening phrase: "Palestine is also the Holy Land."

It is precisely this fact, that Palestine has been and is the Holy Land, that is ignored by so many of the editors and leader-writers, or perhaps it would be fairer to say "by the proprietors" of the sensational newspapers which have been laying down the law concerning Palestine any time during the last three years. These singular folk sometimes give one the impression that they really do believe that Palestine is only "an Arab province," and that although this aspect of the Holy Land is infinitely the least true and the least important. To compare a small thing with a great, what could be said for a description of the Koh-i-noor as a "piece of crystallized carbon about as large as a pigeon's egg"? Scientifically the description is correct, as far as it goes. But it leads you nowhere, suggests nothing; not a word in this false and barren definition—for it is essentially false because incomplete—that gives you the faintest echo of that great

diamond's history, of the splendour, might and majesty of the Great Moghuls of Hindustan, of the sack of Delhi by the hordes of Nadir Shah, of the Sikh kingdom, and the iron rule of Ranjit Singh, of the fall of the Khalsa[1] and of the winning of the gem from Mussulman by Sikh, from Sikh by Briton.

And Palestine, birthplace of the three great religions,[2] Holy Land of Jew and Christian, home of Jewish kings and prophets, casket enclosing the Holy Cities—Jerusalem where three faiths meet in pilgrimage, Bethlehem and Nazareth of the Christian, Safed of the Jew and Hebron of the Moslems—shrine guarding the sacred places, the ruins of the Temple of Solomon upon which stands that fortress of Islam, the Dome of the Rock, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the grotto of the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, for which men have died and have slain in scores of thousands and may die again and slay again—you are more than a mere "Arab Province."

Perhaps the reader is agnostic ; creeds may not interest him, still less shrines. But is Palestine, meeting-place of East and West, pathway of the long line of conquerors from Thothmes III and Alexander of Macedon through Roman and Arab to Selim the Grim and from Selim through Napoleon Bonaparte to that British Expeditionary Force whose dead sleep on Mt. Scopus, bridgehead of the Suez Canal, the spinal cord of the British Empire, scene to-day of a daring and romantic experiment, merely an Arab Province ?

It is a land of the strangest contrasts. Within a day's journey by rail and motor-car you pass from the sandy steppe of the Egyptian border, all but desert, barely covered with the thinnest carpet of herbage—while the desert of the North Sinai is bare sand, leopard-spotted

[1] The Sikh Confederacy.

[2] Islam is a child of Judaism and Christianity, but never understood its parents. Buddhism is a philosophy.

with dark thorn—into the rich soil of Philistia and the Sharon Plain, a belt of flat prosperous tilth. Here are villages, those of the Arabs built of mud brick, picturesquely untidy, with few trees but great hedges of prickly pear to hide their nakedness ; and the Jewish colonies, clean European hamlets with gardens about the cottages, set among wide orchards and plantations of shade trees and hedge after hedge of " fitna " thorn [1] studded with yellow heavily scented flower-tufts. From Lydda you have time to take car and drive to the outskirts of Jaffa to see the great orange groves, rich deep green leafage jewelled with golden fruit against the bright tawny dunes of the coast. Then back across the plain, into the foothills of Judæa, still green, but with increasing outcrops of white limestone reef and dark boulder and ablaze with spring flowers, you follow the road into the mountains. Well before noon your car has climbed up through Bab-el-Wad, the Gate of the Valley, into the Highlands, and follows the highway to Jerusalem ; now along the summits of long bare windy ridges ; now down steep hillsides in bend after hairpin bend. You have left the corn-land far behind you—the rare cornfields in the pockets of soil washed by the rain into hollows among the hills are full of stones and dappled with wild flowers. Here and there the slopes below the few villages built of grey stone and rubble that cling to the hillsides have been terraced for little plantations of olive-trees. Here and there one can see a patch of green, market-garden or tiny bean-field a-foam with white flowers, on the little flats beside the dry water-courses deep down in the narrow valleys ; but their flecks of colour only intensify the deep iron-grey background, the grey of countless boulders, a sea of weathered limestone, scattered as though they had rained down from heaven over every ridge, every hilltop and every slope. The flowers, scarlet and crimson anemone and ranunculus, mauve cyclamen, yellow char-

[1] *Acacia farnesiana.*

lock, white untidy asphodel shot with faintest pink, blue-violet squill, daisy, birthwort and a host more, spring up in every crevice among the boulders that hold a handful of soil, under every patch of olive-trees, by every stream-bed, but even their multitudinous colours cannot dominate the greyness of that grim expanse of stone.

The last valley is crossed, the last slope climbed ; the road enters Jerusalem through a mean unplanned quarter of houses jerry-built for the Jewish immigrants of the eighties of last century, only saved from complete squalor by the strange diversity of faces and costumes that throng its streets. But soon the buildings improve ; the road bears down towards the Jaffa gate, then swings away to left downhill past the splendid walls of the Holy City and away across the valley, past the Garden of Gethsemane and its gnarled ancient trees, on which the Dome of the Rock looks proudly down over the eastern city wall, across the southern shoulder of the Mount of Olives into Bethany. Swiftly from Bethany the road drops downwards, first down a very wall of mountain-side in sharp terrifying curves, then in long gradients along a valley enclosed by flowery slopes. For a few miles it is the same broken boulder-strewn country that you passed as you climbed up towards Jerusalem, but soon it changes in shape and colour.

This is the Wilderness of Judæa, clothed through the brief spring in a light and many-coloured vesture of flowers—a waterless brown solitude in the long summer —where there are no villages, only the tents of the shepherds whose flocks pasture on the slopes while they are still green. The fields of boulders grow smaller as the road descends. The grass grows thinner, the pale brown of bare earth and the dead white of chalk show through the sparser verdure ; the road seems hastening to enter a desert. Suddenly the hills fall away, and through a narrow gate the high road enters the Valley of the Jordan, from a passage through precipitous hills, and turns north-

ward across the plain of the Ghor.[1] It is the strangest scenery imaginable. On each side of the road is plain, half cultivated, green in spring, walled in on the west by the red crags and precipices of the Mount of Temptation. To the south-east lie first the grey salt land, thinly clad in grey-green and russet soapwort and thorn, then the unbelievably blue-green Dead Sea, strangest of all lakes, and across the valley and across the Dead Sea the long frowning range of the mountains of Moab. Northward lie the houses and gardens of Jericho embowered in trees, and beyond them strange white mamelons and peaks of shining chalk. The flowers are different here. Instead of the cyclamens and anemones of the plateau are poppies and a wealth of crucifers, charlocks, bittercress, wild mustard, eruca, sisymbrium in waves of white or brilliant yellow, and great expanses of mauve-purple Iberis. By the swift stream of the river Kelt are great nightshade bushes with deep purple flowers and golden pistils and the tall stems, the fleshy leaves and glaucous-green fruit of the poisonous Oshr,[2] a giant milkweed with acrid creamy sap. Across the Kelt lies Jericho, a strange medley of stone villas where chilly folk from cold Jerusalem come down for weeks in winter, and mud huts where dwell the black Ghowara,[3] negroids sprung from the black slaves who alone could cultivate the sweltering valley in Saracen days, perhaps even from the Africans whom the great Herod is said to have brought into the plain north of Jericho where his great palace stood.[4] But after the road has passed through Jericho virtue begins to die out of the soil for all the streams and runnels that wash it in winter. The flowers and grass grow sparser and disappear, and at length the

[1] The Jordan Trough.

[2] *Calotropis procera.*

[3] "Arabs" of the Ghor or Jordan Trough.

[4] The Aulad Miriam (Descendants of Mary) are thought by some to preserve in their name the tradition of the days when their forbears were the slaves of Mariamne.

road runs down into a horrible belt of oozy dead grey-white mud, piled in confused hillocks of fantastic shapes, utterly dreary and evil, haunt of hyænas, fit dwellers in this hideous solitude. For a moment the white crown of Hermon, far to the north beyond the farthest boundaries of Palestine, looks down on the road ; then the hideous and lifeless white wilderness engulfs it again, and suddenly ends. From a gate between the leprous hills the way plunges into the "Thicket"—the belt of willow, tamarisk, thorn and moringa that hides the swift brown waters of Jordan of the many windings, a jungle, close and impenetrable. Now you are in the tropics ; the vegetation and the climate, the gorgeous blue sun-birds[1] that dart from tree to tree, the great strange milk-weed butterflies,[2] the dragon-flies that skim the stream, are African. The car stops at the police post by the Jordan bridge. At its eastern end stand Emir Abdullah's gendarmes. You have reached the border. In a long day you have seen the four zones of Palestine—the southern steppe, the rich coastal plain, the plateau that extends from Beersheba to the northern boundaries of Galilee, broken between Samaria and Galilee by the invading plain of Esdraelon but renewed again in the Galilee hills, and the tropical rift of the Jordan depression, a strange deep groove, like the scar of a swordstroke, that has cleft a tableland into two, a strip of the torrid Sudan stretching to Dan from the Mount of Sodom,[3] between uplands where the snow falls heavily some winter-times, and the summer heat is never unbearable, even to the Northerner.

The rift had no importance in Palestine's history save as a frontier—a bad frontier too, over which wave on wave of desert men poured, some to raid, some to settle on the Western Highlands. But from the earliest days

[1] *Cinnyris oseae*, a lovely little bird, sometimes occurring on the coast but having its chief stronghold in the Jordan valley.

[2] *Danais chrysippus*.

[3] Jebel Usdom.

of Egypt the caravans went up and down the coastal plain from the Delta of the Nile to the north, and from the north to the Delta, seeking corn in the south, bringing metals and the wool and hides of the beasts that the nomads kept; and ships crept along the coast bringing timber from Lebanon and Cyprus to timberless Egypt.

At length came a great invasion of Egypt by the nomad Semites from Canaan and beyond; and when the last of the Shepherd Kings had been expelled, the Pharaohs set themselves to conquer Canaan and Syria, to hold the great bridgehead covering and commanding the Isthmus of Suez against invaders from Asia, to tax and control the trade route from north to south, to hold the ports into which the cautious galleys ran when storm threatened and whither the seamen of the Ægean might steer their war-fleets, should they ever unite to despoil the Delta and the rich Canaanite coastland.

In a long life of battle Thothmes III made Syria and Canaan an Egyptian empire, conquering Canaanite and Amorite princes, holding in check the Anatolians, who under the Aryan "Hittite" leadership had begun to dominate the Syrian Semites, closing the land west of Jordan against desert raiders. But soon, under a Pharaoh, who turned from war and statecraft to a new and pacifist religion, Egypt relaxed her grasp on her Asiatic empire. The Hittites were swift to seize Egypt's abandoned prey; the petty princes of the Semites became their clients. But a new line of Pharaohs, the Ramessids, essayed reconquest and war followed war, till the two Great Powers fought one another to a standstill, made peace, and incontinently lost their empires. Egypt and Anatolia ceased for a while to dominate the Syro-Canaanite strip. Petty kingdoms and free cities, more multitudinous than the mosaic of "succession states" created after the downfall of the three European Empires in 1918, sprang up and battled from Aleppo to the Egyptian border. From a welter of political

confusion emerged two new dominant peoples, the Philistines, possibly fugitives from Crete, certainly influenced by the Ægean civilization, who mastered the coastal plain, served as a buffer state to weakened Egypt and gave their name to Palestine, and the Hebrews, desert men, Semites, invaders from the south-east who slowly conquered the plateau and, after being conquered by the Philistine lords of the plain, at length won independence under the kings of the House of David.

The Philistine, a stout fighting man, made the unfortunate mistake of settling on the high road between north and south and so disappeared in a few centuries from history. The Hebrew fared politically but little better. He camped so near the high road that when the great kings again fought for its mastery he was swept aside, or compelled by the threats of a Necho or a Nebuchadnezzar to join in the struggle with fatal consequences to himself. But he brought from the desert, not only the physical wiriness and mental alacrity of the Arab, but the beginnings of a national religion, the outlines of a monotheism which was perfected during the Babylonian captivity, and something resembling a national spirit which the struggle with Philistine, Amorite, Canaanite and Syrian intensified and strengthened.[1] But the Jews' services to the spiritual and mental development of mankind were given after their political overthrow, when they were but a threatened client people in part of Palestine and scattered elsewhere as traders and scribes, teachers and craftsmen in the great cities of the Near and Middle East. Politically they failed—for geographical reasons. Their highlands were too barren to give their kings the revenue and the population that alone could have enabled them to resist either the Pharaoh or the Great King. Through all their histories, through the politico-religious exhortations ascribed to

[1] They frequently fought among themselves, but showed great readiness to unite against invading foreigners.

their prophets, one hears their ceaseless preoccupation—"With whom are we to side?"—as a constantly recurring leading theme. The struggle between north and south, between Egypt and the Northern Power, the "Assyria" of the Scriptures, dated from before their entry into the Land of Promise, and endured longer than their kingdoms. First Assyria, then Babylonia, then Persia fought and defeated Egypt through Palestine, and when the Jewish kingdoms of Israel and Judah had vanished, followed by the Persian "King of Kings," Macedonian rulers established in Syria were contending for Palestine with other Macedonians who ruled over Egypt!

There was a brief period during which the decline of the Seleucid power in Syria and the support of Rome gave the Jews of Palestine their second existence as a nation. During this period Hebrew nationalism, based not only on racial pride and the glory of the successful revolt of the Maccabees against heathen political and religious influences but also upon a far stronger monotheism than that of the old Jewish state, seemed to have a chance of founding a permanent Hebrew polity in Palestine and Transjordania. But the Idumæan dynasty to which the chance was given produced politicians rather than statesmen and diplomatists rather than prophets; its Arab kings, "Levantines" rather than Jews, could make no such appeal to Jewish patriotism as had been made by the indomitable and Orthodox Maccabæan chiefs; nor did it really suit Roman policy that a strong Jewish state should take the place of the Seleucidæ. Rome, whether republican or Cæsarist, preferred a group of client states, weak and divided, to a strong and united Jewish kingdom, and when Jewish Nationalism revolted far too late against her domination, destroyed Jerusalem as men destroy a hornets' nest, and drowned the revolt in blood and fire.

It was during the penultimate stage of this period that the Founder of Christianity appeared and preached

His new doctrine among the Jews of Palestine. He met with some support among the masses, but the Pharisees who incarnated Hebrew Nationalism and the local governments who regarded Him as an agitator who might embroil them with their Roman protector, would have none of Him and put Him to death. The fact that He appeared and taught during a crisis in Jewish history which terminated in an impressive and terrible national disaster and that His teaching could in no wise be reconciled with the stern Orthodox Nationalism of the Pharisees, who were the political and intellectual chiefs of Judaism, explains the terrible bitterness against Him that still lingers among some of the Eastern Jews, whose historical memory is longer than that of any other community in the world, to whom He is an anti-nationalist traitor. But there is no reason to suppose that the Christians played any important part in Palestine till some time after the destruction of Jerusalem. The surviving Jews, who were still numerous till thinned by the suppression of the insurrection of Bar-Cochba in the second century of our era, kept aloof from a "heretic" community; the pagan or agnostic Roman long regarded them as a sect of Jews, who were fortunately quietists and might be tolerated as long as they did not too openly indulge in their practice of passive resistance to the worship of the State incarnated in the "Divine Cæsar" and represented by his image.

Meanwhile Palestine came into the Roman synthesis, the Pan-Mediterranean Empire. The country obtained internal peace, was protected against Arab raids by the Transjordanian garrisons and for a while prospered under an administration which, if utterly neglectful of popular education and contemptuous or incurious of applied science, gave its subjects a relatively good legal and judicial system, considerable local self-government and extensive public works.

Under an empire which had become international,

Christianity, the first religion with a universal appeal that the Mediterranean world had known, spread rapidly, more especially among the Asiatic populations and the swarm of slaves who were the shame and the curse of the Græco-Roman civilization.[1] Less than three centuries after the Crucifixion of Christ, Christianity was successfully competing with Mithraism for the spiritual guidance of the increasing numbers of relatively educated men who found no comfort in the formal state worship in which they were ceasing to believe. Like other religions it had been unable to resist the universal human tendency to attach a special sanctity to places associated with the origin and the deeds of its Founder and His first followers, and Palestine had become as Holy a land to the Christian as it long had been to the widely dispersed Jew who had not forgotten the loss of the City around which centred the beliefs and history of his pertinacious race and had not forgiven the Gentile for its loss.

By the close of the fourth century the Roman Empire was Christian and Palestine was one of its most Christian provinces. But the triumph of the new Faith in the Holy Land was short-lived ; the Empire was losing cohesion and vitality under the combined effects of stratocracy, a crude and peculiarly wasteful form of capitalism depending mainly upon slave-labour, excessive monasticism and the pressure of barbarians driven upon the Mediterranean world by the pressure of other barbarians behind them, who in their turn had been driven from the great plains of Asia by climatic changes which had limited their pasture grounds and threatened them with famine unless they migrated. The first impact of barbarian invasion struck the Western provinces of the Empire. Rome fell in A.D. 410. But the eastern

[1] The unlimited supply of slave-labour probably explains why the Roman Empire never took the trouble to turn many of the discoveries of Archimedes and later inventors to practical use.

provinces, more civilized, less warlike and less exposed to the flood of northern fighting men, remained under the sovereignty of that New Rome which Constantine the Great had founded at Constantinople, and for two more centuries Syria and Palestine were protected by the slowly failing but never despicable power of the East Roman Empire. But at length came a long and particularly exhausting war between the Empire and the "Great King" of Persia. The Chosroes raided and sacked Jerusalem,[1] whereat Heraclius Cæsar proclaimed a Holy War and finally carried fire and sword into Iraq and Southern Persia. As it had been after the war between Hattusil the Hittite and Rameses the Pharaoh so it was again. "Victor" and "vanquished" were bled white. And then upon the worn-out combatants burst a furious storm from the southern desert that swept the East Roman Empire back to the Taurus mountains and swept the Magian kingdom of Persia out of existence.

The invasion of the Empire by the Moslem Arabs differed from previous "barbarian invasions" in that while the northerners, with the exception of the possibly Turkish Huns who were apparently mere destroyers, came to conquer but also to learn, the Moslems came from the desert to teach. They believed that they were bearers of a new divine command to mankind and that this command might lawfully be imposed by force as well as by persuasion upon the unbeliever by the servants of Allah. Mindful, perhaps, of his obligations to the Jews and Christians who had influenced his early ideas concerning religious matters, hopeful perhaps of their conversion if they were granted better treatment than other non-Moslems, Mohamed had bidden his followers offer peace to the Jews and the Christians who were "People of a Book"—i.e. had received through Moses

[1] A.D. 614. The Jews of Jerusalem appear to have made common cause with the Persians.

and Christ, their prophets, a divine revelation of the right rules of conduct and belief in this world—on condition that they accepted an inferior position in the Moslem state. Their revelation had been superseded by that vouchsafed to Mohamed, but in that it had been a Divine Command at the time that it was granted, they were allowed so to speak to plead extenuating circumstances for their refusal to accept Islam. But against Christian or Jewish states, which did not accept Islam, the early Moslems declared war, as they declared it against the Magian, the Buddhist and other " heathen," and Christian or Jewish rebels were subjected to pitiless military execution involving the carrying off of their women as slaves and concubines, the seizure of their property and the slaughter or enslavement of males who persisted in their contumacy. In time, of course, practical considerations modified the militant character of Islam ; Moslem rulers, while they long held that war against infidel states was a pious duty, consented to enter into diplomatic relations with neighbouring non-Moslem Powers when no advantage to Islam could accrue from war with them. But the doctrine that the non-Moslem must not enjoy the same privileges, political or social, in peace or in war, as the Moslem, persisted and persists in Moslem practice to this day. It continues to be, and I fear will long remain, one of the causes of the conflict between Europe and Islam. Few Moslem peoples understand the meaning of the word " reciprocity " in their dealings with non-Moslems because the Koran, upon the teachings of which every Moslem polity is based, explicitly refused equality of treatment to the non-Moslem.[1] It may be argued that many

[1] It is forbidden by the " Shari " Law, which has never been abrogated although its operation has been restricted in certain Moslem states, to accept the evidence of a non-Moslem against a Moslem unless corroborated by Moslem evidence. The same law forbids the marriage of a Moslem woman to a non-Moslem, although it permits a Moslem to

Christian states have till recently laid themselves open to the same criticism by refusing social and political equality to non-Christians and even to Christians professing variants of Christianity which differed from the Christianity professed by the majority within such states. But such a refusal is not justified by any passage in the Christian Gospels, while there are abundant justifications for the Moslem refusal in the Koran and in the "traditions" whereupon the "Shari" (Sacred Law) is based.

Another unfortunate feature of Islam considered as a working rule of life is its combination of all-inclusiveness and rigidity. It is too comprehensive. By the confession of its most cultured modern exponents it is a civilization as well as a religion. Its precepts govern not only the ethical and social but the economic and political relations between man and man. It may be argued that this is what any religion which claims the allegiance of mankind ought to do. Unhappily for its devotees Mohamed, in striving to legislate for every contingency that might befall an inhabitant of the deserts and oases of Arabia, produced a vast number of laws which the most ingenious or the most latitudinarian interpretation cannot adapt to modern conditions to the satisfaction of any honest and convinced Moslem, and declared that these laws were the final and immutable decrees of God, Whose apostle he announced himself to be.

In this sense the Moslem Arab invasion was an invasion of the Sown by the Desert. The unchanging monotony of the Desert was matched by the uniformity

marry a non-Moslem woman. In most Moslem countries, including Turkey, an infidel who marries a Moslem woman runs grave risk of murder, as does the woman. The Turk, in spite of his alleged Europeanization, continues officially to describe Turkish soldiers killed in war with non-Moslems as a Shehid, i.e. religious martyr. Many other facts might be adduced in support of the above contention.

[*Photo : American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

BUILT BY THE KAISER IN 1910 UPON THE MOUNT OF OLIVES AS THE GERMAN PROTESTANT HOSPICE. NOW "GOVERNMENT HOUSE"

[*Face page* 26

and the immutability of the religious system which it produced ; even to-day, in spite of many attempts from within to render it more flexible, Islam remains the least changed of the great religious systems and the slowest to accept or admit social evolution ; and it is worth noting that the most active and most militant of its sects are those which go back for their inspiration to the letter of the Koran, such as the Wahabis and to some extent the Senussi.

But the success of the new religion was rapid even in Palestine. Within a few years of the Battle of the Yarmuk and the Caliph Omar's entry into Jerusalem (A.D. 637) the Palestinians were becoming converts to Islam in large numbers, and within two centuries of the conquest the majority of the population was Moslem. This success is easily explained. The rewards promised by Islam in the next world, and the social and political advantages given in this, were most attractive. The new system was democratic in that it offered a career to any Moslem talent irrespective of birth. Its treatment of sexual questions suited a hot-blooded excessively masculine age, which had chafed against monastic repressions. The new dogmas were agreeably easy for simple men to understand. The *Jihad* (Holy War) offered loot and women at the infidel's expense to the Holy Warrior ; it also offered to the young and ardent the inspiring sense of comradeship with their fellow Moslems in a glorious and sanctified adventure. It divided mankind into Moslems, who had every chance of salvation in the next world and must be masters in this, and infidels of various degrees, who might be tolerated here below if they kept their proper stations and did not presume to demand equality, but whom one would not meet in Heaven. Thus, if one side of the Moslem faith emphasized the tie of spiritual brotherhood between those who professed it, the other fostered those emotions of hatred and contempt for

such as followed a different way, emotions which primitive men find highly agreeable and which are so obviously useful to military, religious and revolutionary zealots.

Thus Palestine became an Arabized, Islamized land. Arabic superseded the kindred Syriac speech, the Greek elements left in the country were absorbed by Moslem Arab or Palestinian Christian ; if the Jews enjoyed a somewhat greater tolerance they played no political rôle worth mentioning. For a time Palestine was simply a province of a Moslem World Empire extending from the Oxus to the Pyrénées, aggressive and dreaming of fresh conquests.

The inherent weaknesses of the desert-bred Arab character soon made themselves felt ; some of these are described in a succeeding chapter ; for the present I need only say that the Moslem Synthesis was less complete and more short-lived than the Græco-Roman. The Great Empire of the Caliphs disintegrated as the Roman Empire had broken up, and Palestine became once more the battle-ground of contending Eastern Powers. The agelong struggle between Egypt and Assyria recommenced when Fatimite Caliphs of Cairo warred for the Syro-Palestinian trade route with the later Abbassids of Baghdad, and the Turkish *condottiere* played the same part that the Teuton mercenary had played during the decadence of Rome. Then came the strange interlude of the Crusades. Turkish soldiers of fortune, overbearing bullies with the Prussian sergeant-major's mentality which is still so marked a feature of their race,[1] new and bigoted converts to Islam, rendered life miserable for the West European pilgrims of every class who visited the Holy Places of Palestine. Their cruelties becoming known in the West aroused what writers with such different standpoints as Mr. H. G. Wells and

[1] " Unguentem punxit, pungentem Turcus inunxit." Compare also the Lausanne Conference *passim*.

Mr. G. K. Chesterton have described as the first popular movement in Europe.

They came and they conquered, and for nearly a century Palestine was a Christian land. It did not suffer from Crusading rule. Founded on Justinian's Code and Godfrey de Bouillon's "Letters of the Sepulchre," the laws of the Kingdom of Jerusalem

> "presented features as yet quite unknown in Europe, especially in their careful provision of justice for the bourgeois and the peasant—and for the trading communes whose fleets were so necessary to the King. Not only were free men judged by juries of their equals, but the same applied to those who were technically serfs and actually aborigines" . . . (Colonel Conder).

But the weakness of the central power, the constant difficulty of sea-communication with the West, the divisions of Europe and the malaria and dysentery which prevented the new-comers, unskilled in medicine and blessed with no relative immunity against the diseases of the land such as the natives must have acquired, from multiplying sufficiently in their new home, combined to cause the failure of the Crusaders. Won in A.D. 1099, Jerusalem was lost again in 1187 to the armies of a Moslem leader of genius whom the West knows as Saladin. For a while the Crusaders still clung to castles and ports on the coast, receiving less and less support from the divided West. They had a respite only because Islam was threatened by that terrible heathen power which men call the "Mongol Empire," the pagan tribes[1] of the two Turkestans, with their Mongol conquerors as the spearhead of their hosts, well-organized

[1] The Mongol rulers tolerated anything but political and military opposition. Buddhists and pagans, Moslems and Nestorian Christians, were to be found among their generals and ministers. Hulagu's best general was the Nestorian Kitbugha, and Khubilai's ablest minister was a Chinese mandarin.

mounted archers, who had learnt siegecraft and tactics from the Chinese, who supplied them with staff-officers and engineers, sweeping along with them a motley host of Russian, Persian and Turkish slave-soldiers, the first great "lay" power and the first real army that had appeared for many a century in the West. Great captains led them.[1] Hulagu Khagan, of their royal house, sacked Baghdad and slew the captive Caliph. Before them fled the Kharezmians, Moslem Turks driven south and west by their onrush, devastating Palestine as they fled and routing Saracen and Crusader in their flight.[2] Islam seemed doomed, but again a great leader, Beybars Bundukdar[3] ("The Crossbowman"), appeared, held the Mongol onslaught at 'Ain Jalut in Southern Galilee (A.D. 1260) with his Mamelukes (Turk and Circassian lads sold to the Egyptian Sultan, Islamized and trained as professional soldiers), and disciplined Sudanese, and then turned to undermine the Mongol Empire in the West by diplomacy. He won the game by effecting the conversion to Islam of the Mongol rulers of the Golden Horde who had conquered Russia, and thus at one stroke severing them from their heathen kinsmen the Ilkhans of Persia and the dynasty of Khubilaï (Kubla Khan) in China. The Mameluke Sultans of Egypt were left masters of a devastated land, and in A.D. 1291 fell Acre, the last Crusading stronghold, amid terrible scenes of massacre, before the army of Malik-el-Ashraf Khalil, son and successor of Sultan Kalawun.

At once the old struggle between Egypt and Assyria, suspended as long as the Crusading Kingdom had interposed between the combatants and the Mongol had threatened all alike, revived with undiminished vigour. It ceased for a while when Sultan Selim the Grim, Head

[1] Jebé, Tugachar, and above all Subutaï Bahadur, were far the greatest generals of their day.

[2] They were Saint Louis' fiercest opponents at Mansura and Damietta.

[3] He was a Russian or Tartar slave by origin, who fought his way up.

of the House of Osman, lord of Anatolia and the Balkans, subjugated the Mamelukes and made Syria, Palestine and Egypt provinces of the Turkish Empire (A.D. 1516–1518). Thenceforth an unprogressive military power, now violent, now inert, ruled Palestine. But with the decline that set in after Vienna and Lepanto the provincial satraps began first to indulge in private war and next to rebel against the Sultan. In A.D. 1799 came the descent upon Egypt of Napoleon Bonaparte, followed by his attempt to conquer the Near and Middle East through Palestine and Syria. It failed before Acre, thanks to British sea-power, but it inspired an Albanian of genius, Mahomed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, who, after becoming Pharaoh or Sultan of Egypt in all but name, overran the Syro-Palestinian belt and would have held it had he not grasped at more than European and more especially British sea-power durst permit him to hold. The Turk returned, having learnt as little as usual from adversity, and again came a period of relative peace.

It was during this quiet period that the Suez Canal was constructed. Its construction greatly altered the political and strategical position in the South-eastern Mediterranean.

Since the Napoleonic adventure, Great Britain, mistress of India and of South African and Australasian colonies, which were to become self-governing members of the British Empire, had attached particular importance to the maintenance of a predominant position in Egypt. It was clear to British statesmen and their naval and military advisers that if Egypt fell under the control of any Great Power hostile to Great Britain, that Power might attack India by interior lines, while British reinforcements would have to be sent to India by the long detour round the Cape of Good Hope. But with the coming of steam-propulsion, which greatly increased the mobility of fleets, and the construction of the Suez Canal, the Isthmus of Suez and Egypt in general became

a vital point in the British system, control of which point by an enemy, or even by a potential enemy, would be intolerably dangerous to British Imperial and commercial interests.

For a time British statesmen wavered between a support of the Turk, compromising protégé though he often was, an attempt to maintain a sort of Balance of Power between Turk and Egyptian, and independent action. Within a period of fifteen years our statesmen supported the Turk against the Russian and more discreetly supported Ismail Pasha of Egypt against the Turk; bought Suez Canal shares, thus obtaining financial interest in the completed undertaking; occupied Cyprus, and vainly attempted to buttress up the crazy political and financial edifice of the Egyptian Khedivate. The edifice collapsed ; Ismail Pasha was compelled to abdicate ; a half-nationalist, half-military movement would have overthrown his son had not the British Empire intervened and taken charge of the administration of the country. The French had been invited to co-operate in the occupation ; they declined. The Turks were invited ; they wavered and declined in their turn. Left, somewhat to their anxiety, as sole masters in Egypt, the British set to work to endow the country with a decent financial system, law-courts where some approach to justice was meted out, and public works which rapidly enriched the land-owners great and small. The fame of these reforms soon spread into Syria, Palestine and many other parts of the Arab world, raised British prestige to exalted heights, and, compared with Turkish lack of method, corruption and inertia, contributed to the growth of Arab Nationalism.

From about A.D. 1880 onwards Palestine was subjected to a remarkable penetration by foreign influences. Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Mount Carmel had since the early centuries of the Christian era been visited by Christian pilgrims from west and east. With the

long peace that followed the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1789–1815), with the extinction of Mediterranean piracy and the growth of steam navigation, the number of pilgrims and travellers rapidly increased. Hostels and hotels were built for the reception of pilgrims or tourists of different nationalities with the moral and sometimes the material support of their Governments. Missionary activity, European and American in many forms, evangelistic, educational, medical, increased *pari passu* with the improvement in communications with Europe and the rivalry between nations and Churches ; schools, hospitals and dispensaries were multiplied, and if the missions converted few Jews and fewer Moslems, their presence and activity aroused the Eastern Churches from their secular torpor and compelled their clergy to be better shepherds of their flocks than they had been for many centuries. With this politico-religious Christian activity came an increased interest on the part of the Jews in the land of their fathers. Jewish philanthropists led the way, Jewish pilgrims began to settle down in the country after performing their pilgrimage, and when anti-Jewish riots and repressive legislation aroused the national sentiment which had never died in the Russian Ghettoes, a society known as the Hovevé Zion (lovers of Zion) began to attempt the establishment of colonies of Jewish agriculturists in Palestine. Their efforts would have had scanty results had it not been for the generous aid given by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, yet the movement which they initiated inspired a Jew of the prophetic type, Theodore Herzl, who, if he died with his dream of the purchase of Palestine from the Turk under a Charter guaranteed by the Great Powers of Europe all unfulfilled, had at least aroused among great numbers of Jews a definite and practical interest in " Zionism," as the movement in favour of the establishment of a large Jewish community in Palestine had come to be named. But against Zionism a new movement

fought. Pan-Islamism, having for its object a defensive union of Islam against the encroachments of non-Moslem Powers, was taken up by the astute Abdul Hamid, Sultan of Turkey, who saw in it a means of increasing his prestige among Moslems within his Empire and without, of winning over the Arab world to abandon the mental reservations with which it had accepted the Turkish Caliphate,[1] and of meeting British, French or Russian agitation in favour of the Christian minorities in Turkey with a counter agitation among the Moslem subjects of these Powers. This movement was to some extent opposed to Zionism ; Jewish immigration into Palestine was restricted; and even when Abdul Hamid had fallen (1909) and a more or less revolutionary Government, which owed much to the support of the Jews of Salonika and still more of Central Europe, ruled a " Constitutional " Turkey, Jewish hopes remained unfulfilled. Meanwhile Germany had taken the place once occupied by England at Constantinople, because the Turks knew that she was the greatest military state in the world, because they knew that the British Fleet could not keep the Slav out of Asia Minor and Macedonia, and because Pan-Islamism, which the " Young Turks " converted into an aggressive force, began to aim at the expulsion of the British from Egypt and the Muscovite from Transcaucasia, and to hope for German aid in this audacious attempt. In spite of the setback of the Balkan War, the Turks drew closer to the Teutonic Alliance ; " Chemin de fer est chemin de guerre en Turquie," said a Syrian journalist to the writer in 1905, and the " pilgrim " railway constructed by the Turks, which enabled them to rail troops into Palestine and as far as the Hejaz from the north, improved their military position in Palestine and made the march upon Egypt and the Canal possible.

In 1914 Palestine was, after the Lebanon, the most

[1] I refer, of course, to the Sunni Arabs, not those of the Shiah and kindred sects, who do not recognize the Turkish Caliphate or any other.

advanced Asiatic district of the Turkish Empire. From the Western point of view it was backward and unkempt enough, but it contained islands of progress in the shape of a number of foreign residents in its towns, who were generally a civilizing influence, of Jewish and German agricultural colonies, and a variety of competing educational, charitable and religious institutions. If the Turkish officials slept, some of the Arabs were beginning to awake from their long inertia ; trade was improving and the influx of Christian and Jewish, European and American money, if too largely expended upon somewhat demoralizing charities, yet maintained many people in decent comfort. The pilgrim and tourist seasons had been excellent and, if the Government did nothing for the people, some of the people were beginning to think of doing something for themselves.

But behind this pleasant outward show of Zionists and missionaries, colonization and philanthropy, awakening Arabs and wideawake Jewish colonists, crouched the grim unseen reality of war, like a wild beast awaiting the moment to spring from its lair. The new materialist Germany and Moslem Turkey were secretly discussing the military clauses of an alliance ; German officers were preparing the mobilization scheme at Damascus. Once again " Assyria " was making ready to march south through Palestine against " Egypt," but this time " The Great King, the King of Assyria," was matched against the British Empire which held the land of the Pharaohs, and behind the Turk stood the great military machine of Prussia.

On October 29 Turkish and German warships attacked the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea and Turkish irregulars crossed the Egyptian border.

CHAPTER 2

Zionism and the World War

THE TURKS ATTACK THE SUEZ CANAL. PALESTINE, EGYPT AND THE HEJAZ IN THE WORLD WAR TILL OCTOBER, 1917. THE JEWS AND THE WORLD WAR. THE AGREEMENT WITH THE ZIONISTS. THE BALFOUR DECLARATION. THE AGREEMENT WITH THE GRAND SHERIF OF MECCA. REFUTATION OF THE CONTENTION THAT IT CONFLICTED WITH THE BALFOUR DECLARATION. THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMIES IN PALESTINE, SYRIA AND ARABIA. THE BRITISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE. THE JERUSALEM RIOTS.

IT had been for long an article of faith in British military circles that no serious attack could be delivered against the Suez Canal from Palestine, owing to the lack of railways on the Turkish side and the difficulties of crossing the Sinai wastes by either the Akaba-Suez road or the "coast" road from Gaza to El Kantara on the Suez Canal. To those who objected that the armies of the Pharaohs, the Ptolemies, the Sultans, and all the rest of the conquerors down to Napoleon, had followed the coast road and that a large Egyptian army, encumbered by much transport and many non-combatants, had retreated from Syria to Suez by the other route in the mid-nineteenth century, the pundits replied that these armies lacked the artillery and munitions necessary in modern war and that their achievements consequently proved nothing. But during the years 1912–1914 the British War Office began to take a considerable interest in the problem of the defence of the Canal against attack from the East, and a careful survey of the Sinai between the Turkish border and the Canal to some extent modified the prevailing impression that lack of water and difficulties of transport must prevent any serious attack from Palestine.

In the first days of February, 1915, a Turkish army, totalling perhaps 20,000 combatants, appeared in the Canal region and delivered attacks at several points. These were fairly easily repulsed, but the fact that the

enemy was able to bring a battery of heavy guns across the desert [1] and to withdraw them, after he had shelled vessels in the Canal and the outskirts of Ismailia, was eloquent enough. It became certain that a complete British victory in the World War would be followed by an extension of the Sinai bridgehead of the Canal into Palestine. When in 1916 another Turkish army delivered another unsuccessful attack on the Canal, in which the enemy used 6″ and 8″ howitzers, which he successfully withdrew, and German aircraft raided Port Said and on one occasion Cairo, it became alarmingly clear that the only way to make the Canal reasonably secure against attack was to carry the bridgehead as far as Galilee. This consideration no doubt effected the decision to assume the offensive against the Turkish armies in Palestine which was taken by the British War Cabinet in the late autumn of 1916.

The effects of the war on Egypt, Syria and Palestine and the Hejaz, the three Arab countries of the Near East most involved therein, were very different. Egypt on the whole suffered little from a conflict in which few sacrifices were demanded of the Egyptians. The Moslems, who formed the great majority of the population, were divided in their minds between a vague sympathy for the Turk as the leader of Islam, a desire to keep out of the war, and a still stronger desire to make the utmost commercial profit from the presence of large British forces in the country. They consequently "wished the Turks well from afar," and rendered considerable, if naturally interested, non-military assistance to the British. But mistakes made by the latter, and more particularly by the military authorities, jealousy of the favour shown to the Hejaz Arabs, whom the people of the Pharaohs regarded with contempt as mere barbarians,

[1] At least two and possibly four 12 cm. (4·7″) guns were dragged across the desert by the Turks. The enemy made good his retreat without excessive loss on this occasion.

and subsequently President Wilson's enunciation of the formula of "self-determination" which has had such disastrous consequences in the Old World, kindled a more genuine sentiment of Nationalism among the Egyptians than they had previously felt, with consequences that much surprised our Foreign Office after the conclusion of the Great War.

Syria and Palestine, impoverished countries, forming part of a perpetually needy Empire, suffered cruelly. From the first days of the Turkish entry into the war, they were placed under the virtual dictatorship of Jemal Pasha "the Great,"[1] a capricious tyrant, who combined the functions of Minister of Marine—*in partibus*—with those of Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armies in Syria, Palestine and Arabia. He exercised these functions in the most dictatorial manner during his three years' tenure of command, and displayed such independence of the Turkish central authority and of the German military advisers of the Turkish Army, that a British intelligence officer nicknamed him "the Atabek," after the Turkish regents of the powerless Arab Caliphs in the days of the Crusades. As strong a Turkish Nationalist as his Kemalist successors, he came to the country which he ruled with the intention of Ottomanizing it, although it contained no Turks except soldiers and officials. In Syria, where Arab Nationalism was far stronger than in Palestine, he established a court martial which tried and generally condemned to death a number of Arab leaders, some of whom belonged to the most distinguished families of Damascus. There were not so many executions in Palestine, but there, as in Syria, he ordered the deportation of many Arab families, Moslem and Christian, who suffered great hardships. The Arab troops

[1] He was generally known as "the Great" not in compliment to his abilities but to distinguish him from Jemal Pasha "the Less," who commanded an army corps and afterwards the 8th Turkish Army on the Syro-Palestinian Front.

who were levied in Syria were neglected by comparison with the Turks, and many units were sent to climates that proved fatal to large numbers of the warmth-loving southerners.[1] He was especially hostile to the Zionists. He lost no opportunity of accusing them of revolutionary tendencies and of pursuing aims hostile to the Turkish state. House-to-house searches in Tell Aviv, the Jewish suburb of Jaffa, the closing of Jewish banks, the inhibition of remittances sent to Jewish institutions from Europe and elsewhere through an American channel, constant arrests of prominent Zionists, were among the oppressive measures which he encouraged and sanctioned. On two occasions, December 17, 1914, and March 29, 1917, he effected the expulsion of great numbers of Jews from Jaffa, enabling the Jaffa boatmen on the first occasion to blackmail the Jews to their hearts' content. Jews accused of espionage were treated with terrible severity: witness the suicide after torture of Miss Sara Aaronson, of Zichron Yakub. To the financial and economic hardships caused by the World War and aggravated by the corruption or the caprice of Turkish officials were added the outbreak of serious epidemics among the very helpless and underfed townsfolk and the invasion, in 1917, of swarms of locusts which caused damage estimated at £100,000 in the Jewish agricultural colonies alone.

Before the war the Hejaz was jointly governed by a Turkish Governor-General, who in 1914 was General Ghalib Pasha, who also commanded the Turkish garrison of the province ; and by a mediatized Arab prince, the Grand Sherif Hussein of Mecca, the head of the ancient House of Hashim, authentic descendant of the prophet of Islam through his daughter Fatima, an astute diplomatist and politician, who had acquired much influence among the settled people of his country and still more among the Beduin tribes. These latter could always

[1] The 25th (Damascus) Division was kept through two hard winters on the Lower Danube.

interfere with the pilgrimage if discontented and thus cause much financial loss to the people of the two Moslem Holy Cities of the Hejaz, Mecca "the blessed" and Medina "the resplendent," and to the Grand Sherif's own revenues. When the Great War broke out the Turks of the governing clique were watching Hussein of Mecca with a suspicion which he fully reciprocated. He had already entered into communication with Lord Kitchener. In 1915 he opened negotiations with Sir Henry McMahon, our High Commissioner in Egypt. The Turks increased their forces in the Hejaz ; Hussein quietly made his counter preparations. By May, 1916, the situation was growing dangerous for Hussein. A German mission under Baron von Stotzingen had entered the Hejaz and was on its way to South Arabia ; two new Turkish regiments were coming down to reinforce Ghalib Pasha. At a word from the Grand Sherif, his son Feisal, who was part guest part hostage of Jemal Pasha at Damascus, escaped to the south. He joined his father, and with his brother Emir Abdallah attacked the Turks in June, at Medina, while Hussein with the Mecca population and his own troops, aided by the Beduins, attacked and overwhelmed those at Mecca, though not before they had shelled the sacred Kaaba itself. Ghalib Pasha held out for a while in Taif, but had in the end to surrender ; the Turks were held in Medina, but the Arabs could not permanently cut the Hejaz Railway ; none the less, the Arab revolt spread gradually northwards, and thanks largely to the brilliant exploits of Colonel T. E. Lawrence and his genius for partisan warfare, diverted an increasingly large Turkish force from other fronts. But while the Arabs of Hejaz and their Beduin allies rendered great service to the cause of the Entente, those of Syria and Palestine remained passive or aided the Turks.

The outbreak of the Great War found the dispersed Jews ranged, more or less willingly, under the banners of the nations to which they belonged. The more

liberally they had been treated the more loyally they responded to the call of their political allegiance, and most of all in the British Empire, where the great majority of Jews proved themselves good citizens and patriots. The exceptions were almost always new-comers from the depressed Jewish areas in Eastern Europe, who naturally brought with them no sense of obligation to the State. In Russia, of course, there was far less Jewish response to the appeal for support from a Government which was practically theocratic, still showed a strong anti-Jewish bias and was the champion of Orthodox Christianity, than there was in secular, state-disciplined Germany, where the Jew, if unpopular among the governing military caste, exercised a great influence over the economic and cultural life of the nation.

From the outbreak of war the two great European combinations strained every nerve to obtain at least the moral support of the neutral states of the world, above all of the United States of America. There Jewish influence was considerable. It rivalled that of the American Irish, whose political power had often made itself felt in an anti-British sense. The Jews of America were not naturally anti-British, but they were without exception anti-Russian, and the unhappy lot of the Jews in Russia, still subject to certain disabilities and exposed to attack from extra-legal organizations, which were known to be supported by a powerful element among the Russian governing class,[1] made them unfriendly to Russia's friends. Many Russian measures against Jewish communities in Poland and Galicia, taken under the plea of "military necessity" in 1915, which were kept from the knowledge of the British public by the Censorship, exacerbated Jewish hostility to Russia and secondarily, in many cases, to the Entente.

At the end of 1916 it came to the knowledge of the British Government that Germany contemplated making

[1] *Cf.* The Union of the Russian People.

certain offers to the Zionist Jews in order to win their moral support. It was also alleged that Talaat Pasha, the Grand Vizier of Turkey, had approached prominent German and neutral Zionists—it is said through the notorious communist Parvus Helphand—and had made offers to them with the same object. Learning of this attempt to secure moral support and perhaps financial assistance from neutral Zionists, the British Government began to study the Zionist problem. There had always been considerable sympathy with Zionist aspirations in Bible-reading England, and the problem of the Eastern Jews had been studied from many different angles by British observers. It is to the credit of the Zionists that their most influential leaders had supported the Entente in the Great War in spite of their natural hatred of the Tsarist system. Some had become British subjects ; others had settled in England.

Among these were two very remarkable men, Mr. Nahum Sokoloff and Dr. Haim Weizmann. The former, an historian and student amazingly learned in the history of his people, author of an astonishingly erudite and informative history of Zionism, was the diplomatist and to a great extent the chief intelligence officer of the movement. Dr. Haim Weizmann was of a different stamp. A man of unbounded energy, eloquent, active-minded, he possesses great driving power and the gift of personal magnetism joined to impressive mental ability, which is necessary to any Jew who aspires to leadership among a critical, intellectual people. He has committed numerous indiscretions—as have other and more famous political leaders who are neither Jews nor Zionists—but he has learned from his own mistakes and from adversity ; his optimism has at times appeared excessive, but it has been a necessary antidote to the pessimism which, recurring in sombre waves, has so often threatened to shipwreck the Zionist and other Jewish movements on the reefs of despair.

Zionism and the World War

In October, 1916, the leading Zionists in England made certain proposals to the British Government, which the Government regarded as forming a basis for discussion. In February, 1917, a meeting took place between Sir Mark Sykes—in his private capacity—and several leading Zionists in London. There were further meetings, which were followed by negotiations in which Mr. Sokoloff represented the International Zionist Organization and M. Picot, joint author with Sir Mark Sykes of the " Sykes-Picot agreement," which provided for the settlement of British and French territorial claims in the Near East in the event of Allied victory, represented the French Government.

Meanwhile the Russian Revolution took place and the Foreign Office appears to have laid a memorandum before the War Cabinet in which it pointed out that British support of Zionism might have a good effect in Russia. Jews were playing a prominent part in the Russian Revolution, for reasons set forth in a later chapter, but they were greatly divided. Some were for peace at any price, some for the maintenance of the Alliance with the Western Powers ; many were utterly uninterested in Zionism, and had found a Messiah in Karl Marx and a panacea for the world's disease in Revolutionary Communism. The War Cabinet took no immediate decision, but Zionism became an important political issue.

Zionism and the Russian Revolution together had a disastrous effect on the Sykes-Picot agreement, which had already been extensively modified in deference to the representations of the Russian Tsarist Government in 1915–1916. This agreement, as modified, provided *inter alia* for the setting up of an international state in Palestine with the exception of an area about Haifa, which was to be ceded to Britain. To this internationalization of Palestine the Zionists were strongly opposed. They feared that Russian Orthodox and French and Italian Catholic interests would be strong enough to prevent

any international recognition of the special interest taken by the Jewish community all the world over in Palestine. The First Russian Revolution weakened the power of Russian Orthodoxy, but left the French and Italian Catholic opponents of Zionism in a stronger position than ever.

By now America had entered the war against the Turco-Teutonic Alliance, but it was alleged and believed in many quarters that American Jewry was not yet " pulling its weight " in the struggle. It was becoming painfully obvious that Russia had ceased to count as a military factor in the war, and that, if only for that reason, the Sykes-Picot-Sazonoff agreement, which had succeeded to and might fairly be said to have superseded the original Sykes-Picot agreement, was doomed. The New Russia had lost interest in all but economic and social problems and longed for peace ; something must be done to bring Jewish opinion in Russia to the side of the Allies and to influence American Jewish sentiment. From May, 1917, the negotiations between a Zionist Political Committee, formed in London, and the British Government began to make more rapid progress.

On July 18, 1917, a draft text of what was afterwards known as the Balfour Declaration was submitted by Lord Rothschild to Mr. Balfour. But both the British Government and a number of non-Zionist British Jews raised objections to the wording of the draft. Mr. J. M. Jeffries, in one of a series of anti-Zionist articles recently published in *The Daily Mail* (January 9, 1923), suggests that the word " National " in the " key-phrase," viz. " National Home of the Jewish People," was retained in the Balfour Declaration against the wishes of these non-Zionist Jews and in deference to the insistence of the Zionists. On the other hand, the great Jewish writer and philosopher, Dr. Asher Ginzberg (Achad Ha-Am), who was a member of the Zionist Political Committee, says in an introduction, written in June, 1920, to a new edition of his Hebrew Essays—

"This is not the text suggested to the Government by the Zionist spokesmen. They wished it to read: 'the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish People,' but when the happy day arrived on which the Declaration was signed and sealed by the Government, it was found to contain the first formula and not the second. That is to say, the allusion to the fact that we are about to *re*build our national home was dropped, and at the same time the words 'constitution of Palestine as the National Home' were replaced by 'establishment of a National Home in Palestine' . . .

"There were some who thought that the difference was merely one of form. Hence they sometimes attempted on subsequent occasions, when the negotiations with the Government afforded an opportunity, to formulate the promise in their own wording, as though it had not been changed. But every time they found in the Government's reply a repetition of the actual text of the Declaration, which proves that it is not a case where the same thing may be put equally well in either of two ways, but that the promise is really defined in this particular form of words and goes no further."

Dr. Ginzberg's statement gives no hint that the Government retained the word "National" in the Balfour Declaration out of deference to the Zionists, but rather that it refused to substitute the word "reconstruction" for "establishment" and the phrase "*the* National Home" for "*a* National Home," and that the Zionists attached far more importance to the article preceding the adjective "National" than to the adjective itself.

Finally the negotiations came to a successful issue, owing in part to the intervention of President Wilson, who had been approached by Mr. Justice Brandeis, one

of the best-known American Zionists. His declaration of sympathy with Zionist aims undoubtedly influenced both the French and Italian Governments, which had hitherto shown no particular sympathy with the Zionist movement, and led them to associate themselves with the British in this question.

Yet in the words of the Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization to the XIIth Zionist Congress,[1]

> " The Balfour Declaration is justly so-called not only because it fell to Sir Arthur Balfour as Foreign Secretary to write the historic letter, but also because he, more than any other single stateman, is responsible for the policy embodied in the Declaration."

On November 2, 1917, Mr. Balfour communicated the final text of the Declaration to Lord Rothschild. The following is the text of the Balfour Declaration :—

> " *His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.*"

Vague, perhaps purposely vague, as is the phraseology of the Declaration—*cf.* the reference to the " civil " rights of the non-Jews of Palestine wherein the adjective " civil " has no clear meaning—it aroused the enthusiasm of large numbers of Jews. It was described as a triumph of statesmanship by Maximilian Harden ; it had no effect in Russia, but it encouraged and confirmed the growing pro-Entente sympathies of previously wavering American Jews and it contributed to weaken the " war

[1] Henceforth described as the R.E.Z.O.

[*Photo : American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

DAMIANOS, ORTHODOX PATRIARCH OF JERUSALEM

[*Face page* 46

will " of many of the Zionist Jews of the Central Empires. As to its meaning, may I refer the reader to Appendix I, in which are set forth the views of " Achad Ha-Am," who explains clearly what can and what cannot be read into it, in a manner which may not satisfy extremists on either side, but should satisfy the unprejudiced reader?

In any case it is clear that the Balfour Declaration cannot be represented as the price unreflectingly or unwillingly paid by the British Government in return for Jewish support given for this consideration in a crisis of our national fortunes. To read some of the criticisms which have been passed upon it, one would think that Lord Rothschild and a troop of international capitalists had descended upon the War Cabinet and compelled it, under threat of their extreme financial displeasure, to sign a bond the conditions of which were alike usurious and immoral.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The Declaration was the culmination of long negotiations which had commenced nearly a year previously, and of the steps taken by the British Government during the last eighteen months of the war, few were as deliberately and reflectingly taken.

But it is maintained in anti-Zionist quarters that the Balfour Declaration was concealed from the population of Palestine until 1920, and conflicted with the proclamation issued with the approval of the British and French Governments in Syria and Palestine in November, 1918, and still more with the terms of the undertaking into which we entered with the Grand Sherif of Mecca in 1915. The statement that the Declaration was concealed from the inhabitants of Palestine has been recently published in England.[1] Having served with the British forces in Palestine during 1917 and part of 1918, I can vouch for the fact that it was well known to the inhabitants of Jerusalem and Jaffa very shortly after our

[1] *The Daily Mail*, January 10, 1923.

capture of those towns. The German Wireless had already spread it abroad in the interval between its publication and the capture of Jerusalem on December 8, 1917, and after December 8 British newspapers were available. I remember hearing the Declaration discussed by the Military Governor of Jerusalem with a representative of the Hejaz Government and several prominent citizens of Jerusalem in January, 1918. It was not made public in the form of an official proclamation, since such publication was deemed unnecessary and also somewhat presumptuous. When the result of the war was in grave doubt, it was not a fitting moment to make any official proclamation of our intentions as regards hostile territory. The bear was not dead but very aggressive ; why advertise our designs upon his skin before we had killed him ?

The following is the history of the November Proclamation. The British Government had entered into commitments with both the French—under the Sykes-Picot agreement—and with the Arabs—under the terms of our undertaking made with the Grand Sherif of Mecca—and wished to issue a face-saving proclamation, in which the French were to join, to the inhabitants of Iraq and Syria. We had safeguarded our rights in Iraq by our arrangement with Mecca ; we wished the French to safeguard their rights in Syria by associating themselves with us in the proclamation. The French agreed, and a proclamation was issued which contained the passage—

> " The end that France and Great Britain have in pursuing in the East the war unloosed by German ambition is the complete and definite freeing of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

> In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now freed by the Allies, and in the territories whose liberation they seek, and to recognize them as soon as they are effectively established."

The proclamation was not addressed to the Palestinians but to the peoples of Syria and Iraq (Mesopotamia) and other peoples whom the Allies hoped to free from the Turks. It seems to have been published in Palestine as a matter of routine by the Military Authorities who were responsible for the whole huge area of General Sir E. H. Allenby's command, which extended from Assuan to the Amanus. It is sorry reading now that the Armenians have been forced to choose between leaving their homes in the North Syrian marches and being abandoned to Kemalist vengeance, and since our failure promptly to fulfil our pledges in Iraq led to an outbreak which cost many valuable lives. But it cannot override the Balfour Declaration, which was published a year earlier. The Palestinian Arabs, who assert that our "agreement" with the Grand Sherif in 1915 cancels the later Balfour Declaration, cannot argue that the Proclamation of November, 1918, cancels the Balfour Declaration *because* it is later than it !

But far more serious is the charge made by the Palestinian Arab Delegation and other opponents of Zionism and subsequently taken up by the sensational Press of this country, that the Balfour Declaration conflicts with the terms of our "agreement" with the Grand Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Hejaz, concluded in 1915 by Sir Henry McMahon, then our High Commissioner in Egypt. On the strength of this charge the Balfour Declaration has even been described as "illicit."[1]

[1] By Mr. J. M. Jeffries, *Daily Mail*, January 11, 1923.

What are the facts? In the first place there was no "agreement" with Hussein of Mecca in the sense of a Treaty, and there were no negotiations then or subsequently on the basis of any draft instrument. Sir Henry McMahon gave certain undertakings to the Grand Sherif in return for assurances of eventual military support on the Sherif's part. In the correspondence which led up to this result King Hussein, as he now is, professed to be acting on behalf of that very nebulous political entity "the Arab People," although he had not been empowered to do so by any *general* Arab Assembly, Government or Revolutionary Organization whatever and simply represented the Arabs of the Hejaz and the neighbouring Beduins and the surviving members of a mainly Syrian revolutionary Committee which did little or nothing during the war. In a letter dated July 14, 1915, addressed to Sir Henry McMahon, he urged that the region within which the Arabs were to be independent should be bounded—

> "On the north by Mersina-Adana up to the 37th degree of latitude, on which degree fall Birejik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia, Jezira, as far as the borders of Persia. On the east by the frontiers of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra. On the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the colony of Aden, which is excepted from these boundaries. On the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina."

This was a decidedly comprehensive demand at a moment when the Hejaz Arabs had not fired a shot against the Turks, and when a large majority of the Arabs within the projected boundaries were either siding with the Turks or were ruled by chiefs who would not for one instant accept the Grand Sherif as the representative of the Arab people. On October 24, 1915, Sir Henry sent a reply to the Sherif which contains the following passage on which is based the allegation of

the Palestinian Arab Delegation and its supporters that the Balfour Declaration gave the Zionists what had already been promised to the Arabs :—

> " The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.
>
> " With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries and, in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances,[1] and make the following reply to your letter :
>
> " Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca."

The former Colonial Secretary has on several occasions denied that Palestine was included in the Arab " independent " area. He has denied it particularly explicitly on two occasions, first in his enclosure of June 3, 1922, concerning British policy in Palestine which was communicated to both the Zionist Organization and the Arab Delegation (*see* Appendix IV), and secondly in the House of Commons on July 11, 1922, when, in answer to a question on the part of the present Under Secretary of State for the Colonies,[2] Mr. Winston Churchill said :—

[1] *The Daily Mail's* correspondent translates the Arab word *mawathik* as " Covenant." This goes beyond the ordinary meaning (*cf. The Daily Mail*, January 12, 1923).

[2] Capt. the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P.

"No pledges were made to the Palestine Arabs in 1915. An undertaking was given to the Sherif of Mecca that His Majesty's Government would acknowledge and support the independence of the Arabs within certain territorial limits, which specifically exclude Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. It was also stipulated that the undertaking applied only to those portions of the territory concerned in which Great Britain was free to act without detriment to the interests of her allies. His Majesty's Government have always regarded and continue to regard Palestine as excluded by these provisos from the scope of their undertaking. This is clear from the fact that in the following year they concluded an agreement with the French and Russian Governments under which Palestine was to receive special treatment."

Mr. Churchill added, in reply to another question, that the first suggestion that Palestine was included in the area within which Great Britain had promised to support and recognize the independence of the Arabs had been made by King Feisal, when he was still Emir, in the course of a conversation at the Foreign Office on January 20, 1921, more than five years after the conclusion of the correspondence whereon the claim was based. The British Government's point of view was expressed to the Emir, who said that he was prepared to accept the statement that it had been the British Government's intention to exclude Palestine.

The Secretary of State added that he was ready to bring evidence to show that Sir Henry McMahon was convinced that the Grand Sherif of Mecca was not under the impression that Palestine was included in the "independent" Arab area. But all his denials have not prevented the Arab Delegation from inditing a long reply

full of verbal and geographical quibbles to his enclosure, in which its members refuse to accept his interpretation. Nor have they prevented the industrious Mr. Jeffries from writing nearly two columns in *The Daily Mail*, based on the rather singular premise, Syria=Palestine, to prove that Mr. Churchill threw his pledge and "the word and honour of England" into "the waste-paper basket."

It is true that at first sight the above extract from Sir H. McMahon's letter of October 24, 1915, when read in conjunction with the Grand Sherif's letter to which it was a reply, suggests that we undertook to make the Mediterranean coast of Palestine the western frontier of the Independent Arab area south of the excluded portions of Syria. I may plead guilty of having been under this impression myself less than a year ago (*The Times*, April 3, 1922). But if so, why did the persons most qualified to speak, e.g. the King of the Hejaz and his sons Feisal and Abdallah, make no protest against the Balfour Declaration on this ground either when it was first published or at San Remo?

Perhaps the above evidence is insufficient. But even the Arab Delegation will find it hard to resist the following confirmation of Mr. Churchill's statement, which is contained in a letter written on March 12, 1922, by Sir Henry McMahon himself to the Department most interested in Palestine. In this letter Sir Henry places on record the fact that in his letter of October 24, 1915, it was his intention to exclude Palestine from an independent Arabia. His reasons for restricting himself to specific mention of the towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo in that connection in his letter were that these were places to which the Arabs attached vital importance and that there was no place he could think of at the time of sufficient importance for purposes of definition farther south of the above. It was as fully his intention to exclude Palestine as it was to exclude the more northern

coastal areas of Syria. He did not make use of the Jordan to define the limits of the southern area, because he did not know whether at some later stage of the negotiations with the Grand Sherif a more suitable frontier might be found east of that river. He concludes by stating that he does not remember having ever heard anything from King Hussein that gave the impression that the latter did not understand Palestine to be excluded from an independent Arabia. This is surely conclusive. It cannot be denied that the provisions of the McMahon undertaking conflicted with those of the Sykes-Picot agreement which was being framed at the same time without Sir H. McMahon's knowledge. By the Sykes-Picot agreement the French were granted powers over the inland zone, including and east of the four towns mentioned in the McMahon letter of October 24, 1915, which could scarcely be reconciled with Arab independence. French claims to exercise these powers contributed to the eventual outbreak of war between France and the Syrian Emirate, and the overthrow of the latter. But as far as Palestine is concerned, there can be no question that the country was excluded from the McMahon undertaking, and that, whatever criticisms may be levelled against the Balfour Declaration, it does not conflict with that undertaking in any respect because Palestine does not come within that undertaking's scope.

Zionism had won its first diplomatic success ; within less than six weeks of the publication of the Declaration the British forces in Palestine had fought and won a great battle and captured Jerusalem (December 8, 1917) on the Jewish feast of the Hanukah, which commemorated the delivery of the city by the Maccabees. The battle of Gaza-Beersheba (Bir Saba) was in some respects the most brilliant, if not the most complete, of Lord Allenby's successes. The disparity of numbers between the armies was much less than in 1918 ; the British forces were more handicapped by heat and by the water

problem than on any subsequent occasion. These difficulties and the nature of the ground prevented the outflanking of the Turkish left, but the British Commander, after keeping the enemy in doubt as to which of his flanks was most threatened until an advanced stage in the great battle, forced him to concentrate on his left by a determined holding attack and then, throwing his own "mass of manœuvre" into the scales of battle, pierced his left centre. In spite of difficulties of supply, of bad weather and of ground, and in spite of the obstinate resistance of Turkish rearguards, the British overran Judæa in six weeks and, during a dark period of the war, secured a great moral success by the capture of the Holy City from the Turks, who had held it either politically or militarily since the days of Saladin.[1]

The victory of the Germans over Russia and their subsequent and nearly successful offensive in the West delayed any general British advance in Palestine for nine months. Many British troops left the country for the Western Theatre of War; Indian troops took their place, and a small French contingent, composed mainly of Armenian infantry, entered the line. On September 21, 1918, began the great fight, best described as the battle of Sharon-Esdraelon, in which cavalry won what will probably prove its last great success in modern war, thanks to the victory of the British over the German aircraft. The Turkish forces, though stiffened by a German contingent and commanded by Marshal Liman von Sandars of Gallipoli fame, were overthrown and destroyed in the "battle of a dream." All three armies—those of Fevzi and Mustafa Kemal in Palestine, and that of Jemal the Less in Transjordania—were captured or

[1] The Ottoman Turks had dominated Palestine politically since Sultan Selim's conquest of the Mamelukes, A.D. 1517. But the flower of the Saracens who fought the Crusaders were Turks, *cf.* the "*Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*" *passim*. The Mamelukes were mostly "Turki" by origin.

driven north in hopeless rout, the former by the British, the Transjordanian Army by the combined attacks of British and Sherifian forces, and by a general rising of Beduins and settled Arabs of Transjordania and the Hauran. A flood of cavalry, Australians, New Zealanders, British Yeomen and Indians, raced the Arab Army for Damascus and hunted the remnants of the Turkish host out of Syria from Damascus to the Cilician marches. On October 31 the Turkish Government signed the Armistice of Mudros. The remaining Turkish garrisons in Arabia surrendered.

At the conclusion of the campaign the conquered country from the Egyptian border to the Taurus was divided into three military administrations—a French sphere known as O.E.T.A. (an abbreviation of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration) North ; a Sherifian Arab sphere known as O.E.T.A. East ; and the British sphere in Palestine officially described as O.E.T.A. South, of which Major-General Sir Arthur Money, K.C.B., was appointed " Chief Administrator." Meanwhile, as a logical consequence of the Balfour Declaration, a Zionist Commission had been for some time established in Palestine. It had been installed there with the approval of the British Government to represent the Jewish element in Palestine, between whom and the British authorities it acted as a link, and to act as an advisory body in all matters affecting the National Home for the Jewish people. At first its relations with the military were good. Dr. Weizmann, on leaving Palestine in September, 1918, received an acknowledgment of the wisdom and tact which he had displayed in the direction of the multifarious activities of the Commission from Lord Allenby himself. But too many of the constantly changing members of the Commission, who came to Palestine after his departure, stayed for a while and were suddenly replaced by others, made no sort of attempt to maintain the friendly relations with the

Administration which Dr. Weizmann had successfully established. Some friction was inevitable ; the behaviour of many Zionists increased it to a dangerous extent. On the other hand, the military, having completed the conquest of Palestine, naturally desired a rest after a long and trying campaign, and therefore took the line of least resistance in dealing with the local situation. They were, moreover, jealous of their own official prerogatives and strongly objected to the manner in which members and employees of the Zionist Commission too often overstepped their functions and attempted, as the soldiers thought, to dictate to them. They have been severely criticized, notably in the often-to-be-quoted R.E.Z.O., which has been tactlessly published by the Zionist Organization instead of being allowed to remain a confidential document, and has done no service to the Zionist cause. But the highly disturbed state of the chief Arab countries outside Arabia—Egypt, which saw an attempt at revolution early in 1919 and has been more or less troublesome ever since ; Syria, where the French went to war with the Angora Turks on their border and with the Emirate of Damascus ; and Iraq (Mesopotamia), which rose against the British in 1920—the war-weariness of the British public and the economy campaign at home, and, above all, the failure of the British Government to furnish the Chiefs of the Administration in Palestine with any detailed instructions, explain the unwillingness of the soldiers to adopt "an unmistakable and active pro-Zionist attitude." Throughout 1919 and part of 1920 the Military Administration, first under Sir Arthur Money and after his retirement in July, 1919, under Sir Louis Bols, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., received extraordinarily little assistance from Whitehall. The chiefs of the British Government were otherwise occupied. The energies of the most responsible leaders of the Zionist Organization were absorbed by their preparations for San Remo.

At the same time, it must be admitted that, if most of the accusations brought by the Zionists in the R.E.Z.O. against the Military Administration as a whole were unfounded, there were cases in which individual officers showed excessively pro-Arab or pan-Arab sympathies. The Arabs, sometimes encouraged, perhaps unwittingly, by such officers, grew more and more petulant ; some of them intrigued with the extremist element at Damascus in favour of the union of Palestine with the then existing Arab Emirate of Syria ; their leaders, hoping to play off the Military Administration against the Zionist Commission, refused to come to any understanding with that body. The Zionist Commission, as the R.E.Z.O. shows, grew excessively nervous and touchy, and finally gave the Military Administration every credit for bad intentions. Thus the natural, if perhaps unwise, reluctance[1] of the Administration, when faced as a result of the "National Home" policy with a difficult and, as they wrongly believed, an artificial language problem, to increase its already large staff, and to burden itself with more Hebrew translators and interpreters, was ascribed to anti-Jewish sentiment in some cases, to a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the Balfour Declaration in others. Again, the Zionist Commission held that the policy of permitting the "Islamo-Christian Association" of Arab anti-Zionists, which had by now been formed, to hold public meetings and demonstrations, was bound to be misinterpreted by a people who had long been wont only to demonstrate when the Turkish Government desired them to do so for reasons of its own and knew that such demonstrations often resulted, and were intended by Turkish officialdom to result, in "events"—i.e. breaches of the peace

[1] I do not think that the Military Administration realized the attachment of the Jews to Hebrew, the extent to which the language was spoken among the younger generation or the fact that the alternative to Hebrew was not Arabic but a German dialect—"Yiddish."

progressing or degenerating, according to the point of view, to riots and even massacres of unpopular minorities. The military argued that if the Arabs were not allowed to " let off steam " the suppression of free speech would in itself produce " events." It is impossible to say which was in the right. Tension between Arabs and Jews increased. Dr. Weizmann had established friendly relations with Feisal and had endeavoured to calm the apprehensions of the Palestinian Arabs, but some of his successors in the Zionist Commission did not follow his example and some of the Damascus politicians, in pursuance of their pan-Arab policy, sent agents to provoke trouble in Palestine. As early as August, 1919, there had been a raid of Ghazzale Beduin from Feisal's territory into Galilee. The raiders were caught and badly mauled by an Indian cavalry regiment, but thefts of live-stock and small affrays continued on the border. At the end of February, 1920, the Jewish colony of Metullah in the extreme north of Palestine, beyond the " Waters of Merom," was attacked by a strong party of Arab raiders, who had been indulging in descents on Christian villages in the French sphere. The Jews had done nothing to provoke the attack. They had no military protection since the boundary between French Syria and Palestine had not been defined. They mostly escaped, their retreat being covered by a rearguard of men and women under Captain Joseph Trumpeldor, who had served in the Russian Army and was killed, after a valorous defence, by the Arabs, who appear to have been operating, nominally against the French, but in reality against any villages where there was plunder, with the knowledge of members of the Damascus Government. This incident increased the alarm of the Jews in Palestine ; the Zionist Commission is said to have at one time contemplated bringing pressure to bear on the military for the retention under arms of a large number of the Jewish soldiers of the " Judæan "

battalions, but realized, after playing with the idea, that financial reasons alone made this impossible. They then encouraged the formation of a force described as the Jewish Self-Defence Corps, but generally known as the Hagana, which was organized by Lieut. Jabotinsky, a fiery and, in the opinion of moderate Zionists, dangerous extremist, who was closely connected with the Commission.

On April 4, 1920, a riot broke out between Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem. Its immediate cause is not known. The Arabs allege that a Jew spat at a Holy Banner carried by a Moslem religious procession in mid-street—a proceeding which argues astonishing faith in his expectorative powers; the Jews that an Arab hustled a Jew off the pavement. The Public Works Department having taken up several streets, both parties were well provided with ammunition. The Jewish Self-Defence Corps, provided with a fair supply of firearms, emerged from the confusion and increased it. Six Jews and as many Arabs lost their lives in the rioting. The Zionists have made too much of this "pogrom" and too little of the difficulties of the military. At the same time mistakes were made by some members of the Military Administration. The Chief of Staff to the Chief Military Administrator appears to have left Jerusalem for a trip to Jericho by motor-car at a moment when crowds were already gathering in ominous fashion near the Jaffa Gate.

Martial law having been declared, several perfectly harmless persons were arrested, as well as several Arabs accused of rape and other crimes, and the organizers of the Hagana with their chief. A military court was convened to try these persons. It cannot be said that well-informed neutrals were much impressed by its proceedings or by its findings. Some indeed averred that one of its members fought off slumber during the examination of witnesses by playing "naughts and

crosses" against himself. The extremely severe sentences passed on Lieut. Jabotinsky and others were quashed by the Army Council. Meanwhile a Commission of Inquiry investigated the causes of the outbreak. Its findings were not published, since in the opinion of the advisers to His Majesty's Government "their publication would serve no useful purpose." It is said to have criticized the Zionist Commission very severely.[1] That body was certainly guilty of errors which contributed to the rioting. The Arabs, for their part, made their attacks almost exclusively on the non-Zionist unarmed Jews of the Old City, who had done them no harm and had been guilty of no provocation.

Then came the San Remo Conference, where the Balfour Declaration was reaffirmed. Great Britain obtained the adhesion of her Allies to her mandate over Palestine, and Mr. Lloyd George, according to the R.E.Z.O., said to Dr. Weizmann, "What you want in Palestine is men who really care for the National Home Policy." Nothing was done to correct the dangerous errors of the Zionist Commission in Palestine; Sir Louis Bols protested in vain against the Commission's attempts to create a new political *fait accompli* in the country before the mandate had regularized its situation, and demanded its abolition. His protests were justified—he was there to preserve the *status quo* in "Occupied Enemy Territory" according to International Law; nevertheless, they remained unheeded. More innocent victims of racial riots had to shed their blood before the British Government paid serious attention to the problem of Palestine.

[1] It is alleged to have also commented severely on the conduct of certain British officers; this may be the case. There have been far too many examples of politicians playing at strategy and soldiers playing at politics in the Near East since the Mudros Armistice.

CHAPTER 3

The Granting of the Mandate

A CIVIL ADMINISTRATION ESTABLISHED. COMMUNIST AGITATION BEGINS. MR. CHURCHILL VISITS PALESTINE. THE JAFFA RIOTS. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. THE ARAB DELEGATION IN LONDON. THE MANDATE IN PARLIAMENT. THE PAPACY AND THE MANDATE. THE MANDATE GRANTED. THE PALESTINE CONSTITUTION. ARAB AGITATION. EFFECT OF KEMAL PASHA'S SUCCESSES. THE ARAB DELEGATION REAPPEARS.

REALIZING that the situation in Palestine was not satisfactory, the British Government decided to establish a Civil Administration in Palestine. Sir Herbert Samuel, who sympathized with moderate Zionist aspirations, was appointed High Commissioner. The new regime was installed on July 1, 1920. Jewish immigration was forthwith permitted. In October, 1920, an Advisory Council, composed of ten unofficial members nominated by the High Commissioner and ten official members, was constituted.

The new Administration set to work with great energy to improve the condition of the country, and its efforts were in many cases highly successful, but it was less successful in improving the relations between Arabs and Zionists.

Owing to the fact that the Treaty of Sèvres had not yet been signed and the mandate for Palestine not yet approved by the Council of the League of Nations, the Arab opposition was encouraged to continue its agitation, in the hope not only of influencing British opinion against the pro-Zionist policy of the British Government, but also of obtaining some modification of the terms of the mandate from the League.

Moreover, Jewish immigration furnished the Arabs with economic and political arguments in support of their anti-Zionist case. In his interim report concerning the administration of Palestine during the period July 1, 1920–June 30, 1921, the High Commissioner ad-

mitted that, in consequence of the inability of the Palestine Government to raise a loan, and the financial difficulties of the Zionist Organization, "while there has been much pressure to admit Jewish immigrants, there has been comparatively little expansion in the opportunities for employment."

In 1920 a small group of Communists was formed. It was called the "Mafligat Poelim Sozialistim Ivrit" (Association of Jewish Socialist Workers). From the initials of these words came the nickname "Mopsi," which was applied to the Communists by their opponents—"Mops" in German meaning a pug-dog. In the winter of that year there was discontent arising out of unemployment among many of the newly arrived immigrants. The Communists profited by this to obtain recruits. They then proceeded to indulge in pro-Bolshevist propaganda, in brawls with the other Jews, and in attempts to convert Arab labour to Communism. Their propaganda caused far more alarm among the Arabs than their numbers warranted: it is doubtful whether these ever exceeded 300. In spite of the recommendations of the Governor of Jaffa and of the Moslem-Christian Society, the Government decided to take no exceptional action against them, on the ground that their propaganda had had little or no effect, and that their movement was moribund.

Meanwhile the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Churchill) paid a brief visit to Palestine. His arrival was celebrated by a small anti-Jewish riot at Haifa, which was promptly suppressed with the loss of two killed to the rioters. At Jerusalem the Colonial Secretary not only reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration, but energetically reproved an Arab Delegation which demanded its repudiation.

On May 1 (Labour Day) the Bolshevist Jews held an unauthorized demonstration, which collided with an authorized Jewish Labour procession. The Arabs,

irritated with the Zionists in general and the non-Zionist Bolshevists in particular, suddenly, so to speak, exploded and attacked both. A sanguinary riot ensued, and though martial law was declared, disturbances continued for several days. A massacre on a small scale, but horrible enough, took place in the Immigration House, where Jewish immigrants were lodged till they found work. An Arab police officer's flagrant disregard of his duty let the mob into the ground floor of the building, where thirteen Jews were killed and many more wounded. Mr. Brenner, a Jewish author of repute, with five other Jews, were dragged out of another house and murdered by persons unknown. The Jews on occasion indulged in savage reprisals, but they had had great provocation. The half-trained local police behaved generally badly ; the military extremely well.

General excitement was aroused in the country districts by these events. Large mobs, partially armed, attacked unoffending Jewish colonies in the Plain of Sharon on May 5 and 6. The hamlets of Kafr Saba and Ain Hai were looted, the inhabitants having prudently fled. At Khedera, between Jaffa and Cæsarea, the rioters, excited by lying tales that Arab workmen were imprisoned, broke into part of the Jewish village, looted that part, and would probably have massacred the Jews who were barricaded in the other part had it not been for the timely interposition of a British aeroplane, which dispersed them, killing and wounding several.

On May 5 the large colony of Petach-Tikveh was attacked by rioters, some of whom had rifles. They were about 2,000 strong. Some were villagers, some Beduin of the Abu Kishk tribe. One body was attacked by a squadron of the 8th (Indian) Cavalry which fortunately happened to be on the march from Jenin to Jaffa via Petach-Tikveh, and dispersed by rifle and machine-gun fire. Another was first held up by an

[*Photo : American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

IBRAHIM SHAMMAS EFFENDI, ONE OF THE CHRISTIAN MEMBERS OF THE ARAB DELEGATION IN 1922

[*Face page* 64

aeroplane attack and then charged by another squadron of the same Indian regiment and driven off, with some loss. Altogether about fifty villagers and Beduin were slain in this fight; only four of the Jewish colonists were killed. An attack on Rehoboth on May 6 was easily repelled. In all these disturbances eighty-eight persons were officially reported killed and 238 wounded.

Special courts, civil and military, tried a number of persons for offences committed. The sentences did not err on the side of severity. A Commission of Inquiry, under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice of Palestine, Sir Thomas Haycroft, was formed to investigate, *inter alia*, the causes of the riots.

In its report the Commission of Inquiry made it clear that, in its opinion, the Zionist Commission's conception of its duties and functions

> "has exercised an exacerbating rather than a conciliatory influence on the Arab population of Palestine, and has thus been a contributory cause of the disturbances. The Commission found that the racial strife was begun by Arabs who were generally the aggressors: that the outbreak was unpremeditated and unexpected: that the general body of Jews was anti-Bolshevist: that the fundamental cause of the riots was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents."

In spite of this finding the Zionist Commission continued to function; Jewish immigration, however, was suspended for several months, and when again permitted was subjected to certain restrictions.

In a speech at Jerusalem on the King's Birthday, the High Commissioner made a statement of the policy of

the British Government with regard to the Jewish National Home. He explained to the Arab notables that Great Britain, the Mandatory Power, would never consent to the setting up of a Jewish Government to rule a non-Jewish majority in Palestine, and that the Balfour Declaration meant that

> "Jews, a people who were scattered throughout the world, but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, should be enabled to found here their home, and that some among them, within the limits that are fixed by the numbers and interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all the inhabitants."

But these explanations, though they had some temporary effect, did not eventually calm the Arab agitation. A delegation of Arab Nationalists, representing a strong body of Moslem and Christian opinion, left for England in July. At the Zionist Congress held at Carlsbad and elsewhere prominent Zionists made statements which added to the difficulties of the High Commissioner.

There was a small riot, accompanied by loss of life, at Jerusalem in November, 1921 ; in the winter much excitement was caused among the Arabs by the official discovery that certain Jewish residents had been importing relatively considerable quantities of firearms, both illegally and clandestinely, and that a sort of armed force had again been formed by some Jews.

At the end of January, 1922, Lord Northcliffe visited Palestine for a few days. His stay was hardly long enough to enable him, suffering as he already was from the malady which ultimately killed him, to study the local situation more than superficially, and certain incidents which attended his arrival in Palestine gave him a somewhat erroneous idea of the methods by which Palestine was governed. One of these was the

" armoured car affair." The authorities at Jerusalem had been informed that a large number of Arabs of the Islamo-Christian Society proposed to hold a meeting at Kolonia (Kuloniya), a village on the Jaffa–Jerusalem high road some three miles west of Jerusalem, and greet Lord Northcliffe as he came up in a car supplied by the Palestine Government from Ramleh to the capital. But there is a small Jewish colony at Kolonia, and in the prevailing temper of the Jerusalem Arabs, there was risk of a collision between these Jews and the demonstrators, some of whom would have been delighted to produce an " incident " for their visitor's benefit in the hope that it might favour their propaganda. Consequently an armoured car was ordered up from Ludd to Kolonia to support the authorities, should a demonstration of Arab welcome to Lord Northcliffe degenerate into an anti-Jewish riot. But by some mishap the car started only a minute or so before Lord Northcliffe, who saw in it proof of the Arab contention that the country was ruled with an iron hand, and could not be persuaded that Palestine was not becoming " a second Ireland," terrorized by aeroplanes and armoured cars, where visitors of note required special protection.

But the Easter of 1922, when Orthodox Christian, Moslem and Hebrew feasts—Holy Week, the festival of the Prophet Musa (Moses) and the Passover—coincided, as if to show how cruel religious calendars can be to anxious administrators, passed quietly, thanks to the precautions taken by the Government and the commendable restraint shown by the leaders of the different religious communities. After its passing, Palestine settled down to æstivate, and London, where the Arab Delegation was at work, and Geneva, where the League of Nations after long delays was preparing to grant the Mandate, became the centre of activities connected with the Holy Land.

The Arab Delegation, representing the " Palestine

Arab Congress," arrived in London in August, 1921. Its President was and still is Musa Kazim Pasha el Husseini, the Head of the ancient Husseini family of Jerusalem, an influential Arab House. Three of its five members were Moslems, two Christians, including the Secretary, Shibly Jamal Effendi. Finding London empty on their arrival, the delegates soon repaired to Geneva, where they submitted their objections to the "Zionist clauses" in the Draft Mandate—to the clauses, that is to say, wherein the Mandatory Power was made responsible for putting into effect the Balfour Declaration and whereby "an appropriate Jewish Agency" was recognized as a public body "advising and co-operating with" the Administration of Palestine in matters affecting the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

On their return from Geneva to London, the members of the Delegation settled down at the Hotel Cecil, and conducted or inspired an active Press campaign, on lines that are probably familiar to the reader. Mr. Winston Churchill and the Colonial Office officials, whom they visited on many occasions, urged them to attempt to arrive at a direct understanding with the Zionist leaders. At first they absolutely refused. Finally, in the course of a New Year visit to the Secretary of State with whom their personal relations were excellent, they were persuaded to meet Dr. Weizmann on "neutral ground." The meeting took place in the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office, but in spite of the efforts made by the Head of that Department to further an understanding, and the distinctly conciliatory attitude of Dr. Weizmann, no agreement was reached.

The fundamental incompatibility between the attitude of the Arab Delegation on the one hand and that of the British authorities on the other arose out of the Arab claim that the Constitution of Palestine should be so modified, both in the Draft Mandate which lay before

the Council of the League of Nations and in the draft Order in Council, as to give the proposed Legislative Council of Palestine powers enabling it, if its members wished, to take action which would prevent the Mandatory Power from "carrying into effect" the solemn undertaking given by themselves and their Allies. It was one thing to cry "halt" when the Zionist Executive in Palestine threatened to overstep the limits of their functions. It was quite another to give the proposed Legislative Council powers that would enable it to pass any anti-Jewish measure that commended itself to the majority of its members, without incurring the veto of the High Commissioner.[1] The certainty that the first elected Arab members of any such Legislative Council as the Arab Delegation was prepared to accept, would represent the class of large land-owners and no other, a class which is most threatened by the new regime,[2] naturally made the Colonial Secretary and his Advisers apprehensive that any such body would adopt a thoroughly uncompromising attitude towards the Zionists. They consequently refused, and rightly, to give way on the question of principle and surrender the High Commissioner's right of vetoing legislation which proved to be contrary to the terms of the Mandate and to the pledges given to the Jews by the British Government and its Allies; they also refused to surrender his right at any time to prorogue or dissolve the Council by proclamation. They made certain concessions to the Arabs. Thus, the draft Order in Council (Articles 17–28) provided for a Legislative Council of twenty-five members in addition

[1] *Cf.* The observations of the Arab Delegation in their letter of February 21, 1922. The Delegation, it is true, demands that the Constitution for Palestine should guarantee *inter alia* the rights of minorities and of "the Assisting Power," but in the same breath objects to the recognition of Hebrew as an official language. (Cmd. 1700.)

[2] And would be, even if the Zionist question had not arisen, though perhaps not to the same extent.

to the High Commissioner, of whom ten should be official members holding office under the High Commissioner and three should be nominated by him. Under Article 20 of the Order in Council as promulgated on August 10, 1922, the Legislative Council will consist of twelve elected and ten official members, and will contain no nominated members.

The negotiations dragged on, and by April it was plain that there was no prospect of an agreement being reached. In the meantime it had been realized in London that the conduct of the Zionist Executive in Palestine had been, to say the least, imprudent and had not only aroused the alarm of the Arabs but had given considerable offence to the Vatican. The chiefs of the Zionist Organization in Europe, who, in the writer's opinion, had too long been more than "a little blind" to the mistakes of their representatives in the Holy Land, began to grow anxious and to realize that mistakes had really been committed. Finally, on June 3, 1922, the Colonial Office communicated to the Zionist Organization a copy of a statement of the policy of the British Government as regards Palestine and calling upon the Zionist Organization to give a formal and public assurance that its aims and intentions were consistent with that policy. (See Appendix IV, under the heading of "Enclosure No. 5.") In the statement the Colonial Office made it clear that, while the British Government reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration, it had no intention that Palestine "should become as Jewish as England is English," that the Arab population, language or culture should disappear or be subordinated, and that any section of the population should have any other status than that of the rest of the citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law. It was also formally laid down that the special position of the Zionist Executive in Palestine did not "entitle it to share in any degree" in the government of the country. A copy of the

statement was transmitted to the Arab Delegation through Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir John Shuckburgh, Head of the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office.

On June 17 the Arab Delegation replied, objecting to the " gradual education in self-government " which the Secretary of State had proposed, demanding the immediate creation of a " national Government " responsible to a Parliament entirely elected by the people of the country, objecting to the provisions of the Draft Mandate and contending that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate were contrary to the " pledges given to the King of the Hejaz." Obviously there was nothing to be done with the Arab Delegation. On the following day Dr. Weizmann—did he know in advance what the Arab reply would be and when it would be communicated to the Colonial Office?—penned his reply to the Colonial Office. It was unpolemical, moderate and full of " sweet reasonableness." The Executive of the Zionist Organization gave assurances that its policy would be " conducted in conformity with the policy " of the British Government. Dr. Weizmann had behaved like a statesman ; the Arabs like parish politicians.

But the Arab Delegation had not lost heart. The Secretary of State to the Vatican, Cardinal Gasparri, had written on May 15 to the Council of the League of Nations objecting to the terms of the Draft Mandate as tending to subordinate the native population of Palestine to the Jews, and more particularly objecting to Article 14, under which the delicate questions of the claims and rights of the various Churches in the Holy Places and the religious buildings or sites in Palestine, were to be studied and settled by a special Commission composed of members of all the religious communities whose interests were under discussion.

The Vatican was clearly restive. The Italian Government might be induced to support its objections to the

Mandate. The Delegation had been promised the support of a group of members of the two Houses of Parliament. This group was composed mainly of " die-hards," some of whom still seemed to think that the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Sion* were founded on fact, while all were hostile to the continuation of the Conservative alliance with the Lloyd-Georgian Liberals in the Coalition. It also included that group of members, who in all debates concerning the Near East appear to model their views on the following quatrain, the authorship of which I regret my inability to divulge :—

> " Spread the doctrine far and wide
> That the way to win our battles,
> Is to yield on every side
> When a Moslem sabre rattles " ;

and have done their utmost to communicate their fear of a blunt sword to the British people. Towards the end of June the group came into action. In spite of an eloquent speech by Lord Balfour, whose first appearance it was in the House of Lords, a motion in favour of the postponement of the acceptance of the Mandate by the British Government from the League of Nations was carried in the Upper House (June 21). It was an unpleasant reverse for the Government, but subsequent events showed that it was to be regarded rather as the symptom of a Conservative revolt than as the considered condemnation of the Colonial Secretary's policy in Palestine. On July 1 the White Paper containing the correspondence between the British Government and the Palestinian Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization was laid before the House of Commons. The move was a timely one, and when on July 4 Sir W. Joynson-Hicks moved a reduction in the salary of the Colonial Secretary in order to open a debate on a motion " That, in the opinion of this House, the Mandate for Palestine, the acceptance of which must involve this country in financial

and other responsibilities, should be submitted for the approval of Parliament ; and further, that the contracts entered into by the High Commissioner for Palestine with Mr. Pinhas Rutenberg should at once be referred to a Select Committee for consideration and report," the Government held its own. The motion, after an animated debate, was rejected by 292 votes to 35. The Colonial Secretary had succeeded, as, after his restatement of British policy in Palestine, he deserved to succeed.

There remained the question of the Mandate. It had been long delayed through difficulties with the United States arising out of the claims of the Standard Oil Company in Palestine, through difficulties with the Vatican, and to a less extent in consequence of the constant changes of Government and policy in Italy. On July 1 the Secretary to the British Cabinet addressed a letter to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs containing a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations regarding the Palestine Mandate. The letter contained a note in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's letter to which was appended a redraft of the contentious Article 14 of the Draft Mandate by which the British Government agreed to maintain a Commission of seven members, subject to the approval of the League of Nations, for the purpose of defining the rights in the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine of the different religious communities, these rights including those of ownership, user and access. Any religious confession which considered that the Mandatory was not giving effect to the provisions of the report of the above Commission might appeal to the League. The Vatican, though credited with considering that Catholic religious interests were still not sufficiently protected and represented in the Commission, modified its attitude towards the British Mandate after an audience had been granted to Sir Herbert Samuel by the Pope. His Holiness informed the High Commis-

sioner for Palestine that he quite understood that the British Government could not revoke its promises to the Jews, although he appears to have made it clear that the Vatican would object to any preferential treatment being accorded to Jews, and would insist that the Holy Places should remain in the possession of the Christians. This anxiety on the part of the Vatican, it may be noted, does not seem to have been based upon any evidence that any official body of Jews proposed to lay any claim to these Holy Places. In any case, the somewhat acrimonious discussion of the Mandate in the columns of certain Italian newspapers died down for a time. In the third week in July the Council of the League of Nations met. At once a hitch arose ; the Council of the League had proposed to take the Mandates for Palestine and Syria together, but when these were first discussed in a private session of the Council, the Italian representative explained that his Government desired to obtain concessions from the French in Syria, similar to those which it had obtained from the British in Palestine, with reference to schools, the rights of religious communities, the right of entry into the ports of the mandated territory, and freedom of commercial enterprise therein. The French agreed to discuss the subject and the Council of the League then appears to have suggested that the two Mandates should be approved when France and Italy should have arrived at an agreement. This would have again " hung up " the Palestine Mandate, and the British Government protested, with the result that on July 24 the Council approved the Palestine Mandate, which was to become operative as soon as the French and Italian Governments had reached an agreement concerning Syria.[1]

The Mandate was thus granted and our situation in Palestine regularized. Until July 24 the British Administration in the Holy Land had " carried on " in accordance with a request conveyed to the British Government

[1] The French Mandate for Syria was also approved.

by the Council of the League of Nations in the autumn of 1921. It now secured international recognition from all the States represented in the League of Nations. The League, be it noted, took no account of the fact that the Treaty of Sèvres had not been signed, probably for the good reason that its Council had realized that it never would be signed and that if the consent of Turkey was to be awaited before the granting of the Mandate, that important act would be indefinitely delayed.

It is not necessary to give the terms of the Mandate. It may however be remarked that the troublesome Article 14 was finally redrafted and appeared in the following form :—

> " A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study and define the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission, shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council."

This was vague enough phrasing, but it appears to have satisfied the Vatican ! The " Jewish clauses " of the Mandate made an end of the hopes of the Arab Delegation. The preamble of the Mandate reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration and went so far as to add the following elucidation thereof: " Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country," which might be interpreted as containing more than the Declaration itself. The Zionist Organization was recognized as an advisory public body co-operating with the Government of Palestine in non-political matters affecting

the establishment of the National Home and the interests of the Jews in Palestine as long as its organization and constitution should be, "in the opinion of the Mandatory," appropriate. Article 25 of the Mandate empowered the British Government to withhold or postpone application of the terms of the Mandate, with a few obvious exceptions, to Transjordania. On August 10 was published the Order in Council containing the Constitution of Palestine. Its most important features are the constitution of a Legislative Council composed of the High Commissioner and ten official and twelve elected members, which shall have full powers, without prejudice to those inherent in or reserved to the Crown, to legislate, provided that its legislation does not conflict with the provisions of the Mandate. The High Commissioner may at any time dissolve or prorogue the Council, which shall be dissolved after three years from the date of its first meeting. Ten members shall form a quorum. No financial measures shall be proposed except by the High Commissioner or under his direction. The members shall take an oath to be faithful to the Government of Palestine. In the event of the Council establishing any Ordinance concerning matters specifically dealt with by the provisions of the Mandate, this may be reserved by the High Commissioner for the signification of the assent of the British Government, which may also disallow an ordinance to which the High Commissioner has assented within one year of his assent. Not less than one half of the unofficial members of the Council shall form a Committee, which shall confer with the High Commissioner upon all matters connected with immigration, and any difference between the Committee and the High Commissioner shall be referred to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whose decision shall be final.

Under the special circumstances the Constitution of Palestine appears to have been framed in a decidedly

liberal spirit. The Legislative Council contains a majority of elected members and has full powers, except over (*a*) Finance, (*b*) matters specifically dealt with by the provisions of the Mandate. The limitation of its powers as regards such matters requires no justification. Their limitation in financial matters will be warmly approved by anyone who has studied Arab Finance in the Syrian Emirate and in Mesopotamia. It will, or should, console the British taxpayer !

To return to Palestine ; on finding its protests were in vain, the Arab Delegation published a manifesto addressed to the British people and departed. An Arab Congress held at Jerusalem proclaimed a general strike, which coincided with the Moslem week-end and in which no Government employees were to take part. The strike was unaccompanied by violence, and the Jewish rejoicings that followed the proclamation of the Mandate were tactful and almost sedate. On August 23 a Moslem-Christian Congress, which had met at Nablus, received the Delegation's report, and on the following day resolved to reject the Constitution under the British Mandate, to refuse Palestinian Nationality and participation in the Legislative Assembly and the elections. A boycott of Jewish shops, banks, etc., had already been proclaimed, but soon failed. In spite of the activity of propagandists, a large section of the Arab population seemed disposed to accept the *fait accompli* without excessive protest. At the same time, when the Government began to register Palestinians in view of the coming elections, it found that the great majority of the persons offering themselves for registration were Jews.

At the end of August the Turkish Nationalist forces, inspired to risk all by one of Mr. Lloyd George's unhappiest speeches, attacked the Greek forces in Asia Minor. Under an inept Commander-in-Chief, who had warned his men to be prepared to evacuate Asia Minor and thus ruined the *morale* of an already weary

army, the Greek forces in Anatolia went on strike. No real resistance was offered, except by a handful of brave men under Colonel Plastiras; within three weeks not a Greek soldier was left in Asia and the Turks were wreaking their vengeance on such Greek elements as had not fled, while a new war between Turkey and the British Empire seemed more than probable. The British Government did something to atone for its multitudinous errors in the Near East by sending reinforcements which prevented the Turks from seizing the Dardanelles, but the long-expected revolt among the Conservatives and the indignation of the "man in the street" who, if less scared of a war in the East than the sensational and anti-Governmental Press had sought to make him, angrily wondered how and why his leaders had created worse confusion than ever in the troubled Levant, soon brought about its fall. But the military steps which it had taken and the approach of winter brought the Turks to a halt. They consented to send delegates to a Peace Conference at Lausanne, which terminated at the beginning of February with peace still unsigned. Meanwhile they intrigued in Northern Mesopotamia and Syria and compelled the Jewish community at Constantinople to sign a memorial, which will no doubt be published, if it suits the Turk, as a free expression of Ottoman-Jewish opinion, demanding that the Ottoman Government be consulted as regards the future political status of Palestine. They also came into touch with some of the wilder members of the Islamo-Christian Society. But the very extent of their success and the mental intoxication which it produced, their claims to Arab Mosul, their strongly anti-Christian bias, their hints that if they reoccupied any of their former Arab provinces they would pay off old scores, alarmed the more moderate Arab elements. While a certain number of Arab notables and Ulema, impelled by personal motives or by religious fanaticism, desired the return of

[*Photo: American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

THE CHIEF RABBI OF THE SEPHARDI JEWS OF JERUSALEM, JACOB MEIR

[*Face page 78*

the Turk, the genuine Nationalists showed no pro-Turkish zeal, least of all the Christians, who always dread any revival of militant Moslem fervour. The fall of the Government in England and the seizure of power in Italy by the Fascisti led by a dictator of the mediæval type, Signor Mussolini, who was not reputed to be in the least friendly to Great Britain's Mediterranean interests, encouraged the Arab Delegation to revisit England and the Continent. In England, where it had expected to find a friendly Government, it was disappointed. Former allies, having entered or supported the new Government, were now disposed to accept the policy outlined by Mr. Winston Churchill and to hint that the Arabs were really asking too much. The new Secretary of State informed them that the question of Palestine could not be reopened ; they found the Labour Party, which had greatly gained in strength through its successes at the elections, to be very pro-Zionist in its sympathies. The Delegates thus made the painful but salutary discovery that for one British politician or political journalist who is ready to support a non-British Nationalist movement out of conviction, there are a multitude who are ready to use it for party ends and, their object once attained, to let it drop like a hot coal. In Italy they would seem to have pulled certain clerical strings with the object of inducing the new Italian Government to reverse the policy of its predecessor and to oppose the Mandate. But such a reversal, which would indubitably be interpreted as an unfriendly act by Great Britain, is hardly likely to commend itself to the bold *condottiere* who now rules Italy with the strong hand but realizes that he and his party must prove their possession of constructive ability before Europe accepts them at their own valuation.

Preparations are now being made for the elections of the Legislative Council. The majority of the leaders of the Islamo-Christian party still talk of abstaining from all participation therein, but the Administration has

decided not to put off the elections, as it might have done, on the plea that the Mandate is not yet operative, but to hold them, even though a large number of Arabs do not go to the polls. Abstention on the part of the Islamo-Christian party will simply let in various independents and members of the National-Islamic group, who may not represent much outside Galilee, and little there, but will have "the chance of a lifetime" to profit by the errors of their opponents. Should the Islamo-Christian party refuse to co-operate with the Administration and to present themselves at the elections, they will only have themselves to blame if they are condemned to sit for long in the outer darkness of extra-Parliamentary Opposition. Even the urbane High Commissioner will be tempted to search for the Arabic equivalent of "Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin" when they come complaining to the Mount of Olives.

Note.—The above was written in February. Since then the leaders of the Islamo-Christian Society have persisted in their boycott of the elections and the majority of the Arabs have followed their lead and have abstained from exercising their right to nominate secondary electors. The Administration has extended the period for nomination, but this concession has caused no appreciable change in the situation, and if elections were held it is certain that only a minority of the Arab population would participate therein.

The Administration has two courses open to it. It can order the elections to be held, in which case a minority of the electorate will elect a decidedly unrepresentative Legislative Council. Or it can request the British Government to amend the existing Order in Council and leave the High Commissioner to legislate, as heretofore, with the assistance of a purely consultative Advisory Council, until such time as he considers, after consultation with His Majesty's Government, that the election of a Legislative Council can be held without undue risk of a boycott. The latter course would seem on the whole to be the most probable, because the most politic. *May* 9, 1923.

Note

An Order in Council was published on May 29, 1923, declaring the elections recently held to be null and void in consequence of the failure of the majority of the Arab population to avail themselves of their electoral privileges. The new Order, known as "The Palestine (Amendment) Order in Council, 1923," provides for the eventual Constitution of a Legislative Council from and after a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner in Executive Council by proclamation in the *Gazette*; the first general election for the choice of the twelve unofficial members of the Council to be held within six months from the issue of such Proclamation. Meanwhile a Consultative Advisory Council, composed of twelve members, seven of whom represent leading Mahomedan families and one the Beduins of Southern Palestine, two the Christian and two the Jewish community, has been set up by the High Commissioner. Under the Order in Council no ordinance will be promulgated by the High Commissioner until he has consulted the Council, nor shall any ordinance be promulgated which shall restrict freedom of conscience and worship, discriminate in any way between the inhabitants of the country on the ground of race, religion or language, or be in any way repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of the Mandate given to Great Britain by the Allied and Associated Powers.

CHAPTER 4

Arab Nationalism and its Limitations

ISLAM AND NATIONALISM. THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN ARAB NATIONALISM. FANCIES AND FACTS. AN ARAB CULTURE RATHER THAN AN ARAB NATION. THE DIVISIONS OF THE ARABS. ARABIA, EGYPT, IRAQ, SYRIA. ARAB NATIONALISM IN PALESTINE. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN STANDPOINT AS MANIFESTED IN THEIR FEASTS. THE CEREMONY OF THE HOLY FIRE. THE NEBI MUSA FESTIVITIES.

"*La wataniyet fi'l Islam*"—"There is no nationality in Islam"—is a saying which at one time was accepted as a political axiom by most Moslems and by many European students of Moslem institutions and ideas. Unlike many such generalizations, it erred but little on the side of over-statement. Until recently it did express a fact, and a fact of the highest political importance, viz. that through its vast domain, extending from Morocco to China and from the Russian steppes to the Malay Archipelago, Islam, the faith taught by Mohamed and spread by his conquering disciples, was in the last resort a stronger bond than the accident of political allegiance or the ties of race and speech. The new religion cut off its converts from the past and from the rest of mankind. It was only in Persia, where the adoption of the Shia heresy by a people proud of its history, despising its first Arab conquerors as mere "lizard-eaters" from the desert and its later Turki overlords as brutish "shepherds of Turan," aided in the preservation of a certain national spirit, that some sense of continuity between non-Moslem past and Moslem present permanently survived among a nation that had once embraced Islam.[1] Elsewhere the new religion to a

[1] But would this have been the case if a larger proportion of the Persians had remained followers of Zoroaster? Would the Moslem Persian have felt that the Zoroastrian was more akin to him than the Moslem Arab?

very great extent destroyed that remembrance of a common history which contributes so greatly to the growth and preservation of nationalism. The "ignorant" past was dead and buried; the good Moslem turned his back scornfully on its tomb.

The basic political idea of Islam was the union of all Moslems under the leadership of the Caliph, who was at once the successor of the Prophet, the vicegerent of God upon earth and therefore the ruler of the Moslem community. For more than two centuries this theory of an imperial, super-national theocracy was translated into action. The Moslem world almost without exception obeyed first the Omeyyad and then the Abbassid Caliphs. Such Moslem communities as did not acknowledge their sway refused them allegiance on religious rather than national grounds. Even when the political unity of Islam was finally shattered, the rupture was due to geographical rather than to national resistance to union. The Turkish warriors who swarmed into the decaying Caliphate, recent converts to Islam without exception, brought with them a certain national spirit, a haughty contempt for Arab and Persian; but even they soon yielded to the powerful influences of the Moslem doctrine, and though they set up kingdoms upon the ruins of the Moslem Empire, they professed at least to acknowledge the political supremacy of the Caliph and eagerly sought his recognition of their right to rule the realms which they had conquered. Soon they dropped their picturesque pagan names, Ak-Sunkur (Gerfalcon), Kara-Arslan (Black Lion) and the rest for more conventional and respectable Moslem titles, and so far from aiding Jenghiz Khagan and his successors to realize their dream of a great "lay" Turco-Mongol Empire based upon racial affinities and tolerating all faiths, resisted them to the death as detestable infidels. In a word, their nationalism soon became subconscious.

When the Abbassid survivors of Hulagu's massacres

at Baghdad fled to Egypt it was impossible for the Mameluke Sultan who sheltered them to restore the temporal power of the Caliph, except at his own expense. He did not soar to such heights of abnegation, and kept the lawful Caliph as his nominal overlord and real servant at Cairo. His successors followed his example. The Caliph was now a Pontiff in Islam, who gave Mameluke and other Moslem sovereigns their investiture, and no more. Then came Selim the Grim, who destroyed the Mameluke Sultanate and took the Caliph to Constantinople with him. There he induced the last of the Beni-Abbas to resign his title, rights and prerogatives to him under the form of a legal transfer. Henceforth the Sultan of Turkey was Caliph, although he was neither a descendant of Mohamed, nor an Arab, nor of the tribe of Koreish, and so possessed none of three qualifications which, according to most non-Turkish Moslem theologians, should be united in a Caliph. Nevertheless, the majority of Sunni Moslem doctors accepted the Turkish Caliphate, whereby the most powerful Moslem ruler was invested with the spiritual leadership of Islam. Some, and particularly the Arab theologians, made mental reservations; others, who were out of the Great Turk's reach, openly declared their conviction that the Sultan of Turkey was not the lawful Caliph. But in general Islam accepted the *fait accompli.*

The first important Arab reaction against the Turk was the "Wahabi" religious movement. It was temporarily crushed by the Egyptian vassals of Sultan Mahmud the Reformer in 1818–1821, after an exhausting struggle, but it is doubtful whether Wahabism was in any sense national, and it is certain that in their practice these zealots were as hostile to non-Wahabi Arabs as to Turks. The lessons of the movement were not forgotten by the Sultans, and Abdulhamid throughout his long reign [1] lost no opportunity of bidding for the

[1] 1876–1909.

support of the Sunni Arabs of Arabia, Syria and Iraq, not only by appealing to their loyalty to the Caliphate, but by appointing Arabs to important posts in the Government, the Army and the Palace. Arabs, notably Izzet Pasha "Holo," and the brothers Selim and Nejib Melhame—the latter Christians—dominated the "Mabein" (Private Cabinet) during the latter years of his reign, and by persuading their master to order the construction of the Hejaz Railway, gave a great political and military asset to the Turks, but made many Arabs prosperous. But Abdulhamid showed no favour to the Wahabis, and had to contend with frequent rebellions among the Zeidi heretics of Yemen. Nor did he entirely placate the Syrians. I remember being struck by the anxiety of Turks and pro-Turks at Damascus in 1905 when the news that the Yemen rebels had taken Sanaa became known, and though the Syrians who wrote pamphlets concerning the Arab "awakening" were generally Christians and often suspected of being French agents, many Moslems complained of the ineptitude and sloth of Turkish officials and the unprogressiveness of Ottoman rule. The fact was that the increase of trade in Syria and Iraq, the wider diffusion of European and American education, with which came European "nationalist" ideas, and the object-lesson afforded by the tranquillity and relative prosperity of the autonomous Lebanon, which since 1862 had become in essentials the most civilized province in Turkey's Asiatic Empire, and of British-ruled Egypt, to some extent counterbalanced Abdulhamid's pro-Arabism by making the Arabs more critical of Turkish rule. Then came the Turkish Revolution of 1908. Its results upon the development of Arab Nationalism have been admirably summed up by that great authority on the Arab question, Miss Gertrude Lowthian Bell, who, after pointing out that in 1905 Arab national self-consciousness within the Turkish Empire was still in its feeble infancy, continues :—

[*Photo : American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

AT THE CHURCH OF THE HOLY SEPULCHRE

THE CROWD ENTERS THE CHURCH ON THE FESTIVAL OF THE HOLY FIRE

[*Face page* 84

" The Turkish Government itself gave it vitality by inspiring it with the hopes held out by the constitutional movement of 1908, and it acquired cohesion from the disappointment that followed. Liberty and equality are dangerous words to play with in an empire composed of divergent nationalities. Of these the Arabs, adaptable and quick-witted, proudly alive to their traditions of past glory as founders of Islam, and upholders for 700 years of the authority of the Khilafat (Caliphate), were the first to claim the translation of promise into performance, and in the radiant dawn of the constitutional era the Arab *intelligentsia* eagerly anticipated that their claim would be recognized. If the Turks had responded with a genuine attempt to allow Arab culture to develop along its own lines under their ægis, the Ottoman Empire might have taken on new life, but their inelastic mentality precluded them from embracing the golden opportunity. Moreover, Prussian militarism made to them a peculiarly powerful and, if the political configuration of their Empire be considered, a peculiarly dangerous appeal. The Committee of Union and Progress was determined to hack its way through the sensibilities of subject races, and, not content with this formidable task, by neglecting the cautious diplomatic methods of Abdulhamid it found itself involved in a disastrous and debilitating struggle with its neighbour states in Europe.

Before the war of 1914 broke out, not only were the Arab provinces filled with hatred and the desire for vengeance . . . but for the reasons I have briefly outlined the Nationalist movement was rapidly consolidating itself and had conceived fresh hopes from the manifest diminution of Turkish might, on which, to the exclusion of all other principles of statecraft, Turkish right reposed. Finally,

when the Allies backed the Arab revolt, might changed sides." (*The Times*, February 11, 1922.)

The success of the Arab revolt, however, aroused false hopes among many British and Arab observers, and exaggerated fears among the French. The former were, at times, too ready to equate their beliefs with their hopes and to predict the early formation, if not of an "Arab Empire," at least of an Arab Confederation. The latter feared that such an Empire or Confederation would exercise a dangerously magnetic effect upon their Arab or Arabized subjects or protégés in North Africa. But before the end of the war it had become abundantly clear that there was as little ground for these exaggerated fears as for those exaggerated hopes. There was nationalism enough, of a sort, among the Arabs, but there was no Arab nation, and no one group of the anti-Turkish Arabs could be counted upon to co-operate with another. Still less would any one of the leaders among the greater Arab chiefs acknowledge the political supremacy of any other. The Grand Sherif of Mecca proclaimed himself "King of the Arabs," but few indeed of the Arabs outside the Hejaz recognized his kingship. A war between our ally King Hussein and our ally Abdulaziz ibn Sa'ud, the Wahabi Emir of Nejd, was with difficulty staved off till the General War was over. The Idrisi of Assir, another of our allies, would neither co-operate with King Hussein nor recognize him. Neither his son Feisal when Emir of Damascus nor his son Abdallah when established as Emir in Transjordania admitted any claim to political domination over the Arabs on their father's part, though they saw to it that his name was mentioned in the Friday prayer instead of that of the Turkish Caliph. Differences in civilization combined with sectarian strife to promote disunion. The Damascenes looked down upon the Hejazis and the Hejazis looked down upon the Wahabis of Nejd. The

semi-Shia Zeidis of Yemen supported the Turks, whom they had previously plagued, throughout the war ; the Wahabis thought the Hejazis and Syrians worse than infidels and said so ; the Beduin, whenever strong enough, raided or blackmailed the settled folk. And yet these politically disunited peoples were linked by a great number of ties : they claimed a common ancestry ; they spoke dialects of the same tongue which were generally mutually comprehensible ; they wrote the same literary language, and were justifiably proud of the same jurists and poets, biographers and historians. The majority of them professed the same creed ; their customs and their traditions were often identical ; they were proudly conscious of their difference from other races, and often professed a certain disdain for other Moslems. In short, there was a common Arab culture but no Arab nation.

Faction has always been the curse of the Arab tribes, politically divided by ancient and popular feuds ; Mohamed for a time combined their energies under the banner of the new faith and diverted them from intestine war to foreign conquest, but they carried their feuds with them into the conquered lands. Another political weakness of the Arab is his indiscipline ; the race was and is one of the most naturally intelligent in the world, but its history gives one the impression that the purer it is the less it is willing to master the routine of any but the simplest form of administration, and to endure the drudgery inseparable from a complex system of government. The Arab strikes one as a man who, capable of ruling, preferred adventure, the arts and sciences, commerce, the religious life, to governance. Brave and shrewd in fight, he never organized a great disciplined army, and when the first wave of religious enthusiasm, which carried his hosts to the Taurus and the Pyrénées, had subsided, his military reputation declined until in the days of the later Abbasids, a Turkish general could

exclaim, "What use are Arabs without the Prophet and angelic aid?" There can be no question of lazy-mindedness in his case. The imposing list of Arab scholars and sages, whether pure-blooded or of mixed descent, proves that he has never suffered from that dullness and lack of imagination which are the besetting mental vices of the Turk. But he lacked and still lacks that innate military sense of discipline which bore the Turk, however mixed in blood, however corrupted by Persian or by Levantine influences, to the leadership of Islam. Any attempt to explain the causes of this weakness would be out of place here. Enough that it exists and, if more marked among some Arab or Arabized peoples than among others, remains the chief obstacle to Arab political union and to Arab political success.

To-day, in spite of the resolutions passed by Arab Congresses and Committees, the Arab Near East remains profoundly disunited. Four great potentates and a host of minor independent or British-protected chiefs rule the Arabian Peninsula. The two most powerful rulers are the great Wahabi Emir of Nejd, who has subjected practically all Central Arabia and has in the last ten years extended his dominions to the Persian Gulf and the borders of the Syrian desert, and the King of the Hejaz, who rules Western Arabia from the frontiers of Assir to Maan. The Sultan of Oman in the south-east and the Imam Yahya Hamid-ed-din of Yemen follow them in order of importance; and then come a host of lesser rulers—the Sultan of Lahej and the minor chiefs of the Hadhramaut, of Bahrein and the Trucial Coast, whom we protect, the independent chiefs of Assir, whose ruler, the Idrisi, is now dead, and those of the innermost Yemen and Oman.

No greater political contrast to Arabia could be found in the Arab world than in Egypt, whose people, though obviously to a large extent the Islamized and Arabized descendants of the Ancient Egyptians, and though

greatly influenced in their social and political life by the Turks who ruled them so long, describe themselves as "Arabs" and have played a considerable part in the cultural life of the Arab race. Here nationalism, though it has not really made much way among the mass of *fellaheen* (peasant cultivators), is stronger among the literate classes than elsewhere in the Arab world, and is supported, one does not know how whole-heartedly, by the Christian (Coptic) minority. Whatever the struggles and rivalries of their party leaders, the Egyptians are conscious of the fact that their country is geographically, economically and racially a unit. But Egyptian Nationalism, for all the Egyptian claim to be "Arab," takes extremely little interest in the fortunes of the other branches of the Arab family, and the average Egyptian will confess to a hearty dislike of Maghrabis (North Africans), Shamis (Syrians) and Beduin Arabs wherever these last may dwell.

In Iraq we have given the Arab population a king in the person of Feisal, son of Hussein, since none of the various sections into which the Iraq people are divided could make up its mind to accept the nominee of any other section. Some of the Mesopotamians desired a "Republic"; others the rule of a local chief such as Sayyid Talib of Basra or the Nakib el Ashraf of Baghdad; others a Turkish prince; others, notably in Basra, desired nothing more than autonomy under the British Administration; and the Shias of Kerbela and Nejef, hating and hated by the Sunnis, wished only to be left in their moral and material squalor by heretic and infidel. Under these circumstances it is much less surprising that Feisal received a very cool reception from the people whom he came to rule than that he has subsequently succeeded in making his government fairly popular with certain influential elements in the country. If, as he may, he ultimately succeeds, he will have to thank not only his own attractive personality

but the Turks, who by threatening Mosul have aroused the divided Mesopotamians to a sense of the danger of disunion.

In Syria the political situation deserves special study, in view of the attempt made, first by the French or French-inspired propagandists and latterly by the special correspondent of *The Daily Mail*, to represent Palestine as a mere extension of Syria inhabited by "Syrians." French propaganda aimed, of course, at provoking a movement which might be represented as "a popular demand" for the selection of France as the mandatory for Syria by the Great Powers and the consent of the League of Nations thereto. What the "Syrians" said to the American Crane-King Commission of Inquiry in 1919 does not much matter by comparison with what they did. To begin with, they were divided in their minds as regards the Emirate of Damascus. In Damascus itself there was a party which supported Feisal, and another party which opposed him and from the beginning intrigued with the French. The latter party objected to the "Beduin" character of the Emir's rule, although, as a matter of fact, his entourage was largely Syrian. In Hama, and still more in Aleppo, the Damascus Government was unpopular. The local notables, and still more the *intelligentsia*, complained that Damascus monopolized the "loaves and fishes" of office. At Aleppo, where there is a considerable Turkish or Turcisized population, a pro-Turkish movement began as soon as the Kemalists gave trouble. The "Ansairi" tribes of the hill country behind Latakia and Tarsus, who belong to a sect so heretical that it can no longer be called Moslem, refused to obey the French or to listen to Feisal's emissaries, and raided their neighbours when they dared. A minority and a small minority of the Lebanese were pro-Arab in their sympathies. The majority, realizing that there was no chance of being assigned to rich Britain or richer America, or influenced

by Catholic sentiment, accepted the French Mandate, without excessive enthusiasm. Meanwhile Feisal's extremist friends encouraged raids, accompanied in some cases by cruel massacres, upon Christian villages in the French sphere, which did not make Arab Nationalism any the more popular among the Christians of the French sphere. Then came the brief war between France and the Emirate. The Damascenes deserted Feisal as soon as his forces had suffered their first reverse, in spite of their former protestations of loyalty. But what followed is even more significant. The French found that the Lebanese, even when their territory had been increased by the addition of Tyre and Sidon, Beirut and the plain between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, would not consent to any close form of union with the Moslem provinces of Damascus and Aleppo. The Druses of the Hauran Mountains would not hear of union with the Damascus Government, which the French set up ; the Aleppo Administration would not fuse with Damascus ; and the Ansairi or Alawites would have nothing to do with either Damascus or Aleppo. The French ultimately solved the problem by forming a loose Syrian Federation linked under the French High Commissioner, who represented the Mandatory Power. This Federation consisted of four principal states, each with its flag and independent administration—viz. the Great Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo and the Territory of the Alawites, and the small Druse State in the Hauran.

These facts prove that, while there may be " Nationalism " of a theoretical kind in abundance among the " Syrians,"[1] there is no great desire for national unity.

[1] " Syrian " is a very question-begging expression. It is used mainly of Christians of Beirutine, Aleppine or Damascene origin. These people are no doubt of Syrian and Phœnician rather than of Arab descent. Arabs of Palestine and Syria do not, if Moslems, call themselves " Shami " (Syrian) but " Arab."

The French found that the words " Syrian " or " Arab " covered a host of sectarian and political quarrels between Christian, Druse, Moslem, and Alawite, between Sunni and Shia (Metawileh) Moslems, between the plain and the mountain, the Beduin and the settled people. They had every reason—and especially financial reasons—to work for a unified Syria. They found that political unity could not yet be attained.[1]

The Moslem Arabs of Palestine played a very subsidiary part, if any, in the Arab Nationalist movement which preceded the Great War. In spite of the fact that Jerusalem from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century of the Christian Era was a centre of Moslem learning, the Palestinian Moslems appear to have furnished the Arab world with no scholars of any distinction. The great centres of Arab cultural life have been in recent times, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, and latterly Beirut. These have also been political centres, in which Nationalism grew up. Jerusalem was not one of these. The notables of Palestine have played with pan-Arab ideas at times. They have coquetted with Feisal's unauthorized emissaries ; they have made overtures to the Emir Abdallah, only to turn and criticize him when they found that he had no desire to plunge into adventures on their behalf and that he realized that Zionism could not be lightly dismissed as a dream of a few " Bolshevist Jews." Some of them are far more interested in Islam than in Nationalism. As for the Arab *intelligentsia* of Palestine, one has only to hear their criticisms of Syrian officials in the Palestinian Administration, of Emir Abdallah's Government, and of the Arab Governments set up by the French in Syria,

[1] It may be argued that the French acted on the adage " *Divide et impera* "; but in view of the cry for economy in the French Chamber and Senate they would surely have set up a cheaper because unified administration in Syria had it been possible. They have not divided Morocco.

to realize that their Nationalism has great limitations—that at present it is cultural rather than political, negative rather than positive, based rather upon the fear of Zionism and more especially of political Zionism, than upon any genuine desire to create a Palestinian State or to enter an Arab Federation. And if the Nationalism of the Palestinian Moslems is weak and indeed embryonic, how much weaker is that of the Christians of Palestine! After discussing Arab politics with them you feel in nine cases out of ten that you have made a journey in time back to the early Middle Ages, when what mattered most to the ordinary man was not what Government he served but what Church demanded his allegiance. Unlike the Greeks and Armenians, not to mention the Jews, who can say, "In such and such a period we were a nation," the Arab Christians of Palestine and Syria cannot look back to a "Syrian" or an "Orthodox" or a "Maronite" kingdom in which they were their own masters. They were provincials and often very neglected provincials of the East Roman Empire. To-day ninety per cent. of them, if asked suddenly, "To what nationality do you belong?" will answer "Orthodox" or "Latin" or "Maronite," as the case may be, and not "Arab" or "Palestinian." They are ready to ally themselves with the Moslems against the Jews; this does not mean that many of them really desire to co-operate with the Moslems in the creation of a predominantly Moslem Arab State.

If one compares the two great feasts of the Palestinian Arabs—the Christian Ceremony of the Holy Fire in which the "Orthodox" or "Greek" Christians play the leading part, though the independent Armenian, Syrian and Coptic Churches are also represented, and the Moslem Feast of the prophet Moses (Nebi Musa)—one can see nothing in the former that can for a moment be called national. It is super-national; the Eastern Churches meet on Easter Eve in a religious

festival that is Christian and particularly Oriental Christian. Copts, Syrians and Armenians share the same frenzy as the Orthodox Arabs of Palestine, wait in the same tense emotion for the coming of the sacred and absolutory fire, press with the same impatient longing against the cordon of guards that keeps the way clear for the Orthodox Patriarch to enter the Holy Sepulchre. When I watched the ceremony in 1922 the only reference to a secular monarch or Government that I heard was in the couplet roared out again and again by the waiting multitude before the entry of the Patriarch :—

> "Oh, King George, may you merry be.
> God to our faith gives victory,"

—to translate Arabic doggerel into English doggerel. And this was a reference to the fact that for the first time since the Crusades a Christian king—schismatic, perhaps, in the opinion of many of the worshippers, but a Christian and not a Moslem—ruled Palestine. And when the Patriarch laid down his crown, and cast off his outer robes before the Holy Place and entered in, an Armenian bishop followed him. It was a Copt, who had bought the privilege of first receiving the fire as it flashed from the narrow loophole in the northern wall of the Sepulchre. Men of all the Eastern Churches shouted, gesticulated and swirled like waves in an eddying sea around Damianos the Patriarch, as, ringed round by his struggling guards, passing on the fire to the tapers thrust towards him by imploring hands, he fought through that maddened crowd like a white boat in a sea of night and fire to the safety of the High Altar. Three processions, each formed by the chiefs of an ancient Church—Armenians in flowered robes, brown-faced Copts in purple and crimson, Jacobite Syrians in green and amaranth—followed by their bishop, his face hidden by the folds of his pointed hood, gorgeous

[*Photo : American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

THE FESTIVAL OF THE PROPHET MOSES, 1922

MOSLEMS IN PROCESSION PASSING THE ALLEGED TOMB OF ST. STEPHEN PRECEDED BY THE BAND OF THE SOUTH LANCASHIRE REGIMENT

[*Face page 94*

and mysterious in his robes of deep chrome, thrice circled chanting and rejoicing around the Holy Sepulchre. I have never seen a more moving and a more terrifying spectacle. One felt that on this one day the peoples that had lived for centuries under the yoke of the robber kings who came from Inner Asia, the men of the sword and the book, the Vicegerents of the Sultan of the Sky, forgot the yoke that had galled them, and the shadow of the poised sword, and exulted with the frenzy that follows long repression. And I think I shall never see anything more moving and more terrifying, unless one day I witness the sack of Constantinople by the Orthodox armies of the Balkans or Russia, and the first thanksgiving service held by their leaders under the dome of Santa Sophia.

Utterly different is the Feast of Nebi Musa. In days of Arab-Zionist tension it seems strange at first that this festival should be awaited with a certain anxiety by the Government of Palestine. But Moses is one of the great prophets of Islam as well as the founder and organizer of Judaism. The Moslem *fellaheen* of Palestine, who probably have a strong admixture of Jewish as well as of "Canaanite" and Arab blood[1] may have revered Moses before the establishment of Islam in the Holy Land; and in the days that followed the fall of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem before the armies of Saladin, that politic warrior determined to organize a special festival for the Moslems of Southern Palestine, coinciding more or less with the Christian Easter, in order to strengthen Moslem sentiment and to arouse the local patriotism of the Arabs. To-day, while it is still too early to speak of Arab Nationality in Palestine,

[1] I trust that this assertion will not lead anyone to suppose that I am suggesting that the Palestine *fellaheen* are really Jews without knowing it. The world has heard quite enough of "Bulgarophone Greeks," "Arabophone Turks" and of Kurds who are "as Turkish as the Scotch are British," and I do not wish to add to the list!

this festival certainly contributes, for all that it is nominally a purely religious ceremony, to the growth of national sentiment or at least of local patriotism among the Arabs. One had only to hear the cheers that greeted any reference to "Falastin" (Palestine) by the orators or singers who addressed the procession that entered the walled city of Jerusalem when the festival was held in 1922, to appreciate this. One feels that the prophet Moses may become, so to speak, the patron saint of the Palestinian Arabs—and the possession of a patron saint is a step on the road to nationhood. One wonders whether the cult of Moses by Arab Moslems may not in the end help to bring Jew and Arab into friendlier relations; it would be a cruel paradox were the Nebi Musa feast to become a source of anti-Jewish Nationalism!

Meanwhile it is a most interesting festival. One of its most picturesque features is the entry into Jerusalem of the procession of the men of Hebron,[1] guarding their sacred banners, who enter Jerusalem through the Jaffa Gate. It was led in 1922 by a noisy procession of the men of Jerusalem and Nablus, who had marched down the Bethlehem road to greet those of the city of Abraham, bearing their green and scarlet banners. Then came the Hebron village folk carrying their flags, red, green, yellow and white, embroidered with texts from the Koran, the staff of each flag hung with handkerchiefs given by the village women to be hung in Musa's shrine that they may thus obtain a blessing and bear children to their husbands. As they entered the old city the enthusiasm of the crowds reached its highest intensity. Men with the set blank stare of extreme excitement, danced round and round, bare-headed, their long locks flying wildly as they revolved. The singers strained their throats and now and again a fugleman would jump

[1] The Arabic name of Hebron is El-Khalil, an abbreviation of "Khalil-er-Rahman," *anglice* "The friend of the Merciful One"—that is, Abraham, the friend of God.

on the shoulders of a sturdy human horse who carried him up and down between the rows of dancers while he shouted, sang or directed the dance with an amazing wealth of gesticulation. Last came the green banner of Hebron, surrounded by a guard of ten wiry swordsmen. Proudly they walked with their flag, till they came to where the narrow Street of David plunges down into the labyrinth of the old city. For the last time they whirled their bright blades above their heads and disappeared into the shadow of the streets. One thought of Highland caterans visiting a Lowland town in Claverhouse's day. Next day the Hebron men and their friends marched down to the shrine of the prophet Moses, where the festival culminates in a cheerful scene of merrymaking and prayer combined after the manner of peasant peoples all the world over. The shrine is about five miles from Jericho, in the hills immediately above the entry of the high road into the Jordan trough. It is simply a square building enclosing two courts, almost surrounded by a terrace with small domes rising therefrom, strangely picturesque in the midst of the utterly barren and lonely heights.

Here the rejoicings are loudest and longest. All who can follow the procession from Jerusalem : Arabs from across Jordan stalk impressively about the slopes ; a " merry-go-round," in full swing before the entrance, delights the swarming children and their elders ; boy scouts, neat, smart, and as helpful as good boy scouts can be, camp on the hill-side, enjoying themselves mightily. Inside the shrine the notables of Moslem Jerusalem entertain their guests with their wonted dignity and hospitality—though many of them are Christian or Jewish officials of the Administration. In the courts peasants from Hebron, Beduin from the valley, Transjordanians sturdy and long limbed, dance for hours, chanting improvised rhymes or traditional songs in honour of Moses. In every corner men sell their wares

—handkerchiefs of rainbow colours, sweets of kaleidoscopic variety (which one hopes will not permanently injure the digestions of Young Palestine), the blue and rich green glass of Hebron. Music plays, clouds of dust blow everywhere, carriages and motor-cars struggle through the soft earth of the road. It is a religious festival, a fair, and a National Holiday all in one ; and those who have not seen it must not pretend to know the Moslems of South Palestine.

CHAPTER 5

The Palestine Arabs and their Grievances

THE ARAB MAJORITY. SOME CHARACTERISTICS. EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL. ZIONIST EXPLANATIONS OF ARAB ANTI-ZIONISM. THE REAL CAUSE. THE CRITICS CRITICIZED. TURKISH AND FRENCH INTRIGUES IN PALESTINE. THE ARAB CHRISTIANS. LACK OF ARAB LEADERSHIP. HOW THE ARAB SPOILS HIS CASE. THE MANDATE AND ITS EFFECTS. PRO-ZIONIST ARAB ELEMENTS. ANALYSIS OF THE ARAB ATTITUDE.

THERE are nearly 84,000 Jews in Palestine to-day. The remainder of the population, with the exception of a very few Turks, Circassians, Copts, and Armenians, are Arabs, who number over 650,000 souls. Of these more than five-sixths are Moslems of the Sunni rite.

There are over 73,000 Christians, the majority of whom belong to the Orthodox Church—the minority being Roman Catholics, who are usually known as "Latins"; "Greek Catholics," whose Church is affiliated to the Church of Rome, and who are also called Melchites; and still less frequently Syrians (Jacobites) and Protestants of various denominations.

The Druses, a little more than 7,000 in number, who are to be found in a few villages in Northern Palestine, and the Behais, whose centre is Acre, where dwells the head of their eclectic and very humanitarian faith, do not count politically. The former supply some very sturdy recruits to the Palestine gendarmerie; the latter have given some very useful and reliable public servants to the Administration. The proportion of nomads or semi-nomads—Beduin Arabs—is very small outside the district of Beersheba. These people are pastoral, but raise rain-crops in part of the Beersheba district and in the Jordan Valley. The majority of the sedentary Moslems live by agriculture.

As compared with the Lebanon Syrians, the Damascenes

and the urban Egyptians, the Arab and especially the Moslem Arab inhabitants of Palestine, are in many respects a backward and decidedly inefficient people. They were sedulously neglected by their Turkish rulers ; the majority of them are illiterate and ignorant of all that lies outside their villages. They are quite astonishingly credulous, and have the primitive man's capacity for believing the worst of strangers and foreigners.

Yet they have plenty of mother wit, improve with education, and show, when educated, an aptitude for commerce, which is rare among Egyptians, and rarer still among Turks. Even to-day at Cairo all tramway, omnibus and river services are in non-Egyptian hands. Arab Christians within two years of Lord Allenby's conquest of Palestine had organized omnibus services between Jerusalem and the neighbouring towns, and there are many Christian and some Moslem merchants and professional men who hold their own without difficulty against foreign or Palestinian Jewish competition.

The townsfolk, more especially the Christians, have a higher standard of comfort, and are more intelligent, if also more excitable and more sociable, than the *fellaheen* (peasants), almost as credulous and normally as obedient to authority. There is little or no class consciousness, as there would be in a European proletariat, among the Arab workmen, for there are no sharp class divisions such as exist in many European countries, and the religious bond is strong. Both *fellaheen* and townsfolk are singularly explosive when their racial or religious prejudices are in the slightest degree offended.

In the past, the quarrels between Arabic-speaking Christians, Orthodox and Roman Catholic often led to bloodshed in the most sacred shrine of Christendom. Over a year ago Jerusalem had an example of this explosiveness when the Fox Film Company attempted to stage King David's entry into Jerusalem for the kinema. Transjordanian Arabs, peasants from round the Holy

City, and some British soldiers lent for the occasion, and picturesquely accoutred in long tunics and breast-plates, marched into the Damascus Gate accompanied by cavaliers mounted on Arab steeds and armed with wooden lances (price 10 piastres or 2*s.* 1*d.*).

All Jerusalem was there, dressed in its best, and all went merrily until a peasant beheld an inhabitant of the next village to his, with which his village was at feud. In a few seconds the brawl which these worthies started became general. Many of the humbler spectators took sides. Stones flew everywhere ; the well-dressed fled ; the British troops were recalled hastily to barracks to await emergencies ; the police had to show considerable vigour before the riot was quelled ; and the Transjordanian cavaliers made off, it is said to Transjordania, taking with them their two-and-a-penny lances.

I may recall another incident which occurred during Mr. Churchill's visit to Jerusalem in 1921. The Emir Abdallah, who had recently entered Transjordania, crossed from Amman to confer with the Colonial Secretary. During his stay at Jerusalem he visited the Mosque of Omar, accompanied by the Governor, Mr. Ronald Storrs, C.M.G. Within a few minutes of this being known the mosque itself was crowded to its utmost capacity, and some 2,000 Moslems had thronged into the court that surrounds the Dome of the Rock. Scarcely had the Emir entered the mosque, when one of the congregation began to cry out, "Thanks be to God that the son of the King is among us ; thanks be to God that the day of tyranny will soon pass ! " and was proceeding to denounce the Zionists, the British, and infidels in general, when Mr. Storrs, conscious that the atmosphere was becoming dangerously electric, reminded him that the mosque was not a fit place for political oratory, whereat he subsided. A small boy was bidden climb into the pulpit and repeat the denunciation, but a policeman pulled him down by the slack of his

baggy trousers and presently the excitement died down. But it had been a very perilous moment.

Here is one risk of the present situation in Palestine. As long as no definite understanding has been arrived at between Zionist and Arab, and as long as the fear persists that Zionism involves the domination of a minority, or the flooding of the country with Jewish immigrants, the Arab population of most Palestinian towns may temporarily go raving mad at the slightest real or imaginary provocation.

Till comparatively recently it was the fashion in ultra-Zionist circles in Europe and America, and to some extent in Palestine, to explain away all anti-Zionist manifestations on the part of the Palestinian Arabs as being in reality directed against the British authorities. Thus the Zionist witnesses examined by the Commission of Inquiry which investigated the Jaffa disturbances asserted that Zionism had no connection with the anti-Jewish feeling then manifested, and that the Arabs were " making use of the anti-Zionist cry in order to wreck the British Mandate "—because they were anti-British. More moderate Zionists in Palestine were in the habit of maintaining that the anti-Zionist movement was largely factitious, having been organized and encouraged by the propaganda both of foreign agents and of members of the Effendi class who regretted the Turkish regime, which permitted them to seize public land and otherwise make private profits at the expense of the peasantry.

Religious fanaticism was also described as one of the causes of the movement.

Other Zionists have accused the more important Arab landowners, and many of the Arab merchants, of being more especially incensed against Jewish immigration because the influx of more highly paid labourers tended to force up wages and thus to decrease their profits.

Jewish Socialists and Labour men in Palestine add that the Arab " bourgeoisie " fears that socialistic ideas

will eventually influence the Arab peasantry and render them hostile to the "exploiting classes" and more especially to the large landowners, who are by no means always ideal landlords.

Finally there is the view that the anti-Zionism of the leaders of the Islamo-Christian Society is simply assumed for purposes of blackmail. Those who hold it state that the Palestine Administration, the Zionist Organization in Europe and the Zionist Executive in Palestine have all been approached by prominent Arab anti-Zionists, who have delicately or crudely hinted that they were ready to abandon their campaign for various considerations—in some cases their own appointment or that of a relative to a post carrying patronage or a good salary—in others for a bribe, sometimes surprisingly small.

For most of the above contentions there is a certain slight justification ; but they do not, either singly or cumulatively, explain away Arab anti-Zionist feeling. Some of the wisest Zionists have understood its true cause. That great philosopher and student whom the Jewish world knows by his pen-name of "Achad Ha-Am,"[1] i.e. "One of the People," wrote in June, 1920 :[2]

> "But we all know how the [Balfour] Declaration was interpreted at the time of its publication, and how much exaggeration many of our workers and writers have tried to introduce into it from that day to this. The Jewish people listened, and believed that the end of the *galuth* (exile) had come, and that in a short time Palestine would be a 'Jewish State.' The Arab people too, which we have always ignored from the very beginning of the colonization movement, listened, and believed that the Jews were coming to expropriate its land and to do with it what they liked. All this inevitably led to friction and

[1] Asher Ginzberg.

[2] In the Introduction to a new edition of his Hebrew Essays.

bitterness on both sides and contributed much to the state of things which was revealed in all its ugliness in the events at Jerusalem last April. ["Achad-Ha-Am" here refers to the anti-Jewish disturbances of April, 1920.] Those events . . . might have taught us how long is the way from a written promise to its practical realization, and how many are the obstacles, not easily to be removed, which beset our path. But apparently we learnt nothing; and only a short time after the events at Jerusalem, when the British promise was confirmed at San Remo, we began once more to blow the Messianic trumpet, to announce the 'redemption' and so forth."

And it is this unreflecting "Messianism" revealing itself in wild and sometimes provocative words, that has been the principal cause of Arab anti-Zionism.

In a short but brilliant essay "Achad Ha-Am" once pointed out[1] that "Messianism"—that is the belief that an individual, a collective body or a theory can speedily "redeem" mankind from its tribulations and troubles because this individual, collective body or theory is "The Truth"—is inevitably accompanied by intolerance or criticism, and a contempt for the teachings of experience and reason. When Arabs read the imprudences of Zionist journalists and publicists, e.g.—

"Hence the real key to the Palestine situation is to be found in giving to Jews as such those rights and privileges in Palestine which shall enable Jews to make it as Jewish as England is English, or as Canada is Canadian. That is the only reasonable or indeed feasible meaning of a Jewish National

[1] *When Messiah comes*, 1907.

Home, and it is impossible for Jews to construct it without being accorded a National status for Jews," [1]

they naturally fear the worst.

To take the explanations of Arab anti-Zionism, which once found favour among many Zionists, *seriatim*, the first—viz. that anti-Zionism is nothing but a mask for Anglophobia—was never taken seriously by any British official who knew the country.

It may be confidently affirmed that anti-British feeling and hostility to the British Government have been due almost entirely to the identification of British policy by the Arabs with political and, as they believed, predatory Zionism.

In other words, had we taken the trouble to explain three years ago to the Arabs that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine did not involve Jewish political domination over the indigenous population, and that no British Government would support such a domination, or would disregard Arab opinion with regard to the methods to be employed in founding that National Home, we should not have given them the impression that we intended to impose a tenant upon a householder without consulting his wishes, and that we hoped that the tenant would one day evict him.

The argument that because certain Arab notables, who have identified themselves with anti-Zionist agitation, have privately attempted to sell their land to the Zionists, or their "consciences" to the Government, in return for posts or other bribes, need only to be mentioned to be dismissed. It merely proves what nobody ever doubted—viz. that some of the members of the Islamo-Christian Society are self-seeking rascals, but an agitation must not be dismissed as factitious because of the venality of some of the politicians who support it.

[1] *Jewish Chronicle*, May 20, 1921.

Equally irrelevant is the argument that because the economic interests of the Arab landlords are opposed to those of the *fellaheen*, whether tenants or small freeholders, the Arab movement will ultimately break up owing to class quarrels. This may happen in a somewhat distant future. At present the *fellaheen*, like the Arab workman in the towns, are little affected by class feeling, and no one who knows them but is convinced that if some of them are capable of anti-Zionist rioting, few indeed are at all likely to indulge in pro-Zionist disturbances.

I have already referred to the relation between the Turks and the Palestinian Arabs before and during the Great War (*see* Chapter 4). At present, although there are " Effendis " who regret the Turk, and although one may be surprised to find a Turk who was head of the Haifa branch of the notorious Committee of Union and Progress posing as a " Palestinian " in the local branch of the Islamo-Christian Society, the Turks have little real influence left in Palestine. Many of the wealthy families among the Arabs have extremely unpleasant memories of their Ottoman co-religionists' behaviour towards them during the war ; the peasants remember how they were conscribed, and how their livestock and produce were requisitioned. At the same time there is, let it be fully admitted, an element among the Arabs, neither numerous nor dangerous in normal times, which, as I have already pointed out, is first and foremost Moslem, which cares little for Arab nationality, and would welcome any Moslem success over the " infidel," though won by the Arab's deadliest enemy, though involving multitudes of Arabs in defeat and ruin. These are the people who cheer Mustafa Kemal to-day, and would cheer the Sheikh-es-Senussi or Ibn Sa'ud's Wahabis to-morrow, were there any prospect of these warriors ridding Palestine of European control, and reducing such remnants of the Jewish and Christian

communities as they allowed to survive to virtual slavery. They are a failing force, but they are still a danger during periods of tension. But their existence should have prevented Jews from speaking before Moslems, as some young zealots have done, of the rebuilding of Solomon's Temple on the site now occupied by the Dome of the Rock. In days of religious and political excitement, such threats do an infinity of harm, however unimportant and unrepresentative be those who utter them.

But while one feels that Arab anti-Zionism cannot be light-heartedly dismissed as factitious, it is impossible to ignore the evidence that foreign influences have had a hand in fomenting the hostility of the Arab to Zionism. These influences have not caused anti-Zionism—far from it ; but they have promoted it. Since the Angora Treaty and the *coup de Chanak* have made it a less disagreeable task to criticize French policy in the Near East, one may well ask whether it was logical for General Gouraud, after dividing Syria into several " free and autonomous " states, to foster a Press campaign for the unification (presumably under a French mandate !) of Syria and Palestine, and whether it was politic or economic to maintain so many paid but " unofficial " agents in Jerusalem and Haifa, whose chief occupation was to keep up Arab hostility to Zionism and to " crab " British Administration. Of late there has been no reason to accuse the French rulers of Syria of giving direct countenance to anti-Zionist or anti-British propaganda. But there can be no doubt that certain French Catholic agents are working actively and spending money among the Latin and Melchite or Greek Catholic elements in Northern Palestine, and that Syrian Christians and Moslems from the Lebanon and Damascus are active in the Christian Moslem Society, and that some of the Christians appear to hope that Palestine may fall one day under French control, while some of

the Moslems dream of the day when Palestine will be linked up with Syria and form part of the pan-Arab Empire.

It is also certain that Mustafa Kemal and his Bolshevist allies had a hand in the Jaffa disturbances, the former working through Arab agents, the latter through the Jewish Communists.

It may astonish some of our " die-hard " anti-Semites to learn that the Bolshevist rulers of Russia, including the Bolshevist Jewish Commissars, are violently hostile to Zionism, which they have described as " bourgeois " Nationalism, have banned Hebrew education and rendered life very disagreeable for most Zionist Jews in Russia.

The writer was actually warned of Kemalist and Bolshevist activities in Palestine at Constantinople by a Turkish statesman, who prophesied the early outbreak of disturbances between Jews and Arabs in Palestine some three weeks before the actual explosion at Jaffa.

Italian intrigue has been suspected, but so far the hostility of certain elements in the Vatican has been quite open, frank and, from some points of view, explicable. It remains to be seen whether Signor Mussolini, who is not credited with any strong affection for Great Britain as a Mediterranean Power, will attempt to combine sympathy with Palestinian Arabs and military expeditions against the Arabs of Tripoli. It would not be very surprising if he did.

The opposition of the Palestinian Christians to Zionism requires some detailed explanation. Religious fanaticism exists among Eastern Christians, though it usually takes a less violent form, even in moments of excitement, than among the Moslems. I remember being very disagreeably impressed by hearing a Palestinian, a man who occupied a good business position and was fairly well educated, enlarge upon the Jewish menace to Christianity, " our common faith," and the



[*Photo: Russell & Sons, Baker St.*

H. E. MUSA KAZIM PASHA EL-HUSSEINI, HEAD OF THE ARAB DELEGATION

[*Face page* 108

advantages of a massacre of Jews in a combined Christian and Moslem pogrom. When I pointed out that the Palestinian Government would have something to say, should such an outbreak take place, my Christian acquaintance cried, "Well, anyhow we can call in the Beduin from across Jordan and they will come, for we shall promise them Jewish girls from the colonies and plenty of plunder." I found some difficulty, I confess, in replying without excessive violence to this outburst. But here again the fact that some Christians in Palestine are fanatical does not excuse the singular imprudence sometimes displayed by Jews. It is not long since a Jew made his way into the Church of the Holy Sepulchre during the Ceremony of the Holy Fire, at which religious emotion runs high and sectarian passion may flare up at any moment. He was detected and might have been lynched had not the Governor and his police stood round him and kept off the infuriated crowd. But when the Governor remonstrated with him on his folly, the obstinate man replied that he was an American citizen and had as much right to be there as anyone else, whereupon the police hastily conducted him out of the Church in spite of his loud protests.

But the chief cause of Christian hostility to the Zionists is Jewish competition. As shopkeepers, craftsmen, skilled labourers, traders, the Jews are the rivals of the local Christians. I believe that the latter hold their own well enough, but they resent this competition, since many of them were under the impression during the war that when the British had conquered the country they would enjoy preferential treatment.

Take again the question of the Civil Service : although a number of the "Palestinian" Christian officials are not really Palestinians at all but Syrians, in many cases Lebanese, Arab Christians are certainly over-represented in the Administration. In 1921, out of 181 non-British Palestinians in the Senior Civil Service, 82—

that is to say, over 45 per cent.—were Christians. In the Junior Civil Service in the same year 49 per cent. were Christians. Yet the Christians form less than 11 per cent. of the entire population of Palestine !

It is hard not to suspect some, if by no means all, of the Palestinian or pseudo-Palestinian Christians, who have identified themselves with anti-Zionist agitation, of being actuated by a desire to divert Moslem attention from their own great preponderance in the Civil Service. Of late, and more especially since Kemal Pasha's victory over the Greeks, there have been indications that the Christian element has become somewhat less enthusiastic as regards the Moslem alliance. The Christian members of the Arab Delegation, and the leading Christians of the Islamo-Christian party, continue to talk of the union of hearts, but the mass of followers and, one suspects, the leaders themselves, not to mention many of the Christians of Syria, have taken note of a number of disagreeable possibilities, such as a French withdrawal from Aleppo and Damascus into the " Great Lebanon," which would, at the present juncture bring the Kemalist Turks within striking distance of Palestine,[1] and such facts as the ruthless expulsion of Christians from Anatolia, the sack and burning of Greek Smyrna, and the blank refusal of the Turks at Lausanne to accept any control of their treatment of minorities by any representative of the League of Nations.

There are sturdy, progressive and energetic communities of Christian farmers and craftsmen at Bethlehem, Beit-Jala and Ramallah in Judæa, and at Nazareth and elsewhere in Galilee. But, speaking generally, the Christians form a *petite bourgeoisie* of town-dwellers,

[1] It is certain that were the French to withdraw to the Lebanon and the coast, the Syrian Moslems, unless they had British and French support, would be as little able to withstand the Turks as their ancestors were unable to oppose the Hittites, the Seljuks and every other invader from the north and north-east.

who aspire, on the strength of decidedly insufficient qualifications, to form a sort of aristocracy of intellect, and are vastly annoyed at the competition of the more persevering, more united and more disciplined Jew. Speaking generally, one may fairly say that the Arab Christians of Syria and Palestine in many respects resemble the Greeks and the Western Armenians, but lack the patriotism, which will save Greece from herself and her enemies, and the historical tradition, and the fighting qualities of the Hellenes,[1] and that extraordinary perseverance and strange passive courage which has preserved Armenian nationality, in spite of every disaster.

It cannot be said that any striking personalities have emerged on the Arab side since the commencement of the Arab agitation. There is no leader who can, for an instant, be compared with Zaghlul Pasha, and the Arab politicians who lead the movement seem to be only locally influential. Wadia Bustani, himself a Lebanese, is an excitable, energetic young demagogue, whom the Moslems tolerate. He may become dangerous : but he does not seem in the least constructive. Musa Kiazim Pasha el-Husseini and other Arab Moslem leaders are men with little political or administrative experience, who give one the impression that they represent great family interests—and no more. They have charming manners, but they transact business portentously slowly, and their family quarrels and jealousies stand in the way of united action. This lack of leaders doubtless explains the many mistakes in

[1] It is at present the fashion in England to sneer at the Greek Army. The English seldom know modern history, otherwise they would have remembered that the Greeks have seen the backs of the Turk and of the more formidable Bulgar often enough since 1912 (Janina, Kilkish, Dorylæum) and that the Turkish victory of Afium-Karahissar was won over an army that had gone on strike, owing to war-weariness and the conviction that Greece had been abandoned by the Western Powers.

tactics and in propaganda which both Moslems and Christians have made.

Although the Arab is often cleverer in parish politics than the Zionist, who has sometimes shown himself extraordinarily maladroit, he seems even less capable than the latter of seeing the other side of any political question. His efforts at propaganda are weakened by the same remarkable contempt for the intelligence of those whom he would convert that marks other Orientals, the Turks who try to persuade you that there were never any Armenian massacres, or the Indian Moslems who aver that Adrianople is a Holy City.

Just as many of the Zionist Jews seem to think that the British official in Palestine is a Russian, so the Arab often talks of him as if he were a Turk. Suspicion of the Administration is frequently carried to absurd lengths. I have been gravely assured by a prominent Arab that an excellent ordinance for establishing reformatories for juvenile criminals was designed to punish poor little Arab children who cried "Down with the Jews."

Much of the propaganda in which the Arab Delegation has indulged in London, Rome and elsewhere is deliberately false. Thus the Arab Delegation's statement that the Government is improperly interfering in management of Moslem "Wakfs"—i.e. Pious Foundations—is untrue, and the Delegation must have known that it was untrue, since when it made this statement a representative Moslem Conference had recommended, and the Government had agreed, that such Pious Foundations should be managed by purely Moslem committees, independent of the Government, working under an equally independent Moslem Religious Council.

Most annoying, to anyone who has served with the British and the Sherifian Arab forces in the Palestine campaign and knows something of the history of that campaign, are the pretensions of the Arabs of Palestine

to have rendered important military services to the Allies in the Great War.

Many of the Transjordanians and the Hejazis, whom, for all their talk of Arab union, the Palestine Arabs dislike and fear as rude and hardy men, played their part right well under the inspiring leadership of Emir Feisal and Colonel T. E. Lawrence ; but the Palestinians confined themselves to deserting in large numbers to the British, who fed and clothed and paid for the maintenance of many thousand such prisoners of war, few indeed of whom could be induced to obtain their liberty by serving in the Sherifian Army.

Still, if one must make allowances for the weaknesses of the Zionist Jew who has lived under the Russian yoke, one must also make allowances for the Arab whose life has been spent under the heavy and corrupt incompetence of the Turk, whose regime crushed personality and discouraged progress.

The Arab Press of Palestine is weak ; no newspaper has a circulation comparable to that of the *Doar Hayom* (the "Palestine *Daily Mail*"), the principal Jewish newspaper ; and with a few exceptions the Arab journalists "pontify or rave" rather than discuss. But it is unfair to criticize a child. However mendacious some of their propaganda, however absurd their suspicions or fears may often be, they have a case.

The declaration of British policy in Palestine, generally known as "The Churchill Statement," which was published in June, 1922, has had a certain effect in calming some of the apprehensions of the Arab rank and file. But it failed to mollify the Arab Delegation, and Jewish—and British—mistakes are, as is the way of the world, remembered, and will be remembered long after serious and successful efforts have been made to remedy them. Nor should too much stress be laid on the calming effect of the granting of the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain by the League of Nations. It has

certainly relieved the situation by confronting the extremists on both sides with a *fait accompli*, and thus discouraging the fishers in troubled waters. It has strengthened the prestige of the Administration, which until the Mandate was granted had no international charter from the League Council beyond a request that it should "carry on" addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Government in October, 1921, and had consequently all the weaknesses of a Provisional Government.

It will improve the economic situation, which has greatly contributed to popular discontent, by enabling the Administration to raise loans for remunerative public works. But unless it encourages the moderate elements among Zionists and Arabs to arrive at an agreement safeguarding the principle of a Jewish National Home on the one hand, and the political rights of the Arab on the other, Arab anti-Zionist agitation and Zionist anxiety and discontent will continue to embarrass both the Administration and the Mandatory Power.

A fair criticism of the Arab leaders is that they do not seem to have yet realized the great economic and financial advantages of co-operating with the moderate Zionists, who, after all, are the Zionists who will count in the long run. In this connection mention must be made of the plea for "Semitic Union" of Jew and Arab, which has been and is being conducted by Mr. H. M. Kalvarisky, a member of the Advisory Council and one of the two Palestinian Jewish representatives on the Zionist Executive in Palestine, who strikes one as a wise and moderate Zionist, who knows Palestine thoroughly, and joins to a humane idealism a decidedly practical temperament. Recent commercial and business co-operation between Jews and Arabs at Jaffa is of good omen for the future, and no sensible Arab, however much he may prate of the blessings of the old days, when all were poor but happy, but remembers that over £1,500,000 is spent annually by Jews in Palestine, and that a large proportion

of this impressive total finds its way ultimately into Arab pockets. Indeed the influx of Jewish capital into Palestine has done much to save the Arab peasant from the worst consequences of the present agricultural depression. But if the Arab has much to gain from an alliance with the moderate Zionist, the sane Zionist Jew will remember that even a predominantly Jewish Palestine, however strong, will always be a Hebrew island in an Arab ocean, and that as long as Islam and Christianity are forces that count in the world, so long must Zionism seek to conciliate the Moslem and Christian Arabs. Methods of preparing the ground for such an alliance are surely discoverable.

Of the pro-Zionist elements among the Moslems, those Beduins in the Beersheba district who hope to sell their rights over, or their claims to, large areas of scarcely cultivated or quite uncultivated land at a good price, and those villagers who are anxious to benefit by Jewish methods of cultivation, and hope that the influx of Jewish capital will continue to advantage the Arab as well as the Jew, count for very little politically. There are a good many villages, notably in Galilee, where the Moslems live on quite friendly terms with the Jewish settlements, but these small cultivators could not be relied upon to withstand pressure from the anti-Zionist large landholders in their districts. In Galilee there is also a political party, which came into being about a year ago, called the " National-Islamic " Society, which makes friendship with Zionism and support of the Administration the principal planks in its political platform. It is alleged by its critics of the Islamo-Christian Society to owe its existence to generous Zionist subventions and to the moral support of the Civil Secretary. Its members include a former Mayor of Haifa and several persons who were functionaries under the Turkish Government. Its importance is only local, and one doubts whether it will be able to elect a single

candidate to the Legislative Council unless the Islamo-Christian Society carries out its threat of boycotting the elections. The pro-Zionists among the Christian Arabs are not at all numerous, but they include a certain number of business men, who have a shrewd eye to the value of Jewish co-operation in the economic development of the country, and a few landowners, who hope to sell their estates at a good price to the Jewish Colonization Association.

Speaking generally, the Arab movement, represented by the Islamo-Christian Society, may be described as nationalist, although such factors as religious fanaticism, fear of Jewish economic competition, the class-interests of the Arab notables and especially the large landowners, and a conservative dislike of change, make its nationalism negative rather than positive. Arab Nationalism is a tender plant everywhere and especially in Palestine ; still it has pushed its first spikes above the soil and as far as one can foresee will have to be reckoned with more and more as the years pass. Among the younger generation of the more educated class, Nationalism is stronger and more idealistic than among their elders, whose Turkish training has not taught them to look beyond personal or narrowly sectional interests, and whose fears of Zionism are too often coloured or inspired by personal considerations. At the same time the alliance between Moslems and Christians is not too stable ; the interests of Moslem landowners and Christian traders are by no means identical ; Christian support of the pan-Arab movement in Syria, as in Palestine, has been decidedly lukewarm, and a pro-Turkish or pan-Islamic movement could find no Christian backing whatever. The influence of the Islamo-Christian Society on the country as a whole can easily be exaggerated. Its genuine supporters may be divided into (*a*) real Nationalists, who see in Zionism a threat to Arab political and cultural development in Palestine ;

(*b*) the fanatics, whose numbers are very limited ; and (*c*) those members of the still influential " Effendi " class, who conceive that their interests are threatened by Zionism. Among these must be reckoned a majority of the Christian professional men and traders.

Behind these elements are a large majority of quiet people who go with the stream ; peasants who are instinctively pro-Moslem if the Arab-Zionist quarrel presents itself to them in the form of strife between co-religionists and unbelievers, but who do not know what it is all about, and, while not averse to a little judicious looting, have no desire to rebel against Government and collide with General Tudor's gendarmes ; merchants who will close their shops when a hint comes down from the political leaders, but do so more to be " in the movement " than from any settled conviction ; craftsmen who follow suit for the same reasons—all ready to retire as gracefully as they may, if the Government shows that it disapproves of the action of the leaders and is ready to punish any lawlessness severely.

It is easy enough to arrange meetings of protest, political strikes and similar demonstrations in the Near East, as long as the Government tolerates them. The failure of the attempt to boycott the Jews last summer, in spite of the passive attitude of the Administration, is much more significant.

At the same time it must be admitted that there are certain danger centres in Palestine ; Nablus, where real religious fanaticism exists among the Moslems and where no Jew is allowed to settle ; Hebron, where there is a turbulent population still given to faction fighting ; Jerusalem during the season of the great religious feasts, Moslem and Christian, when wild religious emotionalism easily begets wild explosions of sectarian hatred among people whose natural excitability has been worked up to its highest pitch ; the working-class quarters of Jaffa, if and when the Moslem workmen

suffer from Jewish competition. But one may hope that the improvement in the economic condition of the country, the growth of education and of the conviction that the British Government will not tolerate or support any attempt on the part of the Zionist Organization to override the rights of the Arab majority and make the Jews sole rulers in Palestine, will limit and eventually bring to an end the temporarily inevitable friction between Arab and Jew in Palestine.

The principal Arab grievances, apart from those which have been discussed in this and in preceding chapters, are contained in the following allegations :—

(*a*) That Great Britain, when she took over the administration of Palestine, was led by the Zionists to adopt a policy mainly directed towards the establishment of a National Home for the Jews, and not to the equal benefit of all Palestinians.

(*b*) That in pursuance of this policy the Government of Palestine has, as its official advisory body, a Zionist Commission, bound by its ideals and its conception of its rôle to regard Jewish interests before all others, and constituted by its singular prerogatives into an *imperium in imperio*.

(*c*) That there is an undue proportion of Jews in the Government Service.

(*d*) That a part of the programme of the Zionists is the flooding of Palestine with a people which possesses greater commercial and organizing ability than the Arabs and will eventually obtain the upper hand over the rest of the population.

(*e*) That the immigrants are an economic danger to the population, because of their competition, and because they are favoured in this competition.

(*f*) That immigrant Jews offend by their arrogance and by their contempt of Arab social prejudices.

(*g*) That owing to insufficient precautions immigrants of Bolshevik tendencies have been allowed to enter the country, and that these persons have endeavoured to introduce social strife and economic unrest into Palestine and to propagate Bolshevik doctrines. (*Report of the Commission of Inquiry re the Disturbances in Palestine in May*, 1921, p. 51).

In the following chapters these allegations will be discussed. Those dealing with Jewish immigration and based upon the widespread Arab belief that the Zionist Executive in Palestine, working in conjunction with the world-wide Zionist Organization, is encouraging and organizing this immigration with the object of so strengthening the Jewish element in Palestine as to enable it to bid sooner, rather than later, for political supremacy in the country, must be examined first.

The following are the results of the census recently taken in Palestine:

Sunni Moslems	589,564
Shiah Moslems or Metawileh	156
Total of Moslems	589,720
Christians	73,026
Jews and Samaritans	83,957
Druses	7,028
Bahais	265
Hindus and Sikhs[1]	1,862
	755,858

[1] Indian troops in garrison in Palestine. The Samaritans number 163.

CHAPTER 6

Jewish Immigration

FIRST SIGHT OF THE HALUTZIM. INFLUX OF IMMIGRANTS. "JUDÆO-SLAVS." ARAB CRITICISM. FAIR AND UNFAIR ATTACKS. LACK OF PREPARATION. LABOUR DIFFICULTIES. THE CASE OF KHEDERA. THE BOUNTY SYSTEM. OBSTACLES TO MASS IMMIGRATION. MORE HASTE, LESS SPEED.

I HAD barely left my lodging on Mount Carmel in the early forenoon of March 5, 1921, when a sight, unusual even in the Near East where one is seldom astonished, met my eyes. In the middle of a stony field sat a strapping young woman, attired in a khaki smock, football shorts, socks and hob-nailed boots. The wind blew her shock of bobbed black and tousled hair this way and that. In her right hand she held a hammer, with which she broke stones with a vigour rare indeed among professional road-menders. The development of her calves and biceps would have done credit to many athletes, and she had not that dusty appearance which those who live by breaking stones so frequently exhibit. Addressing the Amazon with some trepidation, I learnt that she was a graduate of a Galician University and had come out to Palestine as one of the earlier "Halutzim" or Jewish "pioneers" to work for Zionism. She hoped to settle on the land one day; meantime she found her new country a haven of rest after the disorderly borderlands between Poland and the Soviets' Ukraine. I should have asked her more had not her manner been curt, not to say forbidding—perhaps because she had a poor opinion of affable Gentiles, perhaps because my presence interfered with her work. Her hammer, too, reminded me of Sisera's fate, so I bade her good day.

Later I met many more of the Halutzim in the Haifa district. Some were planting trees, of which Mount Carmel, largely stripped for the requirements, first of the Turco-German and later of the British forces, stood

much in need. Others were working on the roads. A number were employed in loading coal at the harbour, an experiment which did not succeed, untrained Halutzim, with the best will in the world, being quite unable to compete with the sturdy Egyptians, who at that time were employed at the port. About ten per cent. of those whom I saw were young women. All looked healthy and happy ; many were well-educated folk, and I doubt if there were any illiterates among them. They came, with few exceptions, from Poland and the Russian border states, spoke Hebrew among themselves more frequently than Yiddish or any Slav language, and worked, often with more zeal than skill, but always with zeal.

On a subsequent occasion I visited Dilb in the Judæan hills, a place which I had known in 1918 as a boulder-strewn wilderness. In nineteen months 500 acres had been prepared for cultivation or afforestation under the supervision of a Jewish farmer from Galilee. The hill-sides had been planted with oak, pine and casuarina, the lower levels with vines and fruit-trees, cereals and pulse. This was the work of 200 Halutzim, men and women, from the Ukraine, whose huts and tents were clean and whose beasts were in excellent condition.

Some thirty-five families have now been settled on this land as an " Agricultural Co-operative," the land being leased to them by the colonization branch of the Zionist Organization.

Of the new immigrant Jews, of whom some 30,000 at most have entered Palestine since the end of the Great War, the majority are Halutzim from Eastern and East Central Europe. Many of them are blond, blue-eyed people, and in this connection Mr. H. G. Wells may be interested to learn that many Russian, Baltic and Ukrainian Jews are as " Nordic " in facial type as Northern Russians, Letts or Poles. Whatever their origin, whether they are converted Slavs or descendants of the

enigmatic Khazars, these Ashkenazi Jews are far more Europeanized in appearance than most of their Sephardic co-religionists from the Mediterranean lands, and the Arab therefore regards their coming not as the return of a long-lost but still recognizable kinsman, but as an invasion of Europeans, alien in speech, in customs and in appearance.

It is this constant influx, only interrupted for a few months after the Jaffa disturbances, of obviously foreign Jews into Palestine that has been one of the chief causes of anti-Zionist feeling among the Arabs. The average Arab workman or peasant of the areas which the immigrants penetrate—the Jerusalem district, parts of Galilee, the Plains of Sharon and Esdraelon—knows nothing of the Zionist Executive and less than nothing of the history of the Zionist movement. He leaves the Balfour Declaration, if he has ever heard of it, to be interpreted by his betters of the " Effendi " class. To judge from some of the " interpretations " which lie before me, the Effendis have been as unsuccessful as many Occidentals in attaching a clear and precise meaning to the somewhat vague phrases necessarily employed by the illustrious author of *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt.*

But the Arab in these areas cannot help seeing the Halutzim who came to Palestine to settle upon and cultivate the land, but many of whom, women as well as men, are employed in manual labour and thus compete with him. Had a larger proportion of these pioneers been recruited from the Jews of Spain, Salonika and Barbary, they would have attracted less attention and criticism. No one who knows the Mediterranean well but will admit that, whether Sergi's " Mediterranean Race " is an ethnological entity or not, there are tricks of speech and manner, similarities of outlook on life and of custom, which are generally diffused throughout the Mediterranean world, and that the peoples of its

seaboard—with the exception of the intrusive Slavs and Turks—whether Latin, Greek, North African, or Semitic —can generally contrive to live fairly amicably together when priests and politicians permit them. But the Halutzim are such obvious Northerners—" Judæo-Slavs " would be a good generic term for them—differing profoundly in habits and appearance from the Arabs ! And it is precisely this difference that accentuates the hostility arising in the first place out of real or dreaded economic competition.

And yet one cannot blame the Zionist Organization for encouraging the emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe into Palestine. Jewish opinion throughout Europe and America is profoundly moved by the sufferings and privations of the Ashkenazim of the East. The Zionist leaders cannot risk alienating that opinion by any action which might suggest discrimination against the " Judæo-Slav " immigrants. Any discrimination between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, and favouring the latter on the part of the Government of Palestine or the Colonial Office, would arouse furious criticism and conceivably something more dangerous than criticism. And even if preferential treatment of the Sephardim were possible, its results would not justify it. For one Sephardi Jew who wishes to leave his abiding-place for the " National Home," there are fifty Ashkenazim. The fact is that with few exceptions the Jews of the Mediterranean lands are secure and prosperous. Those of Salonika, though on the whole very well treated by the Hellenes, have suffered economically through the commercial decadence of Salonika and through the destruction of a great part of their city by fire. Hitherto they have migrated mainly to Tunis, Smyrna and Constantinople. Of course, if the Turkish Nationalists, after getting rid of the economically indispensable Greeks and Armenians, commit the crowning folly of expelling or persecuting the Ottoman Jews, these latter

will emigrate and many will go to Palestine : but till now few of them have gone there.

The Arab adversaries of Zionism accuse the Halutzim of being turbulent, immoral, criminal, and "Bolshevik" —the last a very comprehensively vituperative adjective in these days. All these qualifications have been employed in my hearing by eloquent Arab propagandists. When pressed for facts, they referred to the seizure by the police of arms smuggled into the ports by Jews, to various acts on the part of the immigrants which they considered ill-mannered and to the former activities of the Jewish Communists which led to the Jaffa riots. They also alleged in some instances that young men and girls lived together in deplorable promiscuity in the labour camps of the Halutzim.

The smuggling of arms into Palestine must be discussed elsewhere. It need only be said here that, according to information from unbiased sources, there are still too many service rifles, mostly of Turkish origin, in Palestinian Arab hands. There is unquestionably little serious crime among the immigrants, relatively much less than among the Moslem Arabs. As for the sexual morals of the new-comers, there is no prostitution among the Halutzim and no venereal disease. Immigrants suffering therefrom are excluded from Palestine. In a few labour camps some young people afflicted with advanced ideas indulge in "free marriage," that is to say live together without troubling the Rabbi or the Registrar, but so far no Halutza[1] is known to have misconducted herself with an Arab and no Arab woman has been molested by a Halutz.[2] The only white-slave trafficker I heard of in connection with immigrants was, I regret to say, an English Jew, who was accused of having tried to procure a Jewish immigrant girl for an Arab and was set upon and very soundly

[1] Hebrew feminine of Halutz, meaning a female pioneer.
[2] Pioneer.

beaten by the Halutzim, from whose clutches he was finally rescued by the police. As regards the unpleasant subject of prostitution among the people of Palestine in general, all that need be said is this : before the war prostitution was unknown in Jerusalem and rare in other towns. During the Turco-German occupation of Jerusalem this evil, whether open or clandestine, became prevalent, owing partly to the presence of large numbers of troops but mainly to the general economic distress. It was more marked among the resident Jews of Jerusalem than among the Arabs, because the Jews formed the majority of the population and because a large proportion of them lived on remittances from their kindred in Russia, which ceased to arrive after the beginning of the war. With the disappearance of its economic cause, prostitution almost automatically decreased. At Jerusalem prostitution is not tolerated by the British and local authorities, and clandestine vice of this kind is growing rarer. In Jaffa and Haifa the number of prostitutes is not large, and most of them are Egyptian Moslems or Syrian Christians.

As to the manners of the immigrants, it is not easy to generalize. My own experiences have varied. The one occasion on which I witnessed a display of really bad manners on the part of any Halutzim was when the late Lord Northcliffe visited a small camp near Haifa. It was early in February last year ; he was motoring to Haifa to meet a French warship which was to take him to Beirut. He had promised to visit Halutzim camps and was accompanied by Mr. N——, a young official, an Irish Jew by origin, who fortunately for all concerned has a strong sense of humour. We arrived ; a local Zionist met us near the camp and led us to the dining hut, where a number of Halutzim were taking their midday meal. Lord Northcliffe bade me talk to several young women who were peeling potatoes, knitting or helping to cook, and after greeting his hosts with a cheerful

" good morning," began to ask them questions through an interpreter. He met with a churlish reception. No one responded to his greeting, no one rose to meet him, none of half a dozen young men who were sitting on benches or leaning against the wall of the room took the trouble to take their hands out of their pockets. Few replied to his questions, and their replies were curt and monosyllabic. Most looked sullenly at him and were silent. Nothing whatever in Lord Northcliffe's manner or words justified this attitude. In my experience he was forthcoming to all, and was as direct and as free from arrogance of manner when he spoke to a working-man as when he spoke to a high official. Meanwhile I had attempted to ask the young women some questions as to their origin, their work and the conditions of their life, but they refused to reply, generally shaking their heads when asked if they knew German, French or Arabic, and frowned at me as if I had designs on their virtue. After a few minutes, Lord Northcliffe, having expressed his views as to the manners of the Halutzim very freely and forcibly, departed in his car. It took Mr. N—— some time to soothe him. I attempted to discover why these immigrants had been so rude and was informed that many of the people in this particular camp thought that it was not " consonant with human dignity " to rise on the entry of a stranger. I imparted this information to Lord Northcliffe on board the French warship. It produced what R. L. Stevenson in his *New Arabian Nights* described as a " deplorable explosion " of strong and decidedly caustic language.

On the other hand, I have very pleasant recollections of two visits I paid to other labour camps—one in the Haifa region, the other in Judæa. In both I was treated with great kindness and courtesy as soon as the first shyness had worn off. The head-men of the camps were intelligent people, quite frank about their difficulties and very ready to explain the system under

[*Photo: American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

A JEWISH COLONY IN THE MAKING

[*Face page* 126

which the camps were managed to a stranger. My visits to the camps for the newly landed immigrants at both Haifa and Jaffa were rendered equally agreeable by the good manners of the immigrants and their readiness to reply to numerous questions, some of which they must have thought very silly.

My impression is that the history of the new-comers makes them inclined to stand on the defensive, and that in many cases those who brought the Halutzim to Palestine have failed to warn them how to avoid hurting local susceptibilities. Thus the Arabs of Haifa and Jaffa have been greatly shocked by the spectacle of young people of both sexes walking about arm in arm in the evenings, singing, laughing and shouting, as young working-class folk do in most North European cities where food is at all plentiful. They no more intended to annoy the Arabs than did the Russian Halutzim who indulged in mixed bathing, without bathing garments—as is the custom of most South Russians and Roumanians—in the Sea of Galilee, and found that this Edenic simplicity aroused the indignation of the conservative inhabitants of all religions who dwelt on its banks.

Still, it is unfair to criticize the immigrants too severely for these mistakes. It is also unfair to accuse them of being Bolshevists, as do many Arabs. Very few Communists (Mopsi) remain in Palestine. But the critics who, while they deny that the immigrants are Bolshevist in the sense that they are supporters of Communism, yet affirm that many of them have been influenced by the extremist ideas of their Russian or Ukrainian *milieu* and lack social discipline, are standing on firmer ground. During the first two years after the war the Zionist emigration agencies were very careless in their selection of emigrants, took little or no trouble to warn them how to avoid irritating the touchy Arabs—and the much more patient British official, and sometimes quite

unwittingly allowed notorious Communists, Zionism's chief enemies in Eastern Europe, to proceed to Palestine among the Halutzim. Last year one Bidermann, expelled as a dangerous Communist from Jaffa after the riots of May, 1921, reappeared there and was promptly arrested. He confessed that he had joined a group of Halutzim at Constantinople, was passed as a fit emigrant by the local Zionist Organization and re-entered Palestine without let or hindrance. The Zionist authorities at Constantinople denied that any such person had been passed by them, but one cannot help wondering whether they were in a position to detect any Bolshevist agent who chose to take a false name and slightly alter his appearance. Of late much more care has been taken by the Zionist emigration agencies to prevent the importation of undesirables into Palestine and to acquaint the new arrivals with their duties towards the government of the country and towards its inhabitants.

But the main objection to the Jewish immigrant on the part of the Arabs is an economic one. Certain classes of skilled labourers are much required in Palestine, and there is no objection to the entry of the small capitalist, although he does at times compete with the Arab trader. But the Halutzim arrived, as a rule, new to manual labour. They included quite a considerable proportion of university students of both sexes and other well-educated persons of the middle class, who came to Palestine to work for the Zionist ideal on the land. Land not being available for all, or indeed for a majority of them, they were employed by the Government on road and railway work, and by private persons, generally Jews, on work of all kinds—often as porters, carters, etc. They thus competed with the Arabs, who complained that the Jewish employer, owing partly to national sympathies, partly to Zionist pressure, employed Jews by preference, though they demanded higher wages than the native. The experiment of employing them on

public works has not been an unmixed success. It is perfectly true that the Halutzim, working in labour co-operatives, will sign longer contracts than most of the Arabs, who are usually peasants who work for short periods during the slack season ; it is also true that those who worked on the roads have become in most cases as efficient as the Arab workmen—whose efficiency, be it noted, is by no means remarkable.

But they have had to be trained from the beginning ; their early work has not been very satisfactory. They have demanded higher wages than the natives. For some eighteen months they have been paid at the same rates as the latter by the Government, but have had the difference made up to them by subventions from the Zionist funds in the shape of equipment, tools and loans bearing no interest, whereby the co-operatives have been enabled to pay out wages before being paid in their turn by the Government.

Many of the Halutzim have been employed as land-workers on the " old Colonies," i.e. the long-established Jewish settlements in Galilee and the Plain of Sharon. In many cases they have not given satisfaction to their employers. The Halutzim and many of their Zionist friends accuse the Jewish farmers of being close-fisted. The farmers retort with a great deal of truth that times are bad, that they have lost their Austrian, Russian and Turkish markets for their wines, that Italian competition, made possible by the exchange, has robbed them of markets for their almonds, and that under these circumstances they do not care to pay their new workmen from thirty per cent. to forty per cent. more than the Arab labourer requires. They add that they are obliged to provide the Halutzim with hutments, medical attention and other advantages which they themselves never enjoyed and that the new type of Jewish agricultural labourer has sometimes insisted on an eight-hour day irrespective of the possibility of applying it

under agricultural conditions. The story of the Halutz who refuses to chase a runaway horse which is careering through the crops for one minute after 6 p.m., until his employer agrees to pay him overtime, is a " chestnut " in Palestine, and if not necessarily true is decidedly *ben trovato*. That there is ground for these complaints is proved by the action of the Jews of the colony of Khedera near Cæsarea. These people, old-fashioned Jews from Russia, who had built up a prosperous little settlement by the sweat of their brows, employed from 400 to 500 Arab workmen until May 6, 1921. On that day they were attacked by armed mobs of Arabs and some of their properties were looted. They then dismissed most of their Arabs, some of whom had taken part in this unprovoked attack, and employed Halutzim. The new workmen proved so expensive and gave so much trouble that the Khederans, in spite of what had happened and in spite of great Zionist pressure, got rid of them and are now employing Arabs again.

The fact is that the bounty system, introduced originally by the Zionist Commission, and strongly supported by the Palestinian Jewish Labour Organizations, may be defensible from a political standpoint by the Zionists, but seems to be economically unsound. An influx of European Jewish labour obtaining higher wages than the present economic and financial condition of the country justifies, has made agricultural production, already hard hit by the effects of the war, by a high exchange and, to some extent, by our literal application of the Turkish system of taxation (of which more will be said in a succeeding chapter), still less remunerative. The wages of Arab labour are rising, and the Arab landowner, usually in debt and lacking capital, connects this rise with Jewish immigration. Again, is there much to be said from the economic point of view for the payment by the Zionist Organizations of the difference between ordinary rates of pay and those demanded by

the immigrant workers? It has certainly kept many immigrant Jews in the country, but by forcing up wages in poor and backward Palestine it must hamper the beginnings of industrial beginnings and by so doing render it more difficult for Jewish immigrants to enter the country under the existing regulations.

For some time past the Palestine Government has imposed a strict control on immigration. Besides travellers, tourists and others making only a temporary stay in the country, it allows the entry of persons having a capital of £E.500, certain categories of professional men, skilled workmen, such as masons, plasterers, plumbers, and the like, who in the opinion of the Labour Department are required by the country and can find work immediately and finally such persons as have work or maintenance guaranteed them by responsible inhabitants. These restrictions are criticized by some Zionists, who believe that the best way of establishing the National Home on a firm basis is to permit what amounts to free immigration for some years, in order to increase the numerical strength of the Jewish element more rapidly. These critics maintain that though such a policy may seem economically dangerous, yet "where there's a will, there's a way," and the country could eventually absorb the immigrant swarms. The Government, however, has wisely decided against such an experiment, which would be not only economically but politically dangerous, would provoke intense Arab hostility, fill the towns with unemployed or half-employed foreigners who would soon grow dangerously ready to listen to inflammatory preachers of class warfare and compel the Government or the Zionist Organization, which are neither of them blessed with a superfluity of funds, or both, to pay unemployment doles to allay discontent. One can readily understand that many Jews are intensely disappointed that since the end of the war only 25,000 new immigrants at most have entered Palestine and settled

permanently there, representing an increase by immigration of at most 3·8 per cent. in the total population. But the suggested mass immigration is no remedy for this state of things. Circumstances can be imagined under which mass immigration would lead either to mass emigration—or to massacre.

Even as it is one is tempted to criticize the policy which has permitted the employment of large numbers of relatively unskilled Halutzim on work which they did not expect to undertake when they left Eastern Europe. Is it wise or just to keep many of the educated men and women who have come to Palestine to settle on the land, working month after month as unskilled labourers? The great majority of them show an idealistic courage worthy of all praise, but when one remembers that only 500 out of about 17,000 new immigrants who entered Palestine in 1920 and 1921 had been settled on the land up to April, 1922, that over 1,200 are out of work, and that neither the Russian nor the Ukrainian Halutzim can be expected to return to the Soviet's hunger-stricken realms and must stay in Palestine, one cannot help fearing that disappointed idealists may yet give trouble.

Arab propagandists aver that such is the intention of the Zionists; that the Halutzim, mostly unmarried people, often ex-soldiers, are to form a Zionist Army of Revolution as soon as their numbers are sufficiently large. One need not accept these imaginative and biased explanations of the policy that was followed until May, 1921. But it is impossible to deny that the Zionists, in their desire to increase the numerical strength of the Jews in Palestine as rapidly as possible and to do their suffering co-religionists of Eastern Europe a service, have imported relatively large numbers of immigrants before land on which they could settle and public works whereon they could be extensively employed were available. They have sometimes been careless in their selection of immigrants, they till recently

neglected their social and political instruction, and their policy of subventioning immigrant labour has forced up the cost of living and labour in a poor and undeveloped country. Their very haste has added to their difficulties, more particularly by enhancing the Arab's suspicion that they aim at an early political domination over Palestine and that the Government of the country is aiding them to fulfil their design. At the same time the Zionist leaders are not alone responsible for these tactical errors ; the British and Palestinian Governments, which did not realize their danger in time ; the British Consuls, who in the early days of Jewish immigration gave passes for Palestine to numbers of Jews without making sufficient inquiry as to their qualifications ; the Zionist emigration agencies ; and above all the Zionist rank and file who have clamoured so loudly for results as to force the hands of their chiefs—all have had a share in errors which have led to quite unnecessary political and economic friction and which have been more easily committed than remedied.

Note.—For the present restrictions on immigration, *see* Appendix II.

CHAPTER 7

Land, Labour, Language, and Public Works

THE ARAB PEASANTRY. LAND TENURE. JEWISH AGRICULTURAL COLONIES. DIFFERENT SYSTEMS. THE GERMAN TEMPLARS. THE URBAN JEWS AND THE "HALUKA." JEWISH LABOUR PARTIES. COQUETTING WITH THE MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL. THE HAGANA. THE USE OF HEBREW. PUBLIC WORKS. MR. PINHAS RUTENBERG AND HIS SCHEMES. THE RUTENBERG CONCESSION AND OPTION. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST. THE "DESECRATION" CRY.

THERE are distinct if not very important differences between the Arab peasantry of different districts in Palestine. Near Gaza one notices in details of dress, of dialect and in the physical appearance of some of the cultivators, certain traces of Egyptian admixture. Farther north the type becomes more "Syrian," notably in parts of Galilee, where even the poorer *fellaheen* are lighter skinned and sharper featured. There is black blood among both nomads and peasants in the Jordan Valley. There is an obvious mixture of Crusading blood among some of the Christians of Bethlehem and Nazareth, and the head-dress of the Bethlehem women is clearly of mediæval European origin. Methods of cultivation also differ, according to the character of the soil. In the extreme south, where the people outside a few oasis villages are Beduin, a rain-crop of wheat or barley is sown at the end of the autumn, when the early rains fall ; the people camp near it as harvest-time approaches in the late spring, and, after reaping their crop, stroll away over the steppe with their beasts to points where water is relatively easily obtainable, and move from place to place around these points till the rains begin. Farther north, from Gaza to the Syrian border, the Arab population of the plains grows its cereals, chiefly wheat, and its pulse in a primitive and untidy manner. Field crops are sown, cleaned and reaped with few exceptions by hand. The oxen tread

out the corn on the village threshing floor. Weeds swarm in the crops ; plough cattle have been sadly thinned by the war ; the more primitive settlements still grow crop after crop on the same soil, till its fertility is exhausted and then leave it to lie fallow till it recovers. They do not trouble to use manure or chemical fertilizers, and the desirability of experimenting with new varieties of seed or new breeds of animals has not penetrated their minds. But even among these primitive people one finds progressive islands ; I shall have more to say about the Jewish agricultural colonies ; there are also Arab landowners and even village communities on whose properties manuring and crop rotation have become recognized practices. Yet in spite of the object-lesson taught by the Jewish and German colonies, and by the Arab progressives, the average yield of an acre under wheat, barley or pulse in Palestine is less than a third of the average yield of the same area, similarly cultivated, in Egypt. On some of the Jewish estates and colonies up-to-date methods have given results approximating to the Egyptian, and though much of the cultivable soil of Palestine does not, and never will, equal that of the Nile Valley in fertility, far more could be made of it than to-day, when only half the cultivable area of Palestine is under perennial cultivation.

The stony plateaux of Judæa and Samaria, where soil of any depth lies only in pockets among the hills, are unsuitable for cereal cultivation. Here garden and orchard cultivation takes the place of cereal farming ; the olive, grown on the often terraced hill-sides, is the chief crop, but outside Bethlehem, where European blood probably tells, the inhabitants do not prune the trees down but let them grow so high that the fruit can only be brought down by the use of long poles, with which the cultivators beat and break the branches and injure the productivity of the trees for a full year. The one crop produced in Palestine which is both of high value

and quality, and is grown in a scientific manner by most of those who cultivate it, is the Jaffa orange. But it requires irrigation, and only the extension of well-irrigation and the provision of hydro-electric power as proposed in the Rutenberg scheme for the purpose of raising water from deeply sunk wells, can facilitate any great extension of orange-growing. But speaking generally, it can be said that, just as there is a general similarity in the characteristics of the Arab peasantry, so there is a general similarity in their methods of husbandry, which must be greatly modernized if the country is to benefit both economically and fiscally from its chief industry—agriculture.

Turkish law still governs the tenure of land in Palestine, though certain laws have been emended by ordinances. Before the war foreigners, corporations and non-Moslem religious and charitable bodies could not register their ownership of land except in the name of a trustee who was an Ottoman subject. Under the British dispensation corporate bodies and foreigners can own land.

Immovable property in Palestine falls into several categories. There is a fair proportion of freehold (*mulk*), but the villagers generally occupy *miri* land, i.e. land which is the property of the State, but over which individuals enjoy rights of occupation and usufruct. In the event of the holder leaving no heirs, such property falls to the State. Unfortunately in a large number of villages the practice has grown up of holding *miri* lands in common, but registering them in the name of a few persons, generally local notables. Consequently the holding shared by perhaps three hundred persons may be registered in the names of half a dozen. Further, this communal system of tenure involves a redistribution of land among the numerous holders at annual, biennial or triennial intervals. The shorter the interval the less the occupant is disposed to improve the holding. In

fact, this system (known as *masha'a*) has the defects of the Russian *mir* and gives rise to feuds, litigation and neglect. The Government is now attempting to persuade the *fellaheen* to divide such communally held lands. *Wakf* land also exists. This is land dedicated by a former owner to some religious or charitable purpose. Such land is now administered by the purely Moslem "Supreme Shari Council," which has supreme authority over all Moslem pious foundations and Shari (religious) Courts in the country. Other categories of land are *matruka* and *mawat*, the former being "common" lands (or buildings) assigned to the inhabitants of a particular place, which cannot be sold or inherited or used for any purpose other than that for which they were assigned, while the latter are waste lands which have no occupant. These cannot be occupied without the permission of the Government. Owing to the number of disputed titles, land transactions are too often tediously lengthy affairs in Palestine, and the system of land tenure requires to be greatly simplified.

Scattered among the mediæval villages of the Arabs, the traveller may be surprised to find well-built villages and hamlets of stone or brick houses, surrounded with orchards and well-tilled fields, vineyards and gardens, and forcibly reminding him of Central Europe. These are the older Jewish agricultural colonists. They have been through great tribulations ; they were often founded by idealists who knew nothing of agriculture or of sub-tropical climatic conditions and paid a heavy toll of lives to malaria. There is a Jewish colony, now doing well, where I am assured that it has been "bad form" for strangers to mention he-goats, ever since the ingenious Arabs, having "sized up" the agricultural knowledge of the first colonists, sold them a flock entirely composed of billy-goats, which to the pained surprise of the new-comers did not increase in numbers ! Yet this colony and others have made good. It is true that they owed

much to the generous aid of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, without which the first colonies would have met with disaster, and some of those founded later would have come to complete financial grief. Still, the reproach of spoon-feeding which has been levelled against colonies and colonists is now hardly justified. Some became financially independent earlier than others, but when the Great War broke out all the long-established colonies had become self-supporting and some were extremely prosperous. The war of course was a disaster ; and its aftermath of financial and agricultural depression, and the loss of the market for Palestine wine in Russia, Austria and latterly Turkey, has been a severe blow to such colonies as Rishon le Zion, which in pre-war days made great profit out of its vineyards. Still, the perseverance and intelligence shown by the great majority of these Jewish farmers, their readiness to keep their methods of agriculture as up to date as possible, and their strong communal organization have carried them through many difficulties and will carry them through more.

There are now just over sixty Jewish colonies in Palestine. Of these twenty-one are in Judæa, and thirty in Galilee, the remainder being in Samaria. Nearly all bear Hebrew names, often very picturesque ones, such as Mishmar Ha-Yarden (Watchtower of Jordan), though one, in Lower Galilee, is called Balfouria in compliment to Lord Balfour. Thirteen belong to the Jewish National Fund, which was established by the Zionist Organization to purchase lands, which should remain the National property of the Jewish community. The colonies of Tel Adas and Kalandieh belong to the Palestine Land Development Company, which is another Zionist offshoot. The older colonies were mostly founded by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, and by the I.C.A. (Jewish Colonization Association), to which Baron Edmond entrusted the management of the colonies which he founded. The total population of the colonies

is now between 18,000 and 19,000. The largest, Petah-Tikveh, has about 3,500 inhabitants.

The general level of comfort in the older colonies is high ; in the newer colonies it is naturally lower, but the Jews pay attention to the amenities of life and everywhere, even in the newest settlements, one finds schools, the synagogue, and a building used as a town hall, concert-room and club. Each settlement has its Vaad or Council, usually elected by adult suffrage, which looks after the school, the synagogue, the library, and the general management of the village. The system of land tenure varies greatly. In some of the older colonies there are numerous small owners. In the newer colonies created by the different branches of the Zionist Organization, the land is usually let at long lease to the settlers in small lots. In some colonies it is owned in common by co-operative groups. Nuris in Galilee, one of the newer colonies, is practically Communist (though by no means Bolshevist). And here I may remark that the Nuris settlers, though their ideas are " advanced " and though they might have been expected to annoy the Arabs as other recent immigrants have sometimes done (*see* Chapter 6), have established excellent relations with the neighbouring Arab villages. Over 6,000 persons from these villages have been treated at the Nuris dispensary in a year, and the result of the tactful attitude of these colonists has been a marked improvement in the relations between Jew and Arab in the whole district.

One sometimes hears the complaint or criticism that some of the Jewish colonists employ Arab labour instead of working themselves, and that many of the sons of the earlier colonists do not remain on the land. I cannot see why Jewish farmers should not employ Arabs if they can afford it. As for the migration of many of the children of the first colonists from the settlements to the towns or abroad, is not the same phenomenon very general in many European countries, even in rural

France? There are plenty of new-comers who will fill their places in Palestine, and nowadays one cannot expect every farmer's son or daughter to stay on the farm, whether in Samaria or Somerset.

The colonies have certainly done much to raise the standard of rural life and of agriculture in all the districts of Palestine where they have been founded. In forty years they have transformed neglected and often inferior land into flourishing islands of intensive cultivation. They have planted great numbers of trees—sorely needed in deforested Palestine, have drained marshes which reeked with malaria and are still draining them, and have introduced new methods of cultivation and new rural industries into a derelict country.[1]

The amount of agricultural land held by the Zionist Organization is now about 30,000 acres, and the area of all the Jewish settlements is not far short of 150,000 acres. The value of the estates and settlements of the Jewish National Federation alone is estimated at £454,000.

About 20,000 acres of the land belonging to the various Jewish colonies are under fruit-trees and between 2,000 and 3,000 acres are under forest trees.

On my first visit to Haifa after the war, I was surprised, and, I must confess, at first a little scandalized to see that the men of the German colony there were all back at work, some of them in their old field-grey uniforms. On inquiry I found that the British colony, and indeed most of the inhabitants, who liked seeing work well done, were overjoyed at their return. "They are the one thoroughly dependable element here," said a British official to me, "if you want a job really well done. They can turn their hands to anything, and so, if you want a good carpenter, mason, joiner, or wheel-

[1] The I.C.A. has obtained a concession for the drainage and reclamation of the Athlit marshes. The local Arab leaders have protested, alleging *inter alia* that it is well known that mosquitoes have no connection with malaria!

wright, you go to them. I don't know what we should do without them." I heard the same story in the Jaffa region, where there are two thriving German villages, Sarona and Wilhelma, known for their excellent dairies and admirably cultivated gardens. Most of these Germans belong to the sect of the Templars founded by the brothers Hoffman, who came to Palestine in 1868 and 1869 to found an ideal Christian community. Unlike other European colonies in the Levant, these hardy Württembergers have thriven in the sun and established several prosperous settlements which equal any Jewish colony with extremely little assistance. Their success suggests that the Zionist Organization can still learn something about colonization.[1]

The Jewish urban population is composed of three very distinct elements. First there is a " black-coated " class, the members of which call it a *bourgeoisie* or an *intelligentsia*, according to their predilections, which is composed of members of the learned professions, officials of the Administration and of the Zionist Organization, traders and persons belonging to what Mr. H. G. Wells calls the " share-holding " class, who have come out to Palestine to live on their incomes in congenial surroundings. Next there are the working-class folk—craftsmen, small employees, mechanics and labourers, skilled and unskilled. Finally there are the Jews who are generally described as those " of the Haluka." The Haluka (*anglice* " division " or " dole ") is the name given to the stream of charity which before the war flowed into Palestine from all quarters of Jewry. It was first heard of in A.D. 1601, when the Jews of Venice opened a fund for the Jews of the Holy Land, who were then suffering much from a famine. Other Jewish communities followed suit, and for over three centuries money was regularly

[1] It might have saved itself much expense before and after the war had it employed British, American or other experts who had a practical knowledge of the art of colonization.

subscribed, not so much for the purpose of mere charity as to enable Jewish scholars and students to interpret the Scriptures and to pray in Palestine for the Jews exiled among the Gentiles. The Haluka was soon abused. An increasing number of Jews, who had no particular ambition, made a pretence of study, but in reality lived on remittances from Europe. For one Rabbi or student whom the Haluka helped to succeed there were three useless parasites. In spite of the efforts of the Zionists and of progressive Jews, whose self-respect revolted at the maintenance of an intellectual proletariat by the misplaced charity of the race, the Haluka Jews of Safed, of Tiberias and most of all of Jerusalem increased in numbers, remained strictly orthodox and looked picturesque and pathetic until the Great War. Then came disaster. The stream ceased to flow. Thousands of these luckless people, always underfed, for they had preferred to live idly on a pittance in poor circumstances than to do honest work, succumbed with their guiltless children to disease and hunger. Unaccustomed to co-operate with their fellows, divided by all sorts of petty differences, the Jews of the old immigration[1] failed to organize any systematic scheme of relief, while the colonists and other new-comers, in spite of great sufferings, succeeded in staving off complete economic and social ruin.

While the Jewish "black-coated" class regards the Haluka Jews with a certain pity, not unmingled with contempt, the Jewish labourers, and more especially the new-comers from Eastern Europe and the labour leaders, make no concealment of their dislike of them. The great majority of the Jewish trades-unionists are more or less Socialists ; all are Zionists ; relatively few are Orthodox Jews in the sense in which the old Jews are orthodox. I remember a conversation with an energetic young Hungarian Zionist, a mechanic by trade, on the

[1] Prior to 1880 or thereabouts.

subject of the Haluka. An agnostic, he believed that the Children of Israel, if not the "Chosen People," had played and would play a great part in human history; he had studied Jewish philosophy; he had an exceptional knowledge of Jewish letters. But for the "old Jews" who opposed Zionism he had no tolerance, no respect whatever. "This adherence to tradition," he said, "and the meticulous observation of every article in the Law had its value when the Jew lived in constant danger of assimilation or under constant temptation to seek safety or advantage by apostasy. But now it is worse than unnecessary. It is positively dangerous, because it cuts off so many young Jews from culturally valuable contacts and narrows their mental outlook. You think many of us 'new Jews' too hostile to the Gentile; our hostility, which I believe is only a phase in the growth of our racial Nationalism, is nothing to the deep-seated contempt of the 'Goyyim'[1] which these pious conservatives feel. As for the moral value of their traditionalism, judge it by its results; what has it made of thousands of Jews in Jerusalem? Remittance men!" This feud between the new Jews and the old, and more especially between the old-fashioned Orthodox Jews, who are to a large extent members of the class which was formerly benefited by the Haluka, and the trade unionists of the Jewish Labour Parties, will be again referred to in the next chapter.

Jewish Labour in Palestine has become strongly organized during the last three years. It is divided politically into three groups: The Poel Ha-Zair (pronounce Tsair), who may be described as non-Socialist or slightly Socialist trade unionists; the Ahaduth Ha-Avoda or Labour Union, which is a Palestinian branch of the moderate Socialist Right Wing of the Poeli-Zion, and the "Mopsi" (*see* Chapter 3), who are now a negligible quantity. Of these the Poel Ha-Zair,

[1] "Gentiles." Plural of "Goy."

while strong trade unionists and supporters of the co-operative movement, are not affiliated to any International, and do not officially describe themselves as Socialists. They are a young, idealistic party who work with the Ahaduth Ha-Avoda in the Histadrud Ha-Ovdim, or Workmen's Organization, in which both parties combine for cultural, economic and colonizing purposes, while maintaining their political independence. But far the strongest of the labour parties is the Ahaduth Ha-Avoda. It is affiliated to the "Vienna Coalition," also known as the "two-and-a-half International," which repudiates Moscow. This party, which is open to any member of the "non-exploiting" classes, has a very definite economic and political programme. It aims at the development of a Jewish community in Palestine on a Labour basis, strongly supports the teaching of Hebrew in the Jewish schools and its use as a medium of instruction, and the maintenance of good relations with the Arabs. It also advocates the settlement of strikes by governmental arbitration, which, however, must not be compulsory, and the establishment of co-operative industrial enterprises wherever possible. As regards the land it takes the view that all immovable property purchased by the Jewish National Fund should become the property of the Jewish community in Palestine. It recommends that the land should be let in comparatively small areas on long leases to individuals and preferably to co-operative groups. The party does not, however, seem definitely committed as a whole to the support of land nationalization. The object of its present land policy is apparently to prevent frequent sales and consequent speculation in land, which, by forcing up prices, would greatly hinder Jewish colonization. The "Mopsi" may be dismissed as a political factor in Palestine. I doubt whether there are twenty confessed Communists in Jaffa and Haifa, where their numbers never exceeded 300. They originally seceded

[*Photo: American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

A JEWISH COLONY MADE

TEL AVIV, THE JEWISH GARDEN CITY AT JAFFA

[*Face page* 144

from the Ahaduth Ha-Avoda on the ground that it was too "national" and that Zionism was a "bourgeois ideal." Their praises of Lenin and Trotzky and all their works did not impress the Ukrainian Halutzim, who knew that Hebrew schools were being closed and Zionists expelled by the Soviet Government, and their denunciation of Zionism did not please the almost fanatically Zionist Jewish workmen of Palestine. After their propaganda had brought about the Jaffa riots they became anathema to the other Jewish Labour parties, which made no protest against the expulsion, by order of the High Commissioner, of all active "Mopsi" who survived the rioting.

But although the Communist supporters of the Third International have quitted the Palestinian stage, there have been signs that some of the Left Wing of the Ahaduth Ha-Avoda have been inclined to coquette with Moscow. Thus the newspaper *Ha-Ahaduth*, which is published by the propaganda department of the Poel-i-Zion in Palestine, last year contained several articles urging the re-opening of communications with Moscow on condition that the Russian Poel-i-Zion supported Jewish aspirations in Palestine. In one article referring to the Third International one finds the passage—

> "We still cannot agree with the totality of its decisions . . . but we are ready to show our approval of the Third International by our organizational affiliation therewith, on the express condition that it does not make any demands of us which are in opposition to our Palestine programme."

In a later article, entitled "The Revival of the World Movement," one reads a party resolution which concludes as follows :—

> "We emphasize the necessity of constant communication with the Russian Poel-i-Zion on the following conditions, viz. : that the Russian Poel-i-

Zion should support with all their might the endeavours of the Palestine workmen in the creation of workmen's economies (i.e. for party funds ?) in the country, and that the Russian Poel-i-Zion should assist the immigration of their most active and suitable comrades (i.e. from Russia) to Palestine."

One can understand the desire of the strong Judæo-Slav element among the Jewish workmen in Palestine to strengthen their position still further by importing fresh allies, and it is perhaps significant that Mr. Ishaka (Isaac) Ben Zvi, the leader of the Ahaduth Ha-Avoda, resigned his seat in the Advisory Council after Sir Herbert Samuel's speech of June 3, 1921, announcing further restrictions on immigration. Of late there has been less evidence of a desire to be reconciled with the Third International. The fact is that the working-classes all over the world are gradually finding Moscow out, and though there are still strong groups often led by subventioned agents of Moscow, who continue to sing the praises of Russia in many countries, there is a lack of *brio* in their production, which is in very marked contrast to the exuberance of 1919–1920. Still, it is to be hoped, for the sake of the Jews of Palestine, that their Labour leaders will not play with Russian fire. At present they may be described as " Nationalist-Socialists " with a slight bias towards the left. But should this bias be accentuated, and should they chain themselves to any revolutionary Communist party in Russia or elsewhere, the Communists will enter, permeate and finally destroy or capture their organization. In this connection I may quote the following extracts from *Our Task in the Land of our Fathers on the Eve of Regeneration*, an attempt to combine Zionism and Bolshevism by a German writer (J. Eberlin, published in 1920 by the Netriet Company, 66 Zimmer Str., Berlin, S.W.) :—

" The Jewish people will only get Palestine when

> English Imperialism fails. . . . Unimpeded immigration *en masse* to the land of our fathers is not to be thought of under a British Protectorate. The Jewish revolutionaries of the proletariat and the higher classes . . . must not reconcile themselves to this state of things. An energetic fight against British Imperialism is necessary and requires the organization of the Asiatic and African worlds. Asia, and to some extent India, are the bulwarks of British Imperialism, but also its Achilles' heel." (Op. cit., p. 131.)
>
> "It is here that proletarian Zionism encounters Soviet propaganda with which it must co-operate with all its might. The organization of the Asiatic world is one of our tasks. A Socialist Asia is the guarantee of a Socialist Palestine . . . our principal object is now the destruction of British Imperialism." (Op. cit., p. 134.)

One need not take this flatulent nonsense too seriously, though some of our die-hards are sure to do so. The writer, obviously a German-Jewish Bolshevist, has simply repeated the *clichés* of the Russian partisans of the "Eastern policy," which was in such favour in 1920, and aimed at making Asia Communist, if possible, and in any case at using Asia against the West and more particularly against the British Empire.[1] Those were the days of the Baku Conference, when somewhat perturbed Western intellectuals found themselves in the company of Turkish and Circassian cut-throats with long massacre records to their credit, and wondered how the Caucasians, who danced knife-dances and the turbaned

[1] The writer doubts whether Lenin ever had any illusions as to the possibility of Marxizing Asia and believes that this remarkable genius hoped only to set British Asia aflame and by causing the loss of markets in India, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, etc., to increase unemployment in England and thus prepare the ground for Communism. In their own way some of our Press Lords seem to be unwittingly co-operating with him!

preachers of Islamo-Bolshevist union, could be fitted into the Marxian scheme. Herr Eberlin may, of course, be merely an *agent-provocateur* who desires to embroil his fellow-Jews in Palestine with British and Arabs to the greater glory of Moscow—or of the next king of Prussia. But what he has written is a warning to advanced Labour men in Palestine who wish to force the pace.

I have referred to Mr. I. Ben-Zvi as the leader of Jewish Labour in Palestine. No other Labour man in the country has the same power over his followers as he. He is a simple, determined man, strongly National-Socialist, rather inclined, in my humble opinion, to be over-optimistic as to the possibility of early co-operation between Jewish and Arab workmen and to underrate the British share in the building up of a new Palestine, but honest, incorruptible and capable of displaying and enjoining moderation. He is said to be mainly responsible for the revival of the Hagana or Jewish Defence Force, and, it is supposed or inferred, for the importation of arms, the discovery of which aroused some alarm in the winter of 1920–1921. It should be said in fairness to the Jews who imported a considerable number of revolvers, and probably other weapons of greater power, from Austria into Palestine that, in all the outbreaks which resulted in bloodshed in 1920–1921, the Arabs were the aggressors, and that the British Military and Civil Administrations have never taken the trouble thoroughly to disarm Nablus and its surrounding villages and Hebron. They could also point out with some show of justice that as long as prominent Arabs talked openly of attacking the Jews and fanaticism prevailed to such an extent at Nablus, no Jew dared stay in the town, isolated Jewish colonies were liable to attack, and, if unarmed, to massacre before the small force of regulars and gendarmerie could intervene. But from the general point of view the policy of secret arming which many of them adopted was deplorable. They

could not keep their mouths closed, but must needs tell Arabs. The latter, who are nearly as prone to panic in such cases as the Turks,[1] promptly jumped to the conclusion that the Jews were preparing to fall upon them. The inevitable result of unauthorized arming on the part of any section of a Near Eastern community is to produce the vicious circle of (*a*) " defensive " measures, (*b*) panic on the part of those whose aggressions are feared, (*c*) " counter-defensive " measures on their part, (*d*) panic on the part of the other side, and so on *da capo* until panic and suspicion breed riot and bloodshed.

Last summer the Administration called upon the Hagana, through the Zionist Executive, to whom the demand was addressed, to surrender their arms to the Government, which offered to recognize them as a defence force if they complied with that condition. No answer was returned by the Executive, which was either unwilling or unable to persuade the Hagana to agree to this offer. This winter the negotiations were renewed, and Lieut-Col. F. H. Kisch, C.M.G., D.S.O. (*see* Chapter 8), who now acts as the link between the Zionist Executive and the Administration, expects to bring them to a satisfactory issue in the near future, on the basis that the Hagana shall hand its arms over to the Administration, which will register, store and guard them, and recognize the Hagana as a force of special constables to be called out and armed in case of civil disorder. The Arabs will probably try to make capital out of this arrangement as they have made capital out of both the unauthorized importation of arms by Jews and out of the issuing of a limited number of rifles by the police to Jewish colonies exposed to attack. They will probably omit to mention that Arab villages exposed to

[1] I know a village within forty miles of Constantinople where the Turks at a time of Turco-Armenian tension solemnly debated whether the only Armenian, a barber, should be killed or expelled. Being a barber he might cut their throats while he shaved them !

Beduin raids, e.g. in the Beisan area, have been similarly armed by the authorities. After all, the Arab leaders have the remedy for this state of things in their own hands. They have only to persuade the Nablusis and the villagers of the Hebron district, seventeen of whom were killed in a purely Moslem faction fight waged with Turkish rifles last spring, to surrender their rifles to the Government !

The Labour parties with few exceptions are strongly in favour of Hebrew education in the schools. The story of the revival of the language, which for many centuries, except, perhaps, among some of the isolated Jews of Yemen, had ceased to be used, except for purposes of ritual, cannot be told in full in this volume. It is largely the life-story of that strange and powerful personality, Eleazer ben Yahuda, who died in December, having succeeded in his life's work as few men have done. Thirty years ago his fellow-Jews scoffed at the possibility of reviving Hebrew. To-day practically every child in the Zionist schools and an increasing proportion of adults speak it fluently. It has a modern literature, an increasing number of textbooks, several newspapers with a relatively large circulation. There have of course been comic or disagreeable incidents as a result of the excessive zeal of Hebrew propagandists.[1] Dr. Eder himself was once shouted down by a Zionist gathering because he spoke in English, being, as he said, too old to learn Hebrew ! There have been attempts to boycott Jewish schools where Hebrew was not the medium of instruction. But given the diversity of origin of the Jews of Palestine—Western Jews who speak the languages of their countries of origin, Eastern Jews who speak Judæo-German (Yiddish) or Russian, Mediterranean Jews who speak " Spaniolo " (Judæo-Spanish), Jews of the Arab world who speak dialects of Arabic, Bokharan Jews who speak Usbek Turkish,

[1] *See also* Chapter 8.

Persian Jews who speak Persian—a common language was a logical necessity if the Jews of Palestine were to be united in one community. To learn Arabic well required years of study for a non-Arab, and even to-day few Moslem Arabs will admit that an Arab Christian can write perfect Arabic.[1] The defeat in 1912 of the German Jewish Hilfsverein, which had insisted in consequence of German political inspiration that the medium of instruction in its many schools in Palestine should be German, was a great triumph for the Hebraists, and to-day, in spite of Arab criticism, logic has triumphed and Hebrew is the common medium of the younger generation of the mixed Jews of Palestine. And this success was mainly due to the unceasing and dæmonic energy of a frail and fierce little scholar, a convinced atheist, who ostentatiously ate on fast-days, called his dog "God," inveighed against every form of religious teaching and yet compelled his fellow-Jews who held his materialistic views in horror, or were repelled by his anti-religious sallies to follow him, to work with him till victory was won.

Of course the official recognition of Hebrew as one of the three official languages of the country has its drawbacks. A trilingual administration is expensive, and the proceedings in the Advisory Council and in the promised Legislative Council have been, and probably will be, delayed by the necessity of translating Hebrew speeches into English and Arabic, and so forth. At present official documents are written and pleadings conducted in Hebrew as well as in English and Arabic in areas where the Jews form twenty per cent. or over twenty per cent. of the population, viz. : The towns of Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, the district of Jaffa and the

[1] A few exceptions are now admitted to exist, e.g. Dr. Faris Nimr, one of the founders of the great Egyptian newspaper *El-Mokattam*, Dr. Sarruf his partner, Suleiman Effendi Bustani, etc. Moslems regard the Koran as the *ne plus ultra* of style.

sub-districts of Safed and Tiberias. But it is much better that the Jews of Palestine should speak Hebrew than that British Administrators should have to deal with a community using German (or as some of the extremer Labour men have suggested, Russian) as their chief medium of education and intercourse. There are no other alternatives. And on this question the Jews are united. On other questions there are, of course, deep-seated differences of political opinion. The Labour Union (Ahaduth Ha-Avoda) is probably the strongest party in the Vaad Leumi to-day ; the Beni Benjamin will probably form the core of a strong " bourgeois " opposition, and there will be middle parties or groups of " moderates." Members of the Labour Party will no doubt continue to alarm employers by talking airily of promoting strikes, but there has been less use of this weapon of late, and one may hope that the leaders have realized that, while labour, and more especially Arab labour, needs more protection than it has hitherto received from the State against oppressive employers, the general interest of all communities in Palestine cannot be furthered by the promotion of strikes for the mere sake of striking.

Meanwhile there is the question of public works, and the promotion of industries, other than agriculture, in Palestine. The country greatly needs a harbour where merchantmen can accost at all seasons. At present it has two exposed roadsteads, Jaffa and Haifa, which are not infrequently closed by bad weather against the landing of merchandise by lighters, and another, Gaza, which is only safe between May and October. The construction of a harbour at Haifa is necessary and will probably be commenced as soon as the Government has raised a loan for Public Works. It will be of great value should the projects for a trans-desert railway to Basra and the Persian Gulf and for the construction of a pipe-line to carry Mesopotamian oil to the Mediterranean materialize.

For the present, however, the Government of Palestine has no funds whatever for new Public Works ; indeed its recurrent and departmental expenditure under this head amounts to less than five per cent of its estimated revenue.

Palestine has largely depended during the last thirty years for such prosperity as it can boast upon money expended in the country, often as benefactions made without any hope of economic return, by foreigners. Such are the benefactions of Zionists, of wealthy pilgrims, of the founders and supporters of a host of charitable and scholastic institutions. The natural increase of population, the rise of prices which here, as everywhere, has followed the Great War, the impoverishment of agriculture during the war by the destruction or the impairment of the instruments of production, and since the war by foreign competition profiting in some cases by a low exchange, and also by the persistence of the war's effects, and the great reduction in the volume of the stream of foreign benefaction, necessitate an improvement in the quality and the quantity of production in Palestine. Otherwise the country will suffer long and recover slowly, if at all. Zionism, provided that the Zionists in general eschew uneconomic schemes such as the flooding of the country with immigrants whom it cannot support, and political dreams of minority rule, the fulfilment of which could only lead to the exasperation of the relations between Jew and Arab, and perpetual political and economic unrest, can be of great assistance to Palestine. Assuming an impossible hypothesis, viz. that the Jews of the world abandoned all interest in Palestine, the country would be far worse off than now, for one of its principal sources of revenue would be cut off, and the increasing and backward Arab population, delivered from military and sanitary checks, such as conscription and malaria, upon its multiplication, would soon degenerate into a community of starveling peasants

and tourist-pestering, *bakhshish*-hunting, pilgrim-robbing townsfolk, unless the Christian world made up the loss. There are idealists and some good public servants among the Arab Nationalists, but they would be as unable to cope with the economic problem as the British officials. And conditions in Great Britain make it certain that for many years to come there can be no question of further large grants-in-aid for Palestine.

Many Palestinian and British observers believe that the agricultural problem and other problems too will be solved by the utilization of the water-power of the Jordan and the Yarmuk by what is generally known as the "Rutenberg scheme." Mr. Rutenberg is a Russian-Jewish engineer of great energy and driving power. He was a revolutionary in his younger days, and was concerned in the assassination or execution of Father Gapon, that notorious priest who, after playing a considerable part in the revolution of 1905, became an *agent-provocateur* of the Tsarist political police, betrayed many of his former associates, and was put to death after he had revealed his treachery by some enraged workmen, summoned for that purpose by Rutenberg himself. The British Government and a section of the British Press have "shaken hands with murder" so extensively during the last few years that a display of virtuous indignation on this subject appears out of place. Men who had ordered the shooting, often before the victims' wives, by civilian conspirators of persons whose only crime was their obedience to their orders as servants of the crown, have been canonized by some of our newspapers, when their turn came to fall before the bullets of the secret societies which they themselves had organized.

The victims of these assassins were not venal traitors to an organization, which, if revolutionary, was at war with real oppression. Mr. Winston Churchill's remark in the debate of July 4, 1922, in the House of Commons that Mr. Rutenberg's character "was one which would

not in every respect compare with those who had been fortunate to live their lives in this well-ordered country" may be taken as a summing-up of the whole matter.

After the success of the Russian Revolution of 1917, Mr. Rutenberg became Chief of Police to the Kerensky Government, whom he unsuccessfully urged to hang Lenin and Trotzky. On the overthrow of that Government he fled to Odessa, where he co-operated with the French at the time of their evacuation, and saved many lives. I have heard his conduct on that occasion highly praised by French Naval officers and advantageously compared to the poltroonery and corruption displayed by too many non-Jewish Russians on that occasion. In 1919 he went to Palestine, where he worked out a scheme for the utilization of the water-power of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers, the technical details of which were submitted to the Palestine Administration and approved by its technical expert, Sir John Snell. The scheme fell into two divisions. Under the first it was proposed to construct a dam across the Jordan at Kerak, just below the river's outfall from the Sea of Galilee, as a main storage reservoir for a main Jordan power-house to be constructed near Jisr el Mujamyeh (Mujami'), the bridge across the Jordan between Beisan and Semakh. It was anticipated that this would give 100,000,000 kilowatt hours per annum. This power was to be utilized for pumping irrigation water, for electric lighting and heating, both public and private, and for industrial development. A canal was also to be constructed along the foot of the mountains on the western side of the Jordan trough for the irrigation of the slopes between the foothills and the river. The second part of the scheme involved the draining of the malarious marshes of Lake Huleh (The Waters of Merom) and the irrigation of the 50,000 acres thus reclaimed and the construction of a power-house to utilize the fall of the Jordan—nearly 700 feet in fifteen miles—for power generation.

These schemes, if put into operation, would certainly lower the level of the Dead Sea, thus exposing part of its bed, which could be profitably worked for potash and other chemical substances. In 1921 Mr. Rutenberg signed a contract with the Colonial Office whereby he obtained a concession for the supply of electric light and power to the town of Jaffa and its Jewish suburb of Tel Aviv. He undertook to raise, and raised, the necessary capital of £100,000, of which half was provided by the "Keren Ha-Yesod"—a Jewish national and colonization fund created by the Annual Zionist Congress in 1920. He had proposed to make use of the waters of the River Auja for power, but met with such difficulties in buying land, that he was compelled to have recourse to Diesel Oil Engines as generators. These he unwisely purchased in Germany, thus saving a few thousand pounds, but arousing the wrath of British engineering firms. On September 21, 1921, an agreement was signed by Mr. Rutenberg and the Crown Agents for the Colonies representing the High Commissioner in Palestine, whereby, if the former succeeded in forming a limited liability company with an authorized capital of not less than £1,000,000, of which £200,000 should be subscribed and paid up in cash within two years from the date of the agreement, then the High Commissioner in Palestine would grant the said company a concession in the terms set forth in a schedule to the agreement and would in the meantime grant no concession or licence conflicting with the terms of the concession set forth in the schedule. The concession area included not only Palestine but Transjordania. Here one cannot help feeling that Mr. Rutenberg opened his mouth too wide, for the Transjordania Government, which dreads complications arising out of the immigration of Zionists east of the Jordan, objects to the concession, which, as far as Transjordania is concerned, is likely to remain inoperative for a long time to come.

The Governorate of Jaffa was excluded from the concession area, since it had already been included in the concession previously granted to Mr. Rutenberg. The concession for the utilization of the power supplied by the Jordan and the Yarmuk is to be granted for seventy years. It is "exclusive." The works to be executed include a dam across the Jordan at Kerak, a canal for conducting the water to the Jisr el Mujamyeh Power House, and the power-house itself, with the necessary plant, transmission lines, cables, etc. The main features of the option on the concession contained in the schedule attached to the agreement which has not been published hitherto, although laid before the House of Commons, will be found by the reader in Appendix III to this volume. It need only be said here that the rates of payment for electrical energy are not to exceed three piastres (7½d.) per kilowatt hour for electric lighting in private houses, and 1½ piastres (3¾d.) for street lighting, irrigation and industrial purposes. The profits which the company will be allowed to make are strictly limited. It will retain dividends up to 10 per cent. From 10 per cent to 15 per cent, they will be divided with the Palestine Government, which will take all profits above 15 per cent. No similar concession is to be granted to others in the concession area during the continuance of the concession, and any valid pre-existing concession is to be annulled by the Government on payment of fair compensation by the company or as determined by an arbitrator. I may add that the British and Palestinian authorities do not admit that any such valid concession exists.

The terms of the proposed concession as summarized above and in Appendix III show that the interests of the Palestine Administration have been thoroughly protected. The agreement was, however, heavily attacked in the summer of 1922 by a section of the Home Press. Nobody had troubled about Father Gapon's doubtless

well-merited elimination, until the British firms who had expected orders for the Jaffa power-installation, and found that the hated German had undersold them, made a great and natural outcry. It was then discovered that Mr. Rutenberg was a terrible fellow to whom there should have been no question of granting a concession. In the debate on this subject in the House of Commons on July 4, 1922, criticism followed three main lines ; that the grant of a concession to a Zionist Jew before the granting of the Mandate for Palestine to Great Britain was improper because it would give the Zionists complete control of commercial supplies of electricity in Palestine, because British and Arab applicants for a similar concession had had their applications refused on the ground that the Mandate had not been granted, and because the concession was a monopoly. It was also maintained that no useful purpose would be served by the " industrialization " of Palestine. Certain persons also conducted a Press campaign against the " desecration " of the country.

The argument that the grant of a monopoly for a public-utility undertaking in Palestine was improper, can hardly be sustained in view of the fact that Palestine, a small and ill-watered country, has only one source of hydro-electric power of any importance, namely the Jordan-Yarmuk river system. What could be substituted for a monopoly ? A number of small concessions in perpetual litigation *re* their rights over one stream of moderate dimensions ! As for the statement that British firms had applied for the concession, and had been refused, one would like to know what sort of offers they made. The idea undoubtedly present in the minds of those responsible for the agreement was that Mr. Rutenberg and the Jews behind him would demand a smaller return for their outlay than Gentile capitalists, on account of their interest in Palestine. It remains to be seen whether this will be the case. The theory that the Arabs

could have found the capital and the brains for such an undertaking may be rapidly dismissed. If the Arabs had possessed ability of this sort they would long have been the independent masters of the Near East. But it may be asked whether the British Government was well advised to offer the concession without putting it up to public tender, and to offer it to a Zionist, who was strongly supported by the Zionist Organization, at a moment when the Zionist Organization's Executive in Palestine, by its pretensions and policy, had annoyed and alarmed the British Administration, the Arabs and many of its former supporters. At the same time the terms of the Mandate give the impression that we are bound to use Jews freely for the development of new sources of wealth in Palestine. As for the contention that Palestine requires agricultural rather than industrial development, those who support it seem unaware that one of the objects of the Rutenberg scheme is the raising of water by electric power for purposes of irrigation.

The objection to the scheme, on the ground that it will involve the desecration of Palestine by lowering the level of the Jordan and the Dead Sea, and enabling the inhabitants to illuminate mosques and churches by electric light, does not seem a very cogent one. The Mosque of Santa Sophia is illuminated on festal occasions by electricity, and if the Turks approve of this, why should not the Arabs approve the like? I have myself heard Arabs of the Ulema class object to the Rutenberg concession, not on the ground that it might result in the illumination of mosques, but that its monopoly and the delay of two years before the expiry of the option would prevent the electric lighting of the "Dome of the Rock," by any locally formed company. I cannot understand why the lowering of the level of the Dead Sea[1] should be regarded as a desecration; the Jordan can always be allowed to run during the brief pilgrim season at its

[1] There is nothing "Holy" about the Dead Sea.

full flow. After all, the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine should be considered before our own æsthetic susceptibilities. If Mr. Rutenberg is as good as his word, and employs Arabs equally with Jews on the proposed works, and gives them the same chances of participation as shareholders in the undertaking, they will profit greatly therefrom. They will in any case have the right and power to protest should any act on the part of the company offend religious prejudices. I cannot myself see why Palestine should be "desecrated" if a few new factories are built there. We have no right to keep the country poor because a few tall chimneys may offend the sight of some of the visitors to the Holy Land.

CHAPTER 8

The Zionist Executive in Palestine and Jewish Parties

THE "PALESTINE ORGANIZATION." THE ZIONIST COMMISSION FORMED. ITS COMPOSITION AND STATUS. FREQUENT CHANGES OF PERSONNEL. MR. USSISHKIN. CAUSES OF FRICTION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN PALESTINE AND OF ARAB NERVOUSNESS. JEWISH CRITICISM OF THE COMMISSION (EXECUTIVE). THE "BENI-BENJAMIN." THE "AGUDATH YISRAEL" AND ITS GRIEVANCES. JEWISH CRITICISM OUTSIDE PALESTINE. THE CHURCHILL STATEMENT. THE ZIONIST EXECUTIVE'S PRESENT POLICY.

EARLY in 1908 the Zionist Organization had founded a representative branch in Palestine known as "The Palestine Office" with the object of co-ordinating and canalizing all efforts for the Jewish colonization of the country. A new impulse to the colonization movement was given by the Vienna Zionist Congress of 1913, where a complete scheme of colonization was submitted by Dr. A. Ruppin, the head of the Palestine Office, and was adopted by the Congress. The outbreak of war had a disastrous effect on its activities. It succeeded, however, in saving some Jews from persecution and more from starvation, and in mitigating the hardships of the many Jewish families deported from the country on various pretexts by Jemal Pasha in pursuance of his policy of making Palestine Turkish by expelling Jews and Arabs.

The Palestine Office was also able to improve the food supply of the country by introducing vegetable gardening and poultry farming, to keep a certain number of Jews who had not been swept into the Labour battalions employed on land improvement and to preserve Jewish education from the complete destruction with which it had been menaced by the outbreak of the Great War. During the period 1908–1914 the Zionist Organization, which had originally abstained from educational work in Palestine, leaving this to a variety of Committees, local

and foreign, had been compelled, owing to the quarrel between the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden and the Jewish majority in Palestine, to assume the direction of Jewish Hebrew education in Palestine. At the outbreak of war the Zionists contributed to the maintenance of nearly 140 schools with 500 teachers, which absorbed nearly two-thirds of the Jewish school-children of the country. It was becoming the practice of parents residing abroad to send their children to Palestine to receive a national education at such schools as the Hebrew Gymnasium (High School) at Jaffa, the Jerusalem Hebrew High School and other establishments. The general break-down of communication with foreign countries, the cessation of payments from abroad, the financial losses that prevented private committees from continuing to subvention schools which they had founded, might have ruined Jewish education, had not the Palestine Office intervened and created "a single school system embracing all the schools in the country"[1] to which the Zionist Organization gave all possible assistance. "Thanks largely to this unremitting care for the schools, it was found at the end of the war that the knowledge of Hebrew in the country had increased considerably in all sections of the Jewish population."[2] This control of education assumed, and rightly, as an emergency measure had, however, certain unexpected political consequences which will be described later.

The Balfour Declaration and the capture of the Holy City by the British were followed by the formation of a "Zionist Commission to Palestine" (Vaad Hazirim Erez Israel), composed of Dr. Haim Weizmann (Chairman) and Messrs. Sylvain Levy, Joseph Cowen, Dr. Eder, and Leon Simon. Major the Hon. W. Ormsby Gore (now Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies) and Major James Rothschild were deputed

[1] *R.E.Z.O.*, p. 35. [2] *R.E.Z.O.*, II, p. 35.

[*Photo : Faber*

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[*Face page* 162

by the British Government to accompany the Commission. The Commission arrived at Jaffa on April 4, 1918. It met with an enthusiastic reception both there and at Jerusalem. It almost immediately took over the more or less political work, which had been done by the Palestine Office, in its capacity of link between the Zionist Organization and the rulers of the country. Money from the Executive of the Organization for the purpose of relief, educational grants, etc., had formerly been paid direct by the Executive of the Zionist Organisation abroad to its representative, the Palestine Office in Palestine. It was now paid to the Zionist Commission and disbursed by it to the Palestine Office, the expenditure of which was thereafter controlled by the Commission. The Palestine Office remained in control of the internal management of the schools, agricultural work, relief and the preparation of statistics. The schools of the Hilfsverein, a body which laboured under the double disadvantage of being both an enemy organization and an opponent of the Hebraizing educational policy of the Zionist Organization, were taken over by the representatives of the Zionist Commission, which, after the final expulsion of the Turks from Samaria and Galilee, controlled schools attended by nearly three-quarters of the Jewish school-children of Palestine.

The Palestine Office was also reorganized. It had hitherto been directed by a single chief, Dr. Thon, assisted by a group of specialists. It was now divided into a number of departments (described by anti-Zionists as " Ministries "), each under a responsible chief. The departmental chiefs formed a governing board under the presidency of the head of the Office. But these changes were merely a prelude to the disappearance of the Palestine Office. In October, 1919, it was finally absorbed by the Zionist Commission, its departments, save that of immigration, transferred from Jaffa to

Jerusalem, its records and staff transferred to the Commission, which, now led by Mr. Ussishkin, took its place as the "sole representative in Palestine of the Zionist Organization in all affairs both internal and external."[1]

By this time he composition of the Commission had undergone considerable changes. Members were appointed, went out to Palestine, stayed there a few months and departed again. The Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization presented to the XIIth Zionist Congress contains a passage (II. *Palestine Report*, p. 48) which may serve both as an epitaph on the defunct Palestine Office, which undoubtedly did great service to the Zionist cause during its existence, and as a criticism of the really bewildering changes of policy and of personnel within the Zionist Commission between 1918 and 1921. It runs as follows :—

> "During the early period of the Zionist Commission's stay, the Palestine Office represented the principle of continuity in the work of colonization. This point is important, as the Zionist Commission altered its personnel repeatedly in a very brief space of time and the changes in the views and inclinations of its leaders and members gave occasion to frequent modifications and fresh starts in its system and policy. Dr. Weizmann and his Secretary, Mr. Sieff (who remained longer than the other members of the Commission, Simon, Cowan, etc.), were succeeded by Dr. Eder, with Mr. Jack Mosseri as Secretary ; these were soon followed by Mr. Levin-Epstein, who later was assisted by Mr. Gluskin ; these were soon replaced by Dr. H. H. Friedenwald and Mr. Robert Szold, from America, who, again, were followed by Dr. Eder, the reins being finally taken in the autumn of 1919 by Mr. Ussishkin. The existence during this period of the Palestine

[1] *R.E.Z.O.*, II, p. 48.

Office—although its attempts to do positive work were hampered by internal and external obstacles such as had never before been experienced—at least preserved the internal work from the utter disorganization which otherwise would have resulted from the divergent tendencies of the leaders."

I may add that Dr. Thon and his helpers in the Palestine Office, all specialists in Palestinian matters, kept in closer and more friendly touch with the Jews already established in the country and with the Arabs than did their successors of the Zionist Commission.

When the Zionist Commission arrived in Palestine, in the spring of 1918, anxiety was felt in many quarters at the granting of such wide powers in a newly conquered and indeed only half-conquered country [1] to delegates of an organization which was already regarded with some distrust by the Arabs. Its status was defined as follows :—The Commission should represent the Zionist Organization. It should act as an advisory body to the British authorities in Palestine in all matters relating to Jews, or which might affect the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in accordance with the declaration of the British Government.

Its objects were :—

(1) To form a link between the British authorities and the Jewish population of Palestine.

(2) To co-ordinate the relief work in Palestine, and to assist in repatriation and in restoring and developing the colonies and in organizing the Jewish population in general.

(3) To assist the Jewish organizations and institutions in Palestine in the resumption of their activities.

(4) To help in establishing friendly relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities.

[1] Samaria and Galilee were still in Turkish hands, and the war was going ill for the Entente in France.

(5) To collect information and report upon the possibilities of the further development of the Jewish settlements and of the country in general.

(6) To inquire into the feasibility of the scheme of establishing a Jewish University.

Given the Balfour Declaration, there was much to be said for the appointment of some such Commission ; but it may be pointed out that pending the close of hostilities, it was not altogether wise to entrust such large powers to a body which, if it represented a very large and important body of Jewish opinion all over the world, only represented at most a tenth of the population of Palestine.

The Commission was allowed extensive use of the military telephones and cables, and persons recommended by it, who were naturally Zionist Jews,

> " enjoyed greater facilities than Arabs in the matter of obtaining permits to travel on and to import merchandise by military railways, owing to the fact that the Zionist Commission was accepted by the Administration as sponsor for the Jews, whereas the Arabs had no corresponding body to whom they could apply for guarantees for this purpose " (*Report of the Commission of Inquiry re the Disturbances in May*, 1921, p. 55).

These special privileges naturally caused some friction with the military authorities. Among the Arabs they aroused jealousy and discontent. They very logically considered that the principle of an intermediary " linking " a minority with the authorities having once been admitted, a similar body should have been formed to link the majority of the population with them.

In February, 1919, the first Zionist Conference since the outbreak of the Great War met in London. The Jews of America, Russia, and other states not previously represented, sent representatives there. The

The Zionist Executive

Conference passed a resolution in favour of the enlargement of the Zionist Commission. In June, 1919, Dr. Haim Weizmann, one of the presidents of the Conference and the most prominent living Zionist, was requested to give effect to this resolution. A little later it was decided that six leading Zionists should go out to Palestine and represent the Zionist Organization on the reorganized Commission. I have already referred to the constant changes in the composition of the Commission ; only three of those appointed in 1919 were serving in the spring of 1922, but among these three was a remarkably, not to say dangerously, forceful personality.

Among the six elected by the " Greater Actions " Committee of the Zionist Conference of 1919 was Mr. M. Ussishkin, a Russian Jew of Odessa, who had been himself a member of the " Greater Actions " Committee at the London Conference. All his working life—he is now over sixty years of age—had been given to the Zionist cause. He was one of those " Zioné-Zion " (Zion-Zionists), as they were called, who fiercely opposed Dr. Herzl himself when that great leader suggested (in 1903) that the British offer of territory in East Africa for Jewish settlement should be accepted as a stepping-stone to Palestine.

Often in danger from the Tsarist regime, threatened with death by the Bolshevists, he clung stubbornly to Palestinian Zionism, and by 1917 he was the most powerful personality among the Zionist Jews of Russia. Alone, perhaps, among the members of the Zionist Commission who remained in Palestine, he was—and is—a politician. But he had the defects of many extreme Zionists—a narrow outlook, a great intolerance of criticism, an unwillingness to look disagreeable facts in the face.

Meeting him at Constantinople in 1919 the writer was impressed by his intense idealism and appalled by

his woeful ignorance of conditions in Palestine. He deplored the failure of the British Government to support Zionist claims to the Hauran and Transjordania, though such support would have involved the hapless British taxpayer in an Arab war, and to annex Ezion-Gebir (Akaba), Solomon's naval base in the Red Sea. He seemed to imagine Akaba to be a promising natural port with a smiling hinterland instead of being a torrid bay surrounded by arid and almost waterless heights and separated from Palestine by a hundred miles of red-hot rock and desert, visited rather than inhabited by predatory Beduin.

Arriving in Palestine late in 1919, he rapidly succeeded in imposing his will upon most of his colleagues. Other members of the Commission made mistakes—as we all do—but Mr. Ussishkin, supported by his devoted Russian adherents incapable of conceiving that he could ever be mistaken, shunning all non-official contact with officials, speaking only Hebrew and Russian, did more than any other both to alarm the Arabs and to alienate the sympathies of British officials and moderate Zionists.

Like many other East European Jews he was singularly ignorant of British ideas and customs, and in this connection I may quote a story, which caused much mirth in Jerusalem in its day, found its way into the Press[1] and has never been denied. Mr. Ussishkin had invited a British Governor to lunch at his house. Being uncertain what he should offer his guest to drink he consulted various persons as to the favourite beverage of British officials in the Near East. The advice given him, either by an ignorant friend or an impish enemy, had startling results ; the guest was offered nothing but a sparkling drink, which, if as " cool and refreshing " as the advertisements tell us, is rarely if ever seen at luncheon parties. The Governor, who did not subsequently mention the incident, appears to have quaffed

[1] *Near East*, May 18, 1922.

his Eno's Fruit Salts like a man, in defiance of the consequences. But his host's " friends " talked !

I have already explained[1] why friction between the Zionist Commission and the British Military Authorities was inevitable. The changes in the composition of the Commission naturally increased it, for, scarcely had a *modus vivendi* been reached with any one group of Zionist leaders, than another group suddenly acquired the ascendancy in the Commission's Councils and all had to be begun afresh. Nor could Zionists of note, who were believed to be supported by members of the Commission, always refrain from taking up the cudgels for Jewish soldiers serving in the 38th and 39th Royal Fusiliers (Jewish battalions) against the Military Authorities, quite irrespective of the rights of their case and of the necessities of military discipline.

Another cause of friction was the Commission's practice of subsidizing minor Government employees of the Jewish faith who were Zionists. In his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry concerning the Jaffa disturbances, Dr. Eder, then Acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission, admitted that the Zionist Commission had till April, 1920, been in the habit of subsidizing several categories of Jewish Government officials, e.g. Jewish clerks who were receiving a low salary and Jewish policemen. The cost of living was high after the war ; the standard of living of Jews was higher than that of the Arabs ; the Zionist Commission considered it advisable to have a considerable proportion of Jews in the police, with the result that these subventions were paid with the consent of the much-abused Military Administration till the British Government forbade the continuance of this practice. It is unnecessary to enumerate the political disadvantages of having " Bezonians "[2] in your police force ! even in 1921 the

[1] *See* Chapter 2, *passim*.

[2] " Under which king, Bezonian ? Speak or die."

Zionist Commission was subsidizing telephonists and railwaymen who were apprentices until they could earn a living wage. This had been permitted by the Civil Administration, to whom the transaction was represented as a loan, to be repaid when the beneficiaries received higher wages, although Dr. Eder admitted that the Commission would not prosecute if they did not repay. Not only did Arab employees grumble because they did not enjoy such advantageous protection, but British officials were for long inclined to ascribe the annoying and persistent leakage of official information that is so prevalent in Palestine, to the fact that Jewish telephonists had been or were still under obligations to the Zionist Commission.[1]

It was hoped that the substitution in July, 1920, of a Jewish High Commissioner for a non-Jewish Chief Administrator and of a Civil for a Military Administration would rapidly lead to a better understanding between the British authorities in Palestine and the Zionist Commission. But these hopes were doomed to disappointment. Under a civil administration the Commission bated none of its pretensions. Before the same Commission of Inquiry, Dr. Eder admitted that the Zionist Commission had intervened on behalf of dismissed officials and even said that he considered that with regard to the appointment of the High Commissioner for Palestine the Zionist Organization, which stands behind the Zionist Commission, should be allowed either to formulate objections to the selection of the British Government, or to submit a list of its own nominees for consideration (*Palestine: Disturbances in May*, 1921. *Reports of the Commission of Inquiry*. Cmd. 1540, p. 57).

Omitting the minor factors of mutual misunderstanding caused by differences of outlook and temperament

[1] In the spring of 1922 I found this belief widely spread among British officials.

and the effect of incidents unimportant in themselves but cumulatively annoying, friction between the Zionist Commission and the British Administration in Palestine arose, I am convinced, mainly out of the fact that the former body asserted claims which were contrary to the policy enunciated both by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and by the High Commissioner for Palestine. In this connection the opinion of the Commission of Inquiry (loc. cit., p. 57) is worth quoting *in extenso*. After referring to certain statements made by prominent Zionists which were calculated to alarm the Arabs, the Commission continues as follows :—

> " Until the Commission came to examine Dr. Eder, Acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission, they were unaware to what extent such expressions of opinion as those we have quoted above were authorized by responsible Zionists. Dr. Eder was a most enlightening witness. He was quite unaggressive in manner and free from any desire to push forward opinions which might be offensive to the Arabs. But when questioned on certain vital matters he was perfectly frank in expressing his view of the Zionist ideal. He gave no quarter to the view of the National Home as put forward by the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner. In his opinion there can only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the numbers of that race are sufficiently increased. He declined to admit the word ' dominion,' but chose ' predominance.' As Acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission, Dr. Eder presumably expresses in all points the official Zionist view, if such there be, and his statements are, therefore, most important. There is no sophistry about

Dr. Eder ; he was quite clear that the Jews should, and the Arabs should not, have the right to bear arms, and he stated his belief that this discrimination would tend to improve Arab-Jewish relations. . . . We do not comment upon his opinions because the discussion of the questions raised is not our concern, but it is relevant to our report to show that the acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission asserts on behalf of the Jews those claims which are at the root of the present unrest, and differ materially from the declared policy of the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner for Palestine. It is perhaps worth noting as an instance of the diversity of manner in which Jews and Arabs look upon the same questions, that, whereas Arab witnesses denounce the Government of Palestine as a Zionist Government, Dr. Eder stigmatizes it as an Arab administration.

The attitude of responsible Zionists as revealed above is not negligible, as it is one of the irritant causes of the present discontent. It arises, perhaps, from a habit of regarding Palestine as ' a deserted, derelict land,' sparsely inhabited by a population without traditions of nationality, where political experiments may be launched without arousing local opposition. Such a conception is considerably at variance with the spirit of the authorized Zionist policy as defined in the declared intentions of the Secretary of State and the Local Government."

The Commission of Inquiry expressed the hope that the Zionist leaders would "abandon and repudiate" all pretensions going beyond the declared policy of the Government on the subject of the Jewish National Home. For a considerable time, however, there was no change in the attitude of the Zionist Commission.

Late in 1921 it changed its name to "The Zionist Executive in Palestine," but it did not change its policy; a riot at Jerusalem in which both Jews and Arabs lost their lives was made the occasion for a vigorous but unsuccessful attack on the Governor of Jerusalem by the leaders of the Executive, who continued to ascribe Arab hostility not to their own tactical errors but to foreign intrigue and above all to what they described as the anti-Zionism of British officials.

The point of view of the average British official in Palestine—viz., that the Zionist Commission (Executive) in Palestine had alarmed and irritated the Arabs by its policy, that this policy was based upon an incorrect interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, that the activities of the Executive gave the impression that the Zionists wished to form "a Government within a Government" in Palestine, and that these activities were increasing the difficulties which beset the British administrators in the performance of their very delicate task—never seemed to be understood by Mr. Ussishkin and his followers. Arab nervousness, which was to some extent justified by the declarations of Dr. Eder and other prominent Zionists, naturally rendered the task of the British increasingly difficult. A better educated and less excitable people than the Palestinian Arabs might be excused for regarding Zionism as a danger and for suspecting the British Government, which the British official in Palestine represented, of connivance with a Zionist scheme of dominance.

Much has been made by prominent Zionists of the economic advantages which the Arabs stand to gain by co-operation with Zionism. But nine Arabs out of ten do not understand that the country has profited and will profit economically by the very fact of Zionism. They do not realize that were the Jews as clannish, close and grasping as the wildest Arab Judæophobes maintain, they themselves could not fail to profit by the

fact that nearly £2,000,000 is spent by Jewish agencies in Palestine every year. One may regret their ignorance, but one cannot acquit the Zionist Executive of the sin of omission in this matter. Its different chiefs talked much of the benefits which Zionism would confer on the Arab, but until last spring (1922), when the advice of many Palestinian Jews began at last to be heard, did little or nothing to associate the non-Jewish population of the country in the economic development of Palestine, though this was one of the principal planks in the Zionist platform. Thus, many Arab landowners were unable to develop their estates through lack of capital. They disliked selling their lands to the Zionists. The Zionist Commission never offered any of them its assistance and partnership in developing their estates.

Again it may well be asked whether the Commission's objection lodged in 1919 to the ordinance granting loans to cultivators at 6½ per cent. was calculated to remove Arab suspicions that Zionism would result in the impoverishment of the *fellaheen*. The Zionist Commission, be it honestly admitted, had a case ; Jewish colonists in Palestine were unable to obtain any loans under the ordinance as originally drafted ; but this was not made sufficiently clear to the Arabs or, for that matter, to the British public.

Too much may be made of the fact that a consignment of arms seized by the authorities a year ago was addressed to the Zionist Commission at Jaffa, since the invoice also bore directions that the double-bottomed trunks containing the contraband weapons should be delivered not to the Commission but to another consignee. But it was most regrettable that the Zionist Executive did nothing at the time to check either the importation of arms or the formation of a secret defence force, which, when it became known to the Arabs, both increased their natural propensity to panic and added to the many difficulties of the British authorities.

The Zionist Executive

To British and Arab criticism Mr. Ussishkin long turned a deaf ear. A year ago most Zionist Jews outside Palestine met any hint that the representatives of the Zionist Organization in Palestine were following a dangerous road with the reply that the agitation against their policy was factitious and that they had been guilty at most of an occasional lack of tact. But when Lord Northcliffe's visit to Palestine was followed by a fuller and more outspoken discussion in the British Press of the situation created by the activities of the Executive in Palestine, those moderate elements in the Jewish community in Palestine—and elsewhere—who had publicly criticized the doings of the Executive, were able to bring far greater pressure to bear upon the Extremists, who could not neglect Jewish, if they neglected Gentile, opinion. The Moderates were reinforced by a large number of Jews, who had hitherto remained silent, either through a feeling of racial loyalty or through not quite unjustified fears of Extremist displeasure. The conservative Orthodox Jews, whom the Zionists had regarded as a negligible quantity, also made themselves heard outside Palestine as well as in Jerusalem.

The Moderates, who are strongly represented among the Jews settled in Palestine before the Great War, and more especially among those dwelling in the agricultural colonies, did not approve of many features in the policy of the Zionist Commission (Executive) during 1919–1921. They maintained that this body had gone out of its way to alarm the Arabs and to irritate the British element in the Administration of Palestine; that, whatever might be said for the contention that the "Russian" or more properly the East European Jews, threatened both by economic ruin and by the destruction of their distinctively Hebrew culture by Bolshevist "levellers," had a prior claim to Zionist aid, the Commission by its immigration policy during these two years had given a dangerous impetus to the "Rus-

sianization " of Palestine. As I have previously pointed out, it is open to question whether the Zionist leaders could have followed any other policy without antagonizing a great body of Jewish opinion, the support of which was indispensable to it both morally and materially. But the Moderates were right, unanswerably right, in maintaining that the Commission (Executive) had made no use of the experience of the Palestinian Jews who knew how to deal with the Arab. This view was more particularly urged by the local Zionist group, nicknamed the " Sons of the Baron " or the " Sons of Benjamin " by their opponents, on account of the support given to the Palestinian colonies by Baron Edmond (Benjamin) de Rothschild, who accepted the latter nickname as their party title. The " Sons of Benjamin," in addition to the above criticisms of the Executive, asserted that it had distributed relief injudiciously, that it had created far too many salaried posts and had spent too little on constructive work and too much on the importation of schoolmasters, mostly " Russians," who had advanced Socialist ideas, knew nothing of Palestine, and took no pains to be conciliatory to the Arabs or to teach their pupils that the Arabs had rights. They also criticized the excesses of the " Hebraizers," the bitterness of the organs which were supposed with good reason to be inspired by Mr. Ussishkin and his group, and the condonation of much crude and acrid Nationalism, with its invariable accompaniment of ill-mannered intolerance, by the Zionist representatives in Palestine. They added that the work done by many of the new-comers who had been given posts in the many branches of the Zionist Executive in Palestine could have been done just as well, and with far less friction, by Palestinian Jews from the Jewish colonies. Their organ was the *Doar Ha-Yom* or *Palestine Daily Mail*, an enterprising and excellently edited Hebrew newspaper, the editor and manager whereof, Messrs. Ben Avi and Saphir, were among the

leaders of the Benjaminites. But the "Sons of Benjamin" were not the only Jewish opponents of Zionist policy in Palestine. Others were to be found among the rabbis and other leaders of the old Orthodox Jews of the "Agudath Yisrael" (League of Israel), Rabbi Sonnenfeld, Rabbi Jungreis, Dr. de Haan, and others, whose followers were mainly recruited from among the Jews of the "Haluka." (*See* Chapter 8.) Extremely, indeed uncompromisingly orthodox and conservative in their religious views, the Agudath Yisrael and those who sympathize with them build their Judaism upon the rock of creed. To nearly all of them the Zionist, sometimes a vague deist, sometimes an agnostic who would reconstruct Judaism on the foundation of race, seems an irreligious innovator who would build upon the sand. The Jews, say many of these traditionalists, will only return to Zion, when the Messiah has appeared to lead the Chosen People back to the Holy City ; He will appear at the hour appointed by Jehovah, and celestial signs and portents will herald His coming ; it is not for the Children of Israel, who are but men, to attempt to anticipate the decree of the Most High.

These religious considerations have been reinforced by resentment at the Zionist control of relief during the period which followed the capture of Jerusalem, and by the refusal of the Palestine Government, inspired, so say the Agudath, by Zionist advisers, to grant separate communal and religious representation to these "Old Believers." The following is a statement of their case, which was given me by a sympathizer in April, 1922 :

"Orthodox Jews are in many cases hostile, for religious reasons, to Zionism, when interpreted politically as a movement for the establishment of some form of Jewish State, and in so far as it is non-religious. Those who are not hostile have organized the "Mizrahi" Society, which forms part of the Zionist Organization,

but retains a certain independence. The Agudath Yisrael believes that the Jewish Question can only be solved in conformity with the Torah (Old Testament) and the Traditions. Its congregations number fully a million souls. But the great majority of these are settled in countries—Poland, Lithuania, etc.—where the currency has been enormously depreciated since the Great War. The low 'valuta' and economic depression at home have greatly weakened the Agudath both in Europe and in Palestine. Before the Great War they maintained many schools and hospitals in the Holy Land, among them the 'Shaaréi Zedek,' which was perhaps the best hospital in Jerusalem. These were managed by the Pekedim Society with head-quarters at Amsterdam, which was affiliated to the Agudath Yisrael.

"The war brought financial ruin in the Agudath in Palestine. A great number of the Jews of the 'Haluka,' who had been its principal supporters, died of hunger or hunger-induced epidemics. The greatest misery prevailed among these people when the British entered Jerusalem. While the Zionists obtained help from America and the Western Jews, the Agudath could only count upon mere pittances from Poland. Under the British military regime the Zionists obtained the Administration of the American Relief Fund from the American Joint Distribution Committee, because the Zionist Commission had obtained official recognition from the British Government. This relief, the Agudath contend, was not fairly distributed ; its distribution was governed by political rather than by charitable motives. The 'preferential' charity of the Zionists was construed by the Agudath as an attempt to force the conservatives to support the political Zionism which they disliked and feared, and led to frequent injustice to the non-Zionist Jewish poor.

"As regards the Agudath schools and hospitals,

the inability of the local Committees to maintain them led to their being taken over first by the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization and eventually by the Zionist Commission. The Zionists entrusted their management to the Mizrahi Society, a body which is certainly orthodox, if Zionist in sympathy. But the Agudath complained that teachers who did not show sympathy with political Zionism were often dismissed, that political propaganda was introduced into these schools against the wishes of the parents, above all that the Zionist Organization through its possession of funds for educational purposes was able to bring pressure to bear on school committees, which did not show sufficient pro-Zionist zeal, by threatening to cut off their grants.

" As regards religious and communal representation, the Agudath complain that Sir Herbert Samuel, whom they criticize as a Jew who has allowed himself to be led astray by the Zionists rather than as a British administrator, has been obsessed by the idea of ' union ' among the Jews of Palestine. He would have preferred his co-religionists to be represented by one religious chief ; this proved impossible since the Ashkenazim and Sephardim could not agree, except to differ ; why should he not accept the separate representation of the Agudath by a Chief Rabbi of their own choosing ? The Agudath took no part in the elections of these religious chiefs. They also took no part in the election of the ' Vaad Hair Liyehudei Yerushalaim ' (Communal Council of the Jews of Jerusalem) for various reasons, notably on account of their objection to female suffrage, and abstained from participating in the election of the Asefath Ha-nivcharim (Assembly of Deputies), which elected the Vaad Leumi or National Assembly of the Jews of Palestine. In spite of this they complain that they are called upon to pay a tax imposed by the Vaad Ha-Ir on the unleavened bread eaten at the Passover

Feast and fear that the Government will permit the Vaad Leumi to levy an education rate of 5 per cent. on incomes and thus sanction what they consider an unjust exaction of taxes by a body which they do not recognize.

I believe that there was some foundation for the complaints made by the Agudath with regard to the distribution of relief. The refusal of grants to schools which did not, so to speak, conform to the Zionist ideal, cannot be regarded as a serious oppression ; one can no more expect Zionists to assist non-Zionist or anti-Zionist schools out of Zionist funds than one can expect Belfast Orangemen to put their hands in their pockets for the benefit of Roman Catholic seminaries. But the attempts made in 1920 and even later to boycott such schools cannot be defended ; the boycotters often indulged in grossly libellous or inflammatory propaganda, and many Jewish residents of Jerusalem were the butt of most offensive attacks. An attempt was even made to boycott the excellent Evelina de Rothschild girls' school, of which Miss Landau, an Orthodox Jewess and a good Englishwoman, has long been head mistress, because this lady declined to make Hebrew the medium of instruction instead of English. It is not alleged that these attempts to boycott schools and teachers were ordered or inspired by the Zionist Commission in its official capacity, but they were certainly the work of the more extreme supporters of its most extreme members.

The Agudath's claim to separate representation must be discussed on another occasion. It need only be said here that the difference of outlook between the average Jew of the old conservative type and the average Zionist Jew is so great, their ideals so irreconcilable, that one cannot expect either to treat the other fairly or to speak impartially of the other's beliefs or activities.

That the Sephardim (Mediterranean Jews) were long cold-shouldered and excluded from local Zionist politics, that in their dealings with the anti-Zionist section of the

old Orthodox Jews, who may be numerically weak in Palestine but are strong in Poland, the extreme Zionists were allowed to display a dangerous intolerance, and that, in general, the tone set by the Zionist Executive till April, 1922, was too often bitter and provocative—none of these accusations can easily be denied. Of the bitterness of inter-Jewish polemics at Jerusalem the following extracts from a poem published early last year in a Jerusalem weekly newspaper entitled "*Oneg le Shabbath*" (*Sabbath Glory*) are good evidence. The poem was aimed at Dr. de Haan, a Dutch Jew, a poet and a scholar, who with two other leaders of the Agudath Yisrael had protested to Lord Northcliffe against the policy of the Zionist Executive in Palestine.

"This man must be boundlessly insane and unclean;
Nobody attacks him, nobody throws a stone at him,
Nobody beats him or draws his blood,
Nor do they send him to the Asylum. . . .
He is head of the Agudath and Schnorrers[1]
And Pontius Pilate[2] asks his advice. . . .
When Northcliffe came from England,
A memorandum full of lies was given him by this madman.
The man is clearly mad.
Yet he is neither imprisoned
Nor is he beaten with sticks,
And there is no one to mutilate him,
So that his madness might leave him and he be free from pain."

I am no judge of the literary merits of the Hebrew text of the above "poem," but the poet's idea of a Glorious Sabbath seems both unusual and original.

The Agudath Yisrael's opposition to the Zionist

[1] Professional spongers on the charity of pious Jews.
[2] The Governor of Jerusalem.

Commission in 1919–1921 has not taken an active political form. The Jews of the "Colonies" and the Moderates for long had an uphill battle to fight against the extremist influences within the Executive. They lost two of their ablest leaders—Mr. Aaron Aaronson, a most active, determined and knowledgeable Palestinian Jew, who was killed in an aeroplane accident; and Captain Bianchini, commander of an Italian super-Dreadnought, a Sephardi Jew of remarkable culture, ability and charm, who was mistaken for a Frenchman and killed by Beduins in June, 1920, in the Hauran. Since then they have had a hard fight, in which Mr. Ben Avi, the able and eloquent editor of the *Doar Ha-Yom* (*Palestine Daily Mail*) has played a conspicuous part.

Little by little they gained adherents, and the decision taken by the National Council of the Jews in Palestine (Vaad Ha-Leumi) in April, 1922, that two Palestinian Jews should henceforth sit on the Zionist Commission, and its acceptance by Dr. Ussishkin, was a success, which pleased most British officials as much as it pleased the "Beni Benjamin."

Jewish criticism of the earlier methods of the Zionist Executive has not been confined to Palestine. Both in England and America its financial extravagance has been the subject of numerous attacks. I may refer the British reader to the pages of the *Jewish Chronicle*. In America a very powerful branch of the Zionist Organization, led by such men as Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Julian Mack, has latterly given very little financial aid to Zionist work in Palestine, on the ground that the Zionist Executive there has mismanaged the large sums subscribed by Zionists all the world over, that much of the work done has not contributed and will not contribute to the establishment of a strong and economically independent Jewish community in Palestine, and that the political activities of the local leaders at Jerusalem have not benefited Zionism. Lack of support by the

[*Photo: American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

ABRAHAM HA-COHEN KUK,
CHIEF RABBI OF THE
ASHKENAZIM

A BOKHARAN JEW
IN HIS NATIONAL
DRESS

[*Face page* 182

leaders of American Zionism, combined with the enormous depreciation of the currencies of the Central and Eastern European states, from which come most of the subscriptions to Zionist funds in the Old World, have greatly impaired the financial position of the Zionist Organization in Europe. At present the salaries of many of the Zionist employees in Palestine, notably of the redundant staff of teachers in the numerous Zionist schools, are in arrear. The falling off in the receipts of the two principal Zionist funds—the Jewish National Fund, which is devoted to land purchase in Palestine, and the Keren Ha-Yesod (Foundation Fund)—is eloquent not only of the poverty of Eastern and Central Europe but of the disappointment of many Jews, who, while Zionists, have no sympathy for the " political Zionism " in which the Zionist Executive in Palestine indulged so long.

Still, the Jews of the West are so generous and public-spirited a community, and sympathy with non-political Zionism is so frequent among them, that one may expect the present crisis in the Zionist Organization's finances to be solved in the near future. In any case the Zionist's Organization's assets in Palestine are considerable, and could be mortgaged as security for a loan, which is said to be contemplated by some of the Zionist leaders, should there be no signs of an early improvement in the financial situation.

The Churchill statement of British policy in Palestine (June 3, 1922), and the Zionist Organization's acceptance thereof, mark the beginning of a change in the policy of the Executive in Palestine. The Colonial Secretary made it clear that, while the Jewish people would be in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance, the British Government " had no such aim in view as that Palestine should become as Jewish as England is English," and that the special position of the Zionist Executive in Palestine did not entitle it to share in any degree in the Government of that country. The publication of the

statement must have been a severe blow to Mr. Ussishkin.

It was followed by the appointment by the Executive of the European Organization of Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Kisch, D.S.O., R.E., a British officer of a distinguished Anglo-Jewish family, who has an honourable record of service in France and Mesopotamia as intermediary between the Zionist Executive in Palestine and the British Administration in Palestine. Colonel Kisch was empowered to act as a member of the Palestine Executive and will in all probability be definitely appointed a member of the Executive at the next Zionist Congress. His relations with the Government of Palestine have been excellent ; he has done much to allay the suspicions and the natural irritation caused among British officials by the imprudences and by the pretensions of certain members of the Executive and their followers. One may hope that he will eventually succeed in calming the apprehensions excited among the Arabs.

Meanwhile there is a possibility of further changes in the composition of the Zionist Executive in Palestine, which will both strengthen that body and will rally to constructive and non-political Zionism that large body of Jewish opinion which has been repelled by the unbalanced enthusiasm and by the tactical errors of political Zionists. It is, perhaps, presumptuous for a non-Jew to express opinions as to the type of man required in Palestine to restore the moral prestige of the Zionist Organization there. May I merely record my opinion that it is highly regrettable that ill-health has so far prevented " Achad Ha-Am " from taking that leading position among the Zionists in Palestine to which he is entitled by reason of his intellectual and moral eminence, his broad views, his freedom from emotional " Messianism " and his knowledge of Palestine.[1]

[1] " Achad Ha-Am " has lived for some time at Tel Aviv since the war and paid more than one visit to Palestine in pre-war days.

The Zionist Executive

By the irony of fate the change for the better in the policy of the Zionists in Palestine has been followed by at least a temporary change for the worse in the attitude of the Arab Delegation. Past political errors cannot be rapidly and easily expiated, and their results persist long after the policy inspired by them has been abandoned. "A mistake which succeeds is none the less a mistake," says the Jewish proverb; how much more a mistake which has not succeeded.[1] But while the Zionist Executive in Palestine has been guilty of many errors, follies and miscalculations, it is not alone to blame. The British Government, which, after its initial error of believing that the Zionists were the only force that counted in the Jewish world, neglected the frequent warnings of "the men on the spot," took no steps to control the activities and to rebuke the excesses of the enthusiasts to whom the direction of the Zionist movement in Palestine had been committed, and remained supine, until over three years had elapsed, blood had been shed and harm done not only to Zionist but to British prestige, has been at least as guilty.

[1] Witness the disastrous results, of which we have not seen the end, of the initial error of permitting the Greeks to occupy Smyrna.

CHAPTER 9

The Spectre of the Learned Elders

"WHO FILLS THE BUTCHERS' SHOPS WITH LARGE BLUE FLIES?" ANOTHER CAUSE OF HOSTILITY TO ZIONISM. THE *PROTOCOLS* MYTH. A LITERARY PLAGIARISM. ITS EXPOSURE. CONTINUED BELIEF THEREIN IN CERTAIN QUARTERS. CAUSES OF THIS BELIEF. FULFILMENT OF "PROPHECY"? EXPLANATION OF JEWISH PREDOMINANCE AMONG THE RUSSIAN AND HUNGARIAN BOLSHEVIST LEADERS. JEWISH SEGREGATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. JEWISH REVOLUTIONARY MESSIANISM.

THIS chapter is to some extent a digression, and yet a necessary one. At first sight anti-Jewish feeling in Palestine seems to be sufficiently and entirely explained by the grave tactical errors committed by many Zionists, the anger or apprehension which these errors have aroused among the non-Jewish inhabitants of the country, the growth of Arab Nationalism, the revival of pan-Islamism caused by Turkish successes, and the natural, if exaggerated, fears of a backward people exposed to an immigration of more advanced strangers, competing with them economically and differing from them in language, speech, customs, and, above all, in religion. But these causes do not fully explain the dread of Zionism which one discovers not only among certain highly educated Orientals but among equally well educated Europeans and Americans in Palestine, including a few British officials. Over their minds broods the spectre of Jewish revolutionary domination, anti-Christian, narrowly Nationalist and Communist, a doctrinaire, machine-like power, wielded in accordance with the instructions laid down in the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

Although the *Protocols* are probably known, at least by repute, to most readers, I give a brief account of their origin and exposure as a literary forgery for the benefit of those who are not conversant with the discussions to which their translation into English and other European languages gave rise. In 1905 a Russian

professor and official named Sergei Nilus published the *Protocols* as part of a book called *The Great within the Little*. They purported to be a summary of the minutes of a secret meeting, held in Paris, by the chiefs of a revolutionary Jewish organization which was plotting to found a Jewish World-State on the ruins of Gentile civilization. In January, 1917, he re-published them. His account of the origin of the *Protocols* and of the manner in which they were obtained was the reverse of convincing, but the success of the Bolshevist Revolutionaries in Russia, the large proportion of Jews among their leaders and their advocacy and practice of political doctrines to some extent resembling those set forth in the *Protocols*, led many to believe that they were genuine. They were translated into English and many other languages, and appeared in London in 1920 under the title of *The Jewish Peril*. They aroused much discussion in Western and Central Europe, became the textbook of the professional anti-Semite, and puzzled many who were not prepared to accept their authenticity because of the accuracy with which they appeared to have foretold the methods and the triumph of the Russian Bolshevists.

On August 16-18, 1921, *The Times* published a series of three articles entitled "The Truth about the *Protocols*," written by the author to whom a Russian, Christian by religion and Monarchist by political sympathy, who wished and still wishes his name to be withheld, had shown the original of the *Protocols*. This was a forgotten French political pamphlet entitled *Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu*, published at Brussels in 1865. Its author was a French lawyer and publicist named Maurice Joly, who was subsequently arrested by Napoleon the Third's police, and imprisoned as a punishment for his temerity in criticizing the Imperial regime. The articles published in *The Times* proved that the *Protocols* were largely a hasty paraphrase of the *Dialogue aux enfers*, and that they were designed to produce the

impression that the discontent in Russia, which led to the Revolution of 1905–1906 was caused neither by Tsarist absolutism nor by the incompetence of the bureaucracy, but by a Jewish conspiracy, co-extensive with the Jewish race, and aiming at world-domination through revolution. I also showed that it was more than probable that such portions of the *Protocols* as were not mere paraphrases of the *Dialogue aux enfers* were supplied by the Okhrana—the Tsarist Secret Political Police, for which Russia's new tyrants have substituted the still more redoubtable " Che-Ka "—and that agents or chiefs of the Okhrana, so to speak, " Judaized " the *Protocols*, converting what was an attack on the political methods of Napoleon III into the minutes of a meeting of Jewish conspirators.

To judge from certain references in English " die-hard " and " one hundred per cent " American newspapers, this explanation of the *Protocols* has not entirely dispelled the belief in a great Jewish conspiracy. " All very well," say some believers, " you may have proved that the *Protocols* are a plagiarism, but may not Maurice Joly have been influenced by the doctrines of Jewish revolutionaries ? " To this one can only reply that Joly's only reference to the Jews in the *Dialogues* is contemptuous ; that there is no evidence that he had any Jewish revolutionary " contacts "—to use a term dear to Intelligence Departments—or that his political ideas were in any degree influenced by the study of the doctrines of German-Jewish Socialists. Indeed, *pace* Mrs. Webster and other writers who seem to have convinced themselves that Jewish conspirators inspired the French Revolution—a movement in which, to be truthful, Protestants played a larger part than their numbers warranted—there is no evidence that native-born or foreign Jews had any important connection with revolutionary activity in France before the days of the Third Republic. Jewish finance was certainly on excellent terms with

the Second Empire. But most of the romantics who demand simplified explanations of the causes of " World Unrest " and cannot bear to be robbed of their picturesque and learned elders, who play the same rôle in their imagination as do the Jesuits in a certain class of Protestant fiction, ask two more pertinent questions. " If you dismiss the *Protocols* as a plagiarism of the *Dialogues*, how can you," say they, " interpret their uncanny fulfilment in the Russian upheaval as a mere coincidence ? " And again : " How can one explain the large proportion of Jews among the Russian Communist leaders except by the existence of a great Jewish conspiracy ? "

These two questions must be answered separately and in detail. To take the first, the fulfilment of the " prophecies " which are read into rather than contained in Sergei Nilus' books is easily enough explained if it is compared with Joly's original. The dialogue between the shades of Montesquieu and Machiavelli might well be entitled " The Tyrant's Progress," for it describes how a dictator attains absolute power through revolution. The *Protocols* do no more : they merely substitute for the Machiavellian Prince-Dictator a group of Jewish leaders surrounding a sovereign of the House of David, whose powers are apparently to be limited by the control of his elderly advisers.

There is a general similarity in the course of many historically recent revolutions. To the disorders of the French upheavals of 1789–1793 and 1848, succeeded the dictatorships, for such they were, of the Napoleons, and finally the First and Second Empires. To the disorders of that Russian Revolutionary regime which is associated with the name of the eloquent and vacillating Kerensky, succeeded the Bolshevist seizure of power and the dictatorship, nominally of the proletariat but in reality of a relatively small group of bold and ruthless Communists. The parallel between the French and Russian Revolutions must not be pressed too far ; still

it is surely clear that the methods whereby individuals or groups " hack their way through " to power are substantially the same in all periods. Cæsar Borgia and many another Italian despot of the Renaissance, the French terrorists, the Napoleons, the Turkish Chiefs of the Committee of Union and Progress, and Lenin and his adherents all followed the same methods to gain power, and to guard that power when gained.

To win power they stirred up popular hatred against individuals, classes or racial minorities, debauched the Army and Navy, promised social, political or economic advantages to those whom it was most essential to gain to their cause, organized or encouraged secret political societies, and made every possible use of propagandist methods, open or secret, as the occasion demanded.

To guard and preserve their power Saviours of Society such as the Third Napoleon and Saviours of the Proletariat such as Lenin must have recourse to the same measures, the restraint of individual and the extinction of public liberties, the suppression of the right to Free Speech, the muzzling of the Press, the " control " of the Judiciary and the unrestricted extension of the Powers of the State. Tyranny, and above all that form of tyranny which emerges from the welter of war or revolution, marches inevitably along the same military road, whether it be exercised in the name of a nation or of internationalism, of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat.

There were would-be dictators in plenty among the Russian revolutionaries of 1905–1906, and not a few of them were Jews. Integral Marxism, with its prophecy of the dictatorship of the proletariat, had always been the creed of the extremer Russian revolutionaries. Even to-day, though the Soviet Government has been forced, mainly by the disastrous results of its experiments, to dilute its economic doctrine, there is no evidence whatever that it has weakened as regards the doctrine of prole-

tarian dictatorship, exercised, of course, *by* the dictators *for* the proletariat. Now the Tsarist Political Police knew the Jewish and non-Jewish revolutionaries uncommonly well, so well indeed that it was said that no one knew where the Okhrana ended and the Revolution began! The heads of the Okhrana were convinced that the success of a Communist Revolution must bring about the so-called "proletarian" dictatorship and that many Jews would be found among the dictators. The Jews were an unpopular minority in Russia. What was more obvious than to "Judaize" the *Dialogue aux enfers*? There were many Jews and Jewish renegades among the agents of the Political Police. One of them was doubtless employed to give the necessary Jewish colour to the *Dialogues*. Mr. Israel Zangwill has protested against this assumption, but spies and *agents-provocateurs* can be found among the adherents of Judaism as they are found among those who profess other religions, and there is good reason to believe that one of the associates of the notorious Rachkovsky, once head of the Russian Secret Police in Paris, a certain Manassevitch-Manuiloff, whose name is simply a Russianized version of Emmanuel Manasseh or Manasseh Emmanuel, was connected with the original forgery. The following passages may be profitably compared by doubters. The "Machiavel" of the *Dialogue* says :—

> "I am the arm and the sword of the Revolution. . . . Lift up your eyes and bow down before Him who bears on His brow the fated sign of human destiny."[1] The unnamed "elder" of the *Protocols* says : "Pray to God and bow down before Him who bears the mark of the world's destiny and whose star God Himself has guided."[2]

Maurice Joly had in mind the descriptions of Napoleon

[1] *Dialogue aux enfers*, p. 283. [2] *Protocols*, p. 85.

as " the man of destiny " and " the sword of the Revolution," perhaps too the attempt of certain modern commentators on the Revelations of St. John to identify the first Emperor with the " Beast " of the Apocalypse, whose " mark " was the number 666. The plagiarist, having to prove that the anti-Christian World-Ruler is to be a Jew, turns the " mark " into a " star," very probably referring to the interlaced triangles forming a six-pointed star, an almost universal Jewish badge, which was, and is, very well known to all Russians living in the neighbourhood of Jews, and, I may add, has nothing whatever to do with the five-pointed star, which is the Bolshevists' device. The association of Jewish revolutionaries with what is known as " Orient Freemasonry " in the *Protocols* does not justify certain wild deductions dear to those who make too much of the " Jewish Peril." This form of Freemasonry has at times been implicated in revolution and political intrigue. In France, its chief stronghold, it is anti-clerical and anti-monarchical. Many Jews have been Orient Freemasons, and at the time of the " discovery " of the *Protocols* the Grand Orient of France was believed to have fallen very much under Jewish influence. Freemasonry was banned in Russia as " revolutionary " : many Jews were Freemasons outside Russia ; the Jews in Russia were mostly disaffected to the Tsarist regime. Freemasonry was regarded as something mysterious and terrible by devout and conservative Russians. Consequently it was necessary to describe the " elders of Zion " as Freemasons of the 33rd Degree !

The so-called fulfilment of prophecy which has startled many readers of the *Protocols* loses its significance as soon as it is realized that Sergei Nilus' work was simply a plagiarism, produced to order by the Russian Political Police, fathered on the credulous Nilus and published at the moment when the extreme monarchists thought it necessary in order to influence the Court and injure

the Liberals, whose programme included the relief of Jewish disabilities. Of course the incurable Judæophobe can maintain that the Learned Elders plagiarized Maurice Joly by converting his *Dialogue* into their *Protocols* ! These precious documents, according to this theory, were really abstracted from the safes of the Zionist head-quarters in Paris by a " friend " of Sergei Nilus or by a mysterious lady [1] who stole them from one of the leading Freemasons of the Grand Orient. This theory says little for the originality of the Jewish sages in question, and less for the vigilance with which such compromising documents were guarded. But perhaps the lady was one of those fascinating Tsarist agents who used to be so valuable to writers of sensational romances such as Mr. William Le Queux ; perhaps this was a modern version of the story of Susanna and the Elders ending—well—somewhat differently. But I must not prolong these interesting speculations and can best conclude them by misquoting Juvenal :

Credat anti-Judæus Apella—non ego !

But how is one to explain away the prominence, not to say the predominance, of Jews among the Communist party in Russia, Hungary, and in some of the other countries where Communist parties exist ?

In the southern and western districts of what was once the Russian Empire, in Poland and Galicia, Bessarabia, the Ukraine and the Russian cities on the coast of the Black Sea, there has long been settled the largest concentration of Jews in the world, the largest concentration, that is to say, of a community, separated by tradition and by history, by custom and by religion, from the non-Jewish majority among whom it dwells.

[1] In the first edition of the *Protocols* Nilus avers that they were stolen by a " woman " from a leading Freemason. In the second edition he states that " a friend " obtained them from the safes of the " Society of Zion."

Most of the members of this Jewish concentration live, partly by inclination, partly perforce in exclusive and homogeneous communities. They have, until very recently, been subjected to repressive legislation, and to a certain social aversion, which by emphasizing the differences between Jew and Gentile, and by confining the Jewish minorities to a restricted number of professions, strengthened the already strong racial and quasi-national consciousness of the Jews and discouraged any inclination on their part to identify themselves with the social, political and national life of the Gentile majority. Be it remembered, too, that the further you descend the social ladder in East European Jewry the more you realize the similarity between the Jews of Poland and of what was the Russian "Pale" and the exclusive, self-centred, often fanatical Moslem and Christian communities of the Nearest East. Such Jews are little interested in the history and the beliefs of the Gentiles among whom they live. Their own historical experiences combine with their intense and natural racial and religious pride to make a great number of them hostile to Christianity and more especially to the Russian Orthodox Church. But if they have the weaknesses of an intellectual self-centred people, a tendency to be over-subtle, a lack of sympathy with the beliefs and of tolerance for the opinions of non-Jews, the townsman's contempt for all that is not urban, an acridity of temper that invites hostility, in fact all the defects that accompany a narrow outlook, they have remarkable qualities which most of their Gentile neighbours seem to lack. Gifted or cursed with as tenacious an historical memory as the Celtic Irish ; as revengeful as most Balkan and Near Eastern peoples who have memories of oppression, but more grateful than most for kindness done ; clannish but shrewd judges of many values, persistent in their hatreds and in their loyalties, sober, intelligent and persevering, the Jewish masses in Russia were the most dangerous

of the enemies of the Tsarist regime. It is therefore the reverse of surprising that so many of them and also of the Jewish members of the Russian *intelligentsia* threw in their lot with the most extreme of the revolutionary parties, inspired by political conviction or personal ambition, and in the case of many among the multitudes of small functionaries whom the Communist State required for its all-embracing activities, by the natural desire to find employment. The majority of literate Russians belonged to the classes against whom the Revolution had declared a pitiless war ; the minority, who supported the Communists, did not nearly suffice to fill the multitudinous posts created by the new Government. Even if the revolutionary leaders had not been so often either of Jewish extraction or pro-Jewish in the sense that they regarded the Jewish masses in Russia as implacable enemies of the old regime, they would have been forced to employ a disproportionate number of Jews in their administration, because the Jewish skilled workmen, small retailers and the like were as a rule better instructed, soberer and more industrious than their orthodox " comrades."

The Bolshevist Revolution in Hungary was largely the work of Jews who for more than a generation had overflowed from the great East European reservoir into the land of the easy-going Magyars, a race of " Christian Turks " with a thoroughly Turkish incapacity for business. The overflow brought with it the prejudices, the bitterness, the virtues and the traditions of the Jewish " Pale," which do not rapidly disappear even among the most " assimilated " Jews of Vienna and the German cities. It brought too a revolutionary Messianism, which explains why so many Jews in Eastern Europe are subconsciously inclined to favour Utopian schemes of Communism when propounded or supported by Jews. This little-realized aspect of the Jewish character, this idealism which can conquer even the most sordid environ-

ment, has been admirably described by MM. Jean and Jerome Tharaud, the first living authorities on the Eastern Jews, in their most interesting account of the Hungarian Bolshevists *Quand Israel est Roi*. Here is an illuminating passage :—

> "For centuries and centuries, through every disaster, the Messianic vision of an ideal city where there shall be neither rich nor poor has never ceased to haunt the imagination of Israel. In their Ghettos, filled with the dust of ancient dreams, the wild Jews of Galicia on moonlight nights are ever patiently searching the depths of the firmament for some sign, the harbinger of the coming of the Messiah. Trotzky, Bela Kun and the rest have in their turn succeeded to this illusion, only, weary of searching in the heavens for the Kingdom of God that never comes, they have brought it down to earth. The Experiment has shown that their prophets of old time were better inspired in placing it in the void."

This trait in the Jewish character, combined with the belief or delusion that the Jews are the Chosen People of God, explains alike the faith of the traditionalists in the coming of a divinely inspired ruler and the readiness with which even the Jew who has lost all or most of his belief in the supernatural often accepts the most visionary or unpractical political gospel if preached by a co-religionist or compatriot. In 1666 the Smyrna Jew Sabbatai Sefi proclaimed himself the Messiah, and more than 10,000 "Deunmés" of Salonika remain faithful to his teachings to this day, in spite of his confession of his imposture and of his conversion to Islam. It is hard to believe that if Karl Marx, a nominal Protestant of Jewish origin, had been, let us say, a pure Englishman of the name of Charles Moggs, he would have found so many followers among the Jewish masses.

Do not these facts sufficiently explain why the Eastern Jews have been to a great extent the driving force of the Russian Bolshevist Revolution, intensifying its fanatical bitterness against Tsar and Church and Capital, but supplying it with greater brain-power, greater continuity of policy and persistence, than could be found among the Russian masses or among the Communist fraction of the *intelligentsia*?

Is it necessary to see in these natural consequences of Eastern Jewish history and of the Eastern Jewish temperament consciously or subconsciously influenced by that history proof of a great conspiracy organized by Jewish financiers and politicians throughout the world? Between Gentile and Jewish politicians of a certain type is there much to choose? Powerful Jewish financiers may endanger the safety of states, but are they really more dangerous than Christian money-lords? Were the Bleichroeders and Oppenheims a greater danger to Germany than the House of Krupp? Are the great Jewish bankers of New York a greater menace to the United States than Congregationalist Trust magnates?

CHAPTER 10

The British Administration in Palestine

BETWEEN TWO FIRES. ORIENTAL CREDULITY. CRITICISMS OF JEWISH OFFICIALS. THE ADMINISTRATION: ITS CHIEFS AND ITS BRANCHES. FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. COST OF DEFENCE. ROADS, RAILWAYS AND PUBLIC WORKS. EDUCATION. PUBLIC HEALTH. ARCHÆOLOGY. A CREDIT BALANCE OF ACHIEVEMENT.

UNDER a double enfilade of criticism from the political Zionists on the one hand and the extremer Arab Nationalists on the other the British official in Palestine, from the High Commissioner downwards, frequently finds himself in the position of a third party whose attempts to prevent two neighbours from stoning one another merely bring him well under fire from both, in which case his sensations are decidedly not those of the proverbial *tertius gaudens*.

Each side has accused him of partiality, at best of indifference to his legitimate claims. As a matter of fact his attitude towards each is a curious compound of admiration and annoyance. If a British official, you may admire the pertinacious energy of the Zionist, the self-sacrificing idealism of the Halutzim, but when you find that a number of young zealots, having thoroughly irritated the Arab against your advice, accuse you of having set the Arab against them, you are tempted to remember Dryden's reference to the Chosen People :

> "Whom, debauched with ease,
> No king could govern and no God could please."

And however much you may sympathize with the Arab squire's point of view and admire his perfect manners, you are less charitably disposed towards him when, in almost the same breath, he asks you to help him to sell his land to the Zionists, and tells you that if the British would only stand aside he and his would make Palestine

a Jewish national cemetery. In such circumstances you have a strong fellow-feeling for Gallio !

As has been shown in the preceding chapter, the political Zionists' interpretation of the Balfourian phrase " the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People " *differed completely* until the communication of the Churchill enclosure from that accepted by the British Government and affirmed on June 3, 1921, by the High Commissioner. Had the Zionist Executive in Palestine received no such large recognition from the Home Government, or had it been possible at the time to say that those Zionists who interpreted the above phrase as meaning " the establishment of a predominantly Jewish State in Palestine " were isolated extremists, it would have been permissible to overlook this difference of interpretation.

But the Zionist Executive had been granted wide powers by the British Government, and the leader of organized European Zionism, Dr. Weizmann himself, said to Mr. Lansing, on February 27, 1919, when the Zionist case was stated before the Peace Conference :—

> ". . . by a Jewish National Home we meant the creation in Palestine of such conditions as should enable us to establish between 50,000 and 60,000 Jews per annum there and to settle them on the land. Further, that the conditions should be such that we should be allowed to develop our institutions, our schools and the Hebrew language—that there should ultimately be such conditions that Palestine should be just as Jewish as America is American and England is English." (R.E.Z.O., p. 22.)

Dr. Weizmann has explained away the last passage ; if he ever really contemplated the annual establishment of 50,000 Jews in Palestine and the political rather than the cultural Judaization of Palestine, he has by his

acceptance of the Churchill restatement of our policy in Palestine abandoned this idea. In any case the Administration, whether under Sir Louis Bols or Sir Herbert Samuel, never accepted the claims of the extreme political Zionists ; hence the bitter criticisms directed between 1919 and the summer of 1922 by the political Zionists against what Dr. Eder has called " an Arab Administration."

But the Zionists are not the only unfair critics of the British official. The Arabs are now equally unfair, and even foreign ecclesiastics at times show remarkable intemperance in their criticisms. Not so long ago the Governor of Jerusalem received a letter from an Italian Monsignore, accusing the Palestine Postal Administration of having caused the loss of a number of signed photographs of the late Pope, which he had sent to Roman Catholic notables of Jerusalem, and threatening to write to the Press to complain " of the manner in which the British Administration in Palestine treats Catholics." The Government meekly held an inquiry, and discovered that the photographs in question had been lost in Italy. And here it may be said that the meekness of the Administration in the face of criticism has been extraordinary, perhaps excessive. I have only heard of one case in which it defended itself in the local Press ; that was when the American Zionist Medical Unit, a body which has done excellent work, but has made rather a point of refusing to recognize what the Department of Public Health has accomplished since the conquest, publicly accused this Department of having allowed the water supply of Jerusalem to become contaminated by typhoid germs. In this case the Department communicated a refutation of this dangerously misleading statement to the local Press.

I have already referred (in Chapter 5) to the suspicions of the Arabs and the manner in which every action on the part of the Government tends to be interpreted as

an encouragement of political Zionism by Arab politicians and even by the Arab Delegation, which should know better. Thus the ordinance whereby villages, the majority of the inhabitants whereof have been guilty of crimes against property and persons—e.g. looting houses or abetting the same—and have terrorized would-be witnesses against them, are made collectively responsible for the payment of damages, has been described as tyrannous anti-Arab legislation, because it has been sometimes applied in the case of villagers who made unprovoked attacks on Jewish colonies, although it is in accordance both with Turkish administrative practice and with the Moslem Shari law.

Again, if the illegal importation of arms by certain Jews can only be condemned as a cause of fear and hostility among the Arabs, the condonation by prominent Arabs of attacks on harmless Hebrew settlements and the Arab Delegation's excursions into the vulgarest anti-Jewish propaganda are equally condemnable, as causing fear and hostility among the Jews of Palestine, irrespective of the character of their Zionism, and adding to the difficulties of the Administration. Arab suspicion frequently prevents Arabs from co-operating with Jews, even when it is obviously to their advantage and is desired by the authorities. Early last year some Jews of Jerusalem proposed to form a company to work "King Solomon's Quarries," and invited Arab notables to join the board and subscribe to the enterprise. The notables refused because a report had been spread that the Zionists were going to dig a tunnel (through a quarter of a mile of rock !) from the quarries under the Mosque of Omar, which stands on the site of Solomon's Temple, presumably with the object of emerging therefrom and seizing the sacred place ! Faced by such facts as these one asks oneself whether there are any limits to Oriental credulity.[1]

[1] But one's Occidental self-satisfaction is liable to be somewhat depressed by a study of the beliefs of our "Stunt Press."

It need hardly be said that British officials of the Jewish faith can do nothing to please the Arabs, and that any British official who does not please them is liable to be accused either of being a " crypto-Jew " or of being " bought by the Zionists." Non-Jewish officials who have resisted the former pretensions of the Zionist Executive Commission have been accused in their turn of excessive Arabophilia ; thus the Governor of Jerusalem, Mr. Ronald Storrs, C.M.G., who, as president of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, has shown remarkable energy and ability in bringing together representatives of every creed to work in harmony for the preservation of the Holy City from vulgarization and for the revival of its ancient arts and crafts,[1] and has governed a particularly difficult, divided and faction-ridden population with astonishing tact and success, has been a target for Zionist missiles. His services have not saved him, and other Governors too, from being the object of the animosity of some of the extreme Zionist politicians, who, rather than admit that they have themselves to thank in large measure for their difficulties, ascribe these to the perversity of the Arabs, the intrigues of the Catholics, above all to the " lack of sympathy " or " hostility " of British officials.

Even Sir Herbert Samuel—a just, impartial and sympathetic administrator if ever there was one, a Liberal by conviction, a harder worker than almost any member of a hard-working administration—has been subjected to most unfair criticism by extremists on both sides—by the Arab because he is a Jew, by the extremer Zionists because he has declared that

> The measures to foster the well-being of the Arabs should be precisely those we should adopt in Palestine

[1] Such as the weaving industry, the revival of the glass industry at Hebron and the production of really artistic pottery resembling the well-known Kutahia ware.

if there were no Zionist question and if there had been no Balfour Declaration. There is in this policy nothing incompatible with reasonable Zionist aspirations.

On the contrary, if the growth of Jewish influence were accompanied by Arab degradation, or even by a neglect to promote Arab advancement, it would fail in one of its essential purposes. The grievance of the Arab would be a discredit to the Jew, and in the result the moral influence of Zionism would be gravely impaired.

But the most vigorous Arab attacks are directed against Mr. Norman Bentwich, formerly Legal Secretary and now Attorney-General. Mr. Bentwich is a very conscientious and able British official, almost as preternaturally hard-working as the Chief Secretary, a Jew and a convinced and idealistic Zionist. He did excellent service in the war and has written *Palestine of the Jews*, in which he gives a most interesting, if perhaps somewhat too roseate, account of the Jewish agricultural colonies and of Zionist activities in Palestine. Foreign Consuls have complained of his refusal to recognize the Capitulations. These have been suspended under the Mandatory regime, and that regime has been approved by the League of Nations, though it has not been publicly declared operative. It is therefore a nice question whether Mr. Bentwich's action is or is not justified by International Law. The Agudath Yisrael (old Conservative and anti-Zionist Jews) accuse him of attempting to make them accept the jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts, which they consider unorthodox. But the severest criticisms, not of Mr. Bentwich's legal or administrative ability nor in general of his decisions, but of his appointment, come from the Arabs, who urge that the appointment of a professed Zionist to the highest legal position in the country Administration is an injustice to the Arab majority. Given Arab anti-Zionism, one must admit

that his appointment was not calculated to allay Arab apprehensions or to soothe Arab susceptibilities. The Arab assertion that the number of Jews in the Civil Service in general is excessive appears at first sight to be justified by the official figures for certain Departments. The Jews are strongly represented in the Immigration Department, but there is something to be said for strong Jewish representation in a branch which has to do almost exclusively with Jewish immigrants. They are also numerous in the Department of Public Works (forty-four out of sixty-one of the Junior Civil Service officials in this Department were Jews in August, 1920), but this is due to the fact that it is almost impossible to find non-Jewish Palestinians possessing the necessary qualifications. In the Senior Civil Service the Jews supply about a fifth of the non-British officials, the Christians over two-fifths,[1] although they are less numerous than the Jews. The fact is that Moslem neglect of education—for which the Turkish Government was largely responsible in the past—is now bearing its fruits, and for some time to come it will be impossible to avoid the under-representation of the Moslem Arab element. This Arab grievance is one for which the Arabs will have mainly themselves to blame in the future.

In this connection it may be urged that the economizing of British officials in Palestine may be carried too far under present political conditions. There are, as yet, no Civil Service regulations, and the suppression of certain official posts which has taken place in recent years, even in cases where an official had signed a five-years' contract of service with the Palestine Government, must inflict great hardship on individuals, and cause uneasiness among public servants already exposed, owing to the political situation, to an unusual amount of unfair criticism from every quarter.

[1] *See* Chapter 5 (Arab Christians) and this Chapter (under Education) for further reference to this Moslem grievance.

British Administration in Palestine

The reader will at this stage permit a brief account of the Administration. At its head is the High Commissioner, whose extensive powers are set forth in the Palestine Order in Council of August 10, 1922. Sir Herbert Samuel, though unprepared by experience of Oriental Administration, has been a remarkably successful High Commissioner ; Liberal, sympathetic, hard-working, above all just, he has been pardoned for his sympathy with Zionism by the Arabs, whose most anti-Zionist representatives, while they at times criticize the appointment of a sympathizer with Zionism as the British Government's representative in Palestine, express the wish that all Zionists resembled him. Next comes the Chief Secretary, Sir Wyndham Deedes. It is his function to advise the High Commissioner on administrative questions and to act as the channel of communication between him and other officials. Sir Wyndham has a long and full experience of the Near East since his appointment to the Turkish Gendarmerie in 1910. As an Intelligence Officer, Political Officer and Military Attaché he did admirable service on the Turkish front during and after the Great War. His power of work is prodigious, yet one cannot but regret that his austerity never spared a none too robust constitution for the political career to which he is believed to aspire. A strong sympathizer with Zionism, he understands the complexities of Jewish Palestine better than most British officials. There are some who consider that his intolerance of slipshod thinking, of lazy-mindedness and of disingenuous rhetoric and his sympathies with Labour have made him somewhat blind to the Arab side of the Zionist question. He is shortly retiring[1] from the service and his place will be taken by Sir Gilbert Clayton, who, like Sir Wyndham Deedes, was till lately an officer of the regular army, and as head of the " Arab Bureau,"

[1] The above was written in February. Since then Sir Wyndham Deedes has retired and Sir Gilbert Clayton is Chief Secretary in his stead.

Chief Political Officer in Palestine and Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in Egypt has filled a number of important posts in the East with credit to himself and advantage to the Empire. The other chief officials of the Administration are the Treasurer, who may be described as Palestine's Minister of Finance, the Attorney-General, and the other heads of Departments [1] and the Governors of the four Provinces of Jaffa and Jerusalem,[2] the Northern Province (Phœnicia and Galilee), Samaria and the Southern Province (Beersheba and Gaza).

In 1920–1921 the financial situation of the Government was decidedly satisfactory. During the financial period ending on March 31, 1921, the revenue exceeded expenditure by roughly £E.75,000. The Budget for 1921–1922 provided for a revenue of £E.2,214,047 and an expenditure of £E.2,286,133. But from 1921 onwards there was a marked falling off in the revenue. The general fall of prices affected the Customs Revenue ; above all, the growing competition of Australia, whence flour has been largely imported into Palestine during the last two years, seriously lowered the revenue derived from agricultural tithes. The decrease in the amounts spent by the Zionist Organization in Palestine has also to some extent lowered the revenue by diminishing the purchasing power of a large section of the urban population and thus lessening imports. During the six months, March–September, 1922, the receipts from railways, tithes and

[1] These are, besides Finance and Justice, twelve in number, viz.: Agriculture and Fisheries, Antiquities, Customs, Commerce and Industry, Education, Public Health, Land Registration, Public Security, Posts and Telegraphs, Public Works and Railways. The Chief Secretary, Attorney-General, Treasurer, the Inspector-General of Police (Public Security) and the Directors of Agriculture, Customs, Commerce, Education, Public Health and Public Works will sit as members of the Legislative Council when convened.

[2] Jaffa will be definitely adjoined to Jerusalem this year. Till July 1, 1922, the country was divided into seven districts. There are twenty sub-districts in the four provinces. These answer more or less to the Turkish "Nahies."

[*Photographed from the portrait by Sargent by Henry Dixon & Sons*

THE GOVERNOR OF JERUSALEM, TEMPY. BRIG.-GEN. R. STORRS. C.M.G.

[*Face page* 206

customs, and to a less degree from stamps and other sources of revenue, continued to fall off. The Administration appears to have been over-optimistic. It budgeted for a revenue of £E.1,031,096 during this period. It actually encashed £E.737,532. Its estimate of expenditure was £E.735,695, but £E.742,748 was actually expended during this period. Beyond the deficits of the last two years, not in themselves too serious, the Administration has also had to face a deficit of over £E.200,000 unexpectedly bequeathed by the Military Administration and has obtained advances from the Crown Agents against a forthcoming loan. Its total indebtedness will probably amount to £E.1,250,000 by the end of the financial year. This will have to be met out of the loan of £3,000,000 which it is proposed to float during the current year.[1]

One has the impression that the young administration has taken rather too roseate a view of the present resources of Palestine, which is after all a small and poor agricultural country, and has depended too much on Customs and tithes estimated on the basis of the exceptional years 1919 and 1920 for its revenue. It has not yet substituted a land-tax for the tithe, which still bears rather heavily upon the peasantry, and the Tax on immovable property (wirku) is based upon an assessment which, in spite of the maintenance of additional Turkish war-taxes imposed on such property in 1915–1917, is still too low in view of the great increase averaging from 200 to 250 per cent in the value of urban property since the war. It is a matter for regret that a new assessment was not taken in hand in the early days of the Civil Administration. It would have resulted in a substantial increase of revenue. A check on the expenditure of certain departments also seems to be required. The necessity

[1] Not floated in 1922 on account of the advisability of awaiting the Near Eastern Settlement at Lausanne, before the loan was put on the market.

for economy does not seem to be so thoroughly appreciated in official circles in Palestine as it is in England.

On the other hand, expenditure on remunerative public works seems likely to be profitable, more especially if the Rutenberg scheme by lowering the level of the Dead Sea permits an attack on its salts. The briny waters of the " Sea of Lot," as the Arabs name it, contain possibly 1,500,000,000 tons of potassium chloride and 300,000,000 tons of magnesium bromide which await exploitation. Palestine is therefore richer in potash resources than any country in the world. There is also great hope of petroleum occurring in paying quantities to the south of the Dead Sea, and the Standard Oil Company is believed to be genuinely optimistic on this head. There is, therefore, good reason to hope for an improvement in the revenues of the Administration in a fairly near future. But it must economize for the present.

The defence of Palestine has been met until recently entirely out of the Imperial Exchequer. In 1921 the upkeep of a garrison of roughly 5,000 troops cost about £4,000,000. In 1922 the garrison was greatly reduced and expenditure thereon fell to about £2,000,000. The present garrison of two Indian battalions with a small force of artillery and engineers supplemented by a detachment of the Air Force may be somewhat further reduced. The new British gendarmerie commanded by Major-General Tudor, who has won golden opinions in Palestine, was recruited from the constabulary and the " auxiliaries " who served in Ireland during the troubles. In spite of ill-natured propaganda anent " Black and Tans," it has proved a great success. Its strength is about 750 of all ranks. There is also a Palestinian gendarmerie about 500 strong, which is very efficient and a Police Force which is steadily improving in discipline with a strength of about 1,200 of all ranks. A grant will be required for the British gendarmerie, but there is every reason to believe that Imperial Expenditure on the defence of the

country will be steadily reduced. Palestine can be rapidly reinforced from Egypt and the other Mediterranean garrisons in case of serious trouble, internal or external, and the strong Air Force which we now maintain in Egypt could send a number of machines to any disturbed part of the country in a few hours. Under the present circumstances an infantry battalion with a small force of artillery, our present aircraft strength and the gendarmerie should be able to maintain order and keep off any probable Beduin raids.

To turn to some of the Departments of the Administration, the Road system of Palestine has been greatly improved during and since the Great War. The Turks under German advice devoted considerable time and labour during the war to the construction of roads, though, as usual, they did not lay nearly enough metal on them to stand the strain of heavy motor traffic. The roads have been since thoroughly repaired by the British Military and Civil Governments. The first and second class roads, i.e. those fit at all seasons for mechanical transport, form a system covering about 300 miles. There is a main high road from Jaffa to Jericho via Jerusalem and another from Beersheba through Hebron, Jerusalem, Nablus and Jenin to Nazareth, where it forks, one branch going to Haifa, the other to Tiberias, where it bifurcates, a northern branch running to Safed, where it meets the Damascus road which crosses the Jordan at Jisr Banat Yakub (Jacob's Daughters' Bridge), while a southern branch runs to Semakh at the southern extremity of the Sea of Galilee. There is also a metalled road which branches off the Jerusalem-Jenin road a little north of Nablus and goes to Kilkilieh by way of Tulkeram.

The Palestine metalled roads are excellent. The surface of the great high roads from Jaffa to Jerusalem and Jericho and from Jerusalem to Haifa through Jenin and Nazareth is as good as that of most first-class English roads. There are also a number of " third-class " roads,

resembling those in Russia and America outside the great cities. These are earth tracks, supplemented in marshy places with some metalling and provided with a certain number of bridges and culverts. In some areas they can be used by wheeled traffic most of the year, except just after exceptionally wet periods in winter and early spring, and furnish no obstacle to Ford cars. But in other parts of the country they are impassable by mechanical transport during the greater part of the winter, notably in the plains of Sharon and Esdraelon, where the mud is extraordinarily deep and maddeningly adhesive after heavy rain. Remembering the difficulties of our wheeled transport during the pursuit of the Turks through the coastal plain after the capture of Gaza, one can easily imagine the discomfiture of Sisera's chariots in the mud flats by the river Kishon.

But, excellent as the first-class Palestine roads undoubtedly are, their upkeep is extremely costly. The limestone rock of which the highlands of Judæa and Samaria is composed makes bad road metal. There is some good basalt in Northern Galilee, but its transport to South Palestine is at present too expensive. New road construction in the Palestinian Highlands has proved expensive, owing to the amount of masonry—culverts, parapets, bridges, etc.—necessitated by the configuration of the country, a tableland falling steeply at the sides and seamed with deep gullies and ravines scored in the limestone by the rain-fed torrents, which are dry for the greater part of the year, but may after a sudden storm come down in spate and sweep a hundred yards of road away in a few hours.

Owing to the necessity for strict economy only one new road is being constructed at present. This is the metalled road along the sea-coast from Haifa to the French Syrian frontier at Cape (Ras) El-Nakura where it meets an excellent French-built metalled road from Beirut. This road, which has long been needed, will

certainly increase commercial traffic between the fertile Acre-Haifa region in Palestine and the towns of Beirut, Tyre and Sidon in the French Mandatory area in winter, when landing at the Haifa roadstead is sometimes impossible for two or three days owing to unfavourable winds, and will benefit tourists and travellers who wish to avoid a sea journey or the long detour by the narrow-gauge line from Haifa to Beirut via Deraa, Damascus and Rayak.

The railway system is now divided into two groups. These are :

(*a*) The standard (4 ft. 8½ in.) lines laid by the British Army or converted by it from the narrow (3 ft. 6 in.) gauge. These are the Kantara-Rafa-Ludd-Haifa Railway with the line from Jaffa to Jerusalem via Ludd. The latter has recently been purchased from the French company, which originally constructed it as a narrow-gauge line. There is also a branch line from Rafa to Beersheba and a small branch line from Ras el Ain to Petach Tikveh. These lines cover the following distances :

	Kilometres.	
Kantara-Haifa . . .	415	(of which 202 km. between Kantara and Rafa form the Sinai Military Railway in Egyptian territory).
Rafa-Beersheba. . .	60	
Jaffa-Jerusalem . .	88	
Ras el Ain-Petach Tikveh	6½	
Total . . .	569½	

(*b*) The narrow-gauge lines, i.e. captured portions of the Hejaz Railway and of Turkish military lines constructed during the war. These lines are :

	Kilometres.
Haifa-Semakh and Syrian Frontier . . .	87
Haifa-Acre	22½
Afule-Nablus	78½
Tulkeram-Mesudieh	20
	207½

In addition the section of the Hejaz Railway in Transjordania from Nasib to Maan (323 kilometres) is now worked by agreement with the French and with the Transjordanian Government by the Palestine Railways Administration, which runs two trains a week from Haifa to Amman.

The Railway Administration has been decidedly successful ; the track is excellent throughout, even on the narrow-gauge lines. Trains are punctual, and passenger accommodation is growing monthly more satisfactory. Above all, this Administration, the chief of which, Colonel Holmes, O.B.E., was second in Command of the Richborough ferry service, during the Great War, has so far paid its way, although it is greatly handicapped by having to share the expenses as well as the profits of the railway from Rafa to El Kantara with the British military authorities, on whose behalf it operates this railway, which passes through 200 kilometres of very " light soil," uncultivated save for the oasis of El Arish.

The British Treasury has agreed to postpone any demand that Palestine should repay the value of the capital assets created during the war by the British Army, such as the standard-gauge railway from El Kantara on the Suez Canal to Haifa and its branches until the country can afford to pay. If the Egyptian Government were to take over the Sinai Military Railway, i.e., the section from Rafa to El Kantara which runs through territory which is politically Egyptian, the Palestine Railways instead of making a small annual profit would be able either to increase profits or to reduce railway fares, the raising of which has caused some complaints. So far the Egyptian Government has refused to do so. If tourist traffic between Egypt and Palestine continues to increase as it did last winter, there may be less difficulty in inducing Egypt to agree to this. One criticism of the Government's policy with regard to communications is

suggested by a study of the road and railway map of Palestine. Has it been good policy from a financial point of view to construct or repair so many roads parallel to the railways, and thus enable private companies to compete with them in the transport of goods and passengers by motor-omnibuses and lorries?

Education is spreading. Primary schools are being opened under a scheme by which the Administration defrays out of general taxation the salaries of teachers and cost of maintenance, while the inhabitants of any place where a school is demanded provide a suitable building and keep it in repair. But the lack of funds, which must persist until the Palestine Government can raise a loan for productive purposes and thus eventually increase its revenue, prevents the Administration from granting any considerable sum for secondary or higher education, which is much needed, especially among the Moslems, in spite of the existence of many voluntary schools maintained by funds subscribed by Christian and Jewish religious bodies outside Palestine.

The Arab Christians have long benefited by the foundation of numerous mission schools, ranging from little " dames " schools in remote villages to the " Syrian Protestant College," and the almost equally well-known Jesuit College at Beirut, throughout Syria and Palestine. In spite of the diminution of Zionist funds and the consequent setback to Zionist-Jewish educational activities the Jewish community in Palestine appears to be over —rather than under—schooled. There are few Moslem private schools and their standard is lower than that of the Jewish and Christian schools, with one exception. The only school in the country which prepares pupils up to English matriculation standard is the English College at Jerusalem. St. George's School and Bishop Gobat's School at Jerusalem are also secondary schools. The language of instruction in these three schools is English. But there are no Government schools devoted entirely to

secondary education, and though the foundation-stone of the Hebrew University has been laid it has made no further progress. Arab Moslems attach much importance to the teaching of Arabic and its use as a medium of instruction, and the Government has not repeated the mistake of the Turks who taught little Arabs Arabic through Turkish ! Yet one cannot help feeling that more will have to be done both by the Government and by the Moslem community to improve Secondary Education even at the expense, if there is no other way out, of primary education. At present it is not easy to find suitable Moslem recruits for the Civil Service among the Moslems, owing to their lack of education. Jews, and above all, Christians are disproportionately represented therein and in time the Moslems will make this a grievance. The wealthier Moslems can of course afford to send their sons abroad, to Europe or to Syria for higher education, but after a study of the results of European education without parental or other control such as has been inflicted upon many Oriental students, and particularly upon Turks in the last generation, one cannot blame their unwillingness to do so. At the same time, one cannot help feeling that some of the richer Moslems might spend a little more of their superfluous wealth on education and a little less on motor-cars and other articles of luxury instead of leaving all to be done by Government.[1]

A great deal has been done for public health. There are nine Government hospitals, besides epidemic and casualty posts. Vaccination is now compulsory, as is the notification of infectious diseases, and the Department of Public Health is waging a successful war against malaria, which has long been the scourge of the plains of Pales-

[1] At present the Education Department gives a schooling to about one-seventh of the Moslem children in the country. The total number of registered pupils in the Jewish schools is about 17,500. Of these about 12,000 attend schools controlled by the Zionist Organization.

tine. The towns are now remarkably clean. When we entered Jerusalem at the end of 1917, some of the streets were no better than open sewers, the moat round the Tower of David was a receptacle for every kind of filth, and an exploration of the poorer quarters led one through a diapason of stenches. The Governor set to work at once to remedy this state of affairs, and Jerusalem is now the cleanest Oriental city I know, and the moat round David's Tower has been converted into a garden. Haifa and Jaffa run Jerusalem close for cleanliness, and Safed, which was once the dirtiest town in the Near East, has been swept and garnished.

The vital statistics of the Department of Public Health for 1920 show very satisfactory figures. The birth-rate for the year was 25·51 per thousand, the death-rate 12·95 per thousand. The birth-rate as contrasted with the death-rate compares favourably with that in many European countries. Given a continuance of the campaign against malaria, which accounts for a large number of deaths annually, the population should increase rapidly and fill the gaps left by the war in a very short time.

The Government's handling of the archæological problem, which has more than once led to international friction in Egypt, has been extremely wise. It has formed an Advisory Board of representatives of the archæological bodies, British, French, American, Italian, Greek and Jewish, working in Palestine under the chairmanship of the Director of Antiquities which deals with archæological questions, and more particularly with the granting of permits to excavate. A very full and carefully drafted Antiquities Ordinance has been promulgated. It is based upon two principles—(*a*) that the antiquities of Palestine and its monuments are the property of the Government and the people of Palestine, (*b*) that the Government shall render every possible

assistance to archæological research carried out by properly qualified archæologists irrespective of their nationality.

If we have made some mistakes in Palestine, we can still show a credit-balance of achievement. We have freed the country from conscription ; we are freeing it from malaria and other plagues ; we have done much for the peasant, generally an Arab Moslem, whom we are now protecting from rural usury (which, it may be noted, is the foundation of several Arab fortunes) and whom we have already converted in several districts from tenants at will into freeholders. We have encouraged education, though we have more to do yet ; the administration of justice is infinitely better, in spite of the complications of a mixed legal system, half-British, half-Turkish, than it was in Ottoman days. We have done a great deal, perhaps too much, to improve transport and communications. We have given Jerusalem a good water-supply, the first it has had since pre-Turkish days ; we are preserving the antiquities and the rare forests of the country ; and we have made its towns clean and sightly. Our Provincial Governors have taken their duties seriously and conscientiously, and on the rare occasions when we have had to put down disturbances by force, there has been no undue severity. Crime, which was very prevalent off the beaten track in Turkish days, has greatly decreased. The Land Settlement courts which we have established will aid the development of the country and assist the cultivators by unravelling the tangled confusion into which the Turks had allowed titles of ownership of land to fall. Above all, we are beginning to teach the masses that they have some rights as well as duties. Conservatives may dislike this, but there is much to be said for the theory that ideally docile subjects demoralize their rulers. After all, no man, who is worth anything, wishes to go through life without opposition.

British Administration in Palestine

Note.—In view of the necessity of improving the Defence Force in Transjordania, of other expenditure in that region, the Administration of Palestine has agreed to forgo £100,000 out of this year's grant of £1,500,000 from Imperial Funds, which will be paid to the Transjordanian Government. A further reduction of the garrison in Palestine is now under contemplation. This may enable a reduction of between £300,000 and £400,000 to be effected in the next financial year.

CHAPTER 11

Frontiers and Neighbours

THE FRONTIERS OF PALESTINE. THE FRANCO-BRITISH CONVENTION. FUTURE POSSIBILITIES. TRANSJORDANIA. A PERIOD OF CONFUSION. THE EMIR ABDALLAH AND HIS ADMINISTRATION. NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING TRANSJORDANIAN INDEPENDENCE. THE BEDUIN CHIEFS. IBN SA'UD AND THE WAHABIS. THE "IKHWAN." IBN SA'UD OCCUPIES WADI SIRHAN. THE BATTLE OF UMM EL 'AMAD. ITS LESSONS.

PALESTINE marches with the territories of four neighbours. These are, from south to north, firstly the Kingdom of Egypt, next the Kingdom of the Hejaz, then the country governed by Emir Abdallah, which is known as Transjordania, and finally the French Mandatory area of the Lebanon and Syria. The frontier between Egypt and Palestine is the old Turco-Egyptian frontier as delimited in 1906, and runs from near Akaba on the Red Sea through Rafa, where the Sinai Military Railway enters Palestine, to the Mediterranean.[1] The frontier between Palestine and the Hejaz to the north of Akaba has not been completely delimited. It runs through almost uninhabited country, visited now and again by Beduins, and is only of importance in view of the possibility of raids by Wahabis from Central Arabia, being pushed in the direction of Beersheba or even Gaza[2] through Hejaz territory. The frontier between Transjordania and Palestine, south of the Dead Sea, has not been delimited, but a line drawn due south from the southern end of the Dead Sea to the latitude of Maan, represents the border recognized by the two Administrations. North of the Dead Sea, the Jordan forms a natural frontier between Palestine and Transjordania, as far as the French sphere. The northern and north-eastern boundary of Palestine marches with

[1] The frontier is about 1½ miles east of Rafa station.

[2] The Huweitat from the south of the Dead Sea have raided as far as the Euphrates, and the Wahabis are equally mobile.

French Mandatory territory. It was determined by the Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920. Between French Syria and British Transjordania the boundary follows a line from the south of the Jebel Druse in the Hauran to south of Nasib on the Hejaz Railway, and thence to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias to the south of the Deraa-Semakh Railway. At Semakh the frontier has been fixed in such a manner as to allow each of the two Governments to construct a port and railway station giving free access to the Sea of Galilee. From Semakh the frontier crosses the Sea of Galilee, and runs north on the east side of the Jordan rift, which it includes, as far as Banias (Cæsarea Philippi). Thence it bends west and south, including Tel-el-Kadi (Dan), on the retention of which Mr. Lloyd George, fired by memories of the Biblical phrase "from Dan to Beersheba," stoutly insisted, crossing the head waters of Jordan, including the farthest Jewish colony of Metullah and the Huleh basin, and then west again till it reaches the Mediterranean at Cape Nakura. The Franco-British Convention provides for the joint use of the section of the railway between Semakh and Nasib, and permits the British Government to move troops by this railway in perpetuity and at any moment. It also permits it to carry a pipe-line along the railway. It also provides for the nomination of a Commission which may readjust the frontier in the Yarmuk Valley in such a manner as to render it possible for the British to construct a railway and a pipe-line connecting Palestine with the Euphrates Valley, and running entirely within the British Mandatory area. It is agreed, however, that the Deraa-Semakh Railway is to remain entirely in French Mandatory territory, and that the right provided for, for the British Government's benefit, must be utilized within ten years, i.e. by December 23, 1933. The Syro-Palestinian frontier was not determined without considerable discussion. Zionist influences appear to have inspired a

proposal for the inclusion of the Lower Yarmuk Valley in the interests of the Rutenberg Scheme, but this was not accepted by the French, who, while making no difficulties as to our use of the Yarmuk Valley for military and transport purposes, determined, naturally enough, to reserve their rights over its waters. At one time during the negotiations the surrender of the area north of the Waters of Merom in return for a frontier abutting on the river Litani was mooted, but the French required the Leontes waters for the irrigation of their fertile plain of the Bukaa (Coelesyria). Since the determination of the boundary between Palestine and Syria there have been no frontier incidents, and no raids from the Northern Hauran, such as threatened Beisan in 1919 and led to the plundering of Metullah in 1920.

It is unnecessary to discuss the naval advantages to Great Britain in the Mediterranean of the construction of a pipe-line connecting the South Persian oil-fields with Haifa. These would be considerable, but it is unlikely that the British Government, even if it is not driven out of Mesopotamia by newspaper clamour and thus eventually loses the South Persian oil-fields, will have the funds to pay for railway or pipe-line for several years to come. Our withdrawal from Mesopotamia would undoubtedly expose the French in Syria to considerable pressure in front and flank from the Turks, and might well result in their withdrawal from the interior of Syria into the Great Lebanon, leaving Damascus to be the prize of either Mustafa Kemal or of the Emir Abdallah of Transjordania. And what would our position be in Palestine with the Turks at Damascus?

Transjordania, although included in the Palestine Mandate, has its own Arab administration, and the British Government, in spite of the propaganda launched by numerous Zionist or pro-Zionist writers in 1919–1920, wisely decided to exclude it from the area of the Jewish National Home. Jewish immigration into this region,

[*Photo : American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

ON THE AMMAN LANDING GROUND

COLONEL LAWRENCE | SIR HERBERT SAMUEL | H.H. EMIR ABDALLAH OF TRANSJORDANIA

[*Face page* 220

a high plateau-land, fertile in many districts, and inhabited by some 300,000 settled, semi-nomad and nomad Arabs, most of whom are Moslems, and nearly all of whom are armed,[1] would have provoked serious outbreaks, and the British Government had neither the force nor the funds to protect Jews who imprudently ventured there. Under the Mandate (Art. 25), the British Government are entitled to postpone or withhold such provisions of the Mandate as they consider to be inapplicable to existing local conditions. On September 16, 1922, the Foreign Office presented a memorandum to the Council of the League inviting it to exclude "Transjordan" from the application of the "Jewish clauses" of the Mandate and its preamble, and taking full responsibility as Mandatory for Transjordania over which we claimed to exercise a general supervision. The Council, through its Secretary-General, approved the British memorandum.

A brief description of Transjordania and of its recent history may now be given. It is a tableland rising abruptly from the Jordan rift, resembling the plateau of Judæa in its general configuration, seamed like it with deep gorges, which, unlike those of the greater part of Judæa, contain a number of perennial streams. It is less stony than Judæa, has not been entirely deforested, and, being on an average higher, has a heavier winter rainfall and grows much more corn. In fact during the war it was practically the sole source of supply for the Turkish garrison and the population of the highland of Judæa. Under the Turks it was neglected till after the Russo-Turkish War, when colonies of "Circassians," relatively civilized if rather truculent folk, were sent there to protect the cultivators from Beduin attack. Many of them died of neglect or were killed, but they took root and held their own. Somewhat later Hussein Hilmi

[1] There are also Circassian settlements. There is no reason to suppose them to be pro-Zionist.

Pasha,[1] by a judicious mixture of force and persuasion, compelled the till then very pestilent Adwan Beduin of Moab (Kerak) to settle on the land, to the great satisfaction of their neighbours. Other clans such as the Beni-Hassan and some of the Beni-Sakhr, abandoned their nomad habits. But after Hilmi Pasha's departure the country was misgoverned, and although the construction of the Hejaz Railway brought money into Transjordania and encouraged agriculture, the Arabs were restive, and in 1910 the Kerak clans rose and were savagely suppressed, one of their chiefs being torn between two mules. During the war Transjordania remained a source of anxiety to the Turks, who poisoned Faiz ibn Fawwaz, one of its most powerful chiefs.

When the Turkish forces in Transjordania had been destroyed or had surrendered to the Anglo-Arab forces, the whole of the region from Maan northwards was included within O.E.T.A. East, i.e. in the Arab sphere. During 1919 and the first half of 1920 it was governed by Emir Feisal's administration. It cannot be said that the Arab Government was very efficient. It failed to prevent a certain amount of raiding by parties of Beduin into the border districts of Palestine, and, although these raids were not militarily formidable, they caused unrest and alarm and involved some loss of live stock, which were lifted by the raiders. Its finances were ill-administered ; there was profuse and, as the event proved, useless expenditure on the upkeep of an army which failed entirely to make any really serious resistance to the French, and the collection of revenue was sporadic and inefficient.

On the fall of the Sherifian Government of Damascus in July, 1920, the Arabs of Transjordania were left very much to their own devices. In August of the same year Sir Herbert Samuel visited Salt and informed an assembly of notables and sheikhs that the British Govern-

[1] Afterwards Inspector-General of Macedonia and Grand Vizier.

ment had decided to further a system of local self-government, assisted by a few British officers as advisers, in Transjordania. British " control " was thus represented by at most half a dozen officers directly under the orders of the High Commissioner. These officers combined the functions of advisers to the local governments, which rarely listened to them, and of intelligence officers.

These governments were numerous. That of Ajlun (Northern Gilead and the Mountains of Ajalon) broke up into four independent *kazas* [1]—Ajlun, Irbid, Mezar, and Jerash (Gerasa). The Government of the Belka (Southern Gilead and Ammon) held together more or less. It was composed of the " *Sanjak* " of Salt, ruled by Mazhar Pasha, its Arab Governor in Turkish days, with a local council to assist him, and the " Kazas " of Amman (Philadelphia), Madeba and Ziziya (Zize). Farther south the " Kaimakam " of Kerak with a Council of Notables ruled part of Moab, whilst still farther southward Tafila, an independent town, refused to have anything to do with Emir Abdallah's Sherifians who held Maan or with the Government of Kerak. Forming themselves out of the wreck of the Emirate of Damascus, the Transjordanian Administrations all summoned Assemblies of Notables, who voted taxes and sanctioned the formation or the maintenance of forces of gendarmes. This done, many of them repaired to their villages, where, with very human inconsistency, they defied the gendarmes and shot at venturesome tax-collectors.

Much bickering followed between, and within these Governments, whose difficulties were increased by strikes of unpaid gendarmes and raids by Beduin, whose sympathy with anarchy among their neighbours is natural—and interested. Into the midst of this confusion came Emir Abdallah from Maan (February, 1921). He was accompanied by a force of some 1,200 Sherifian troops,

[1] A *kaza* was the next subdivision below a Sanjak under the Turkish administrative system. It was governed by a " Kaimakam."

and gave out that he intended to attack the French in Syria and avenge his brother Feisal's expulsion. At first his arrival did not improve matters. Some of his partisans promptly raided French territory, and taxes for a while altogether ceased to come in. But the son of Hussein soon proved that his reputation as a politic and wary leader was well deserved. He threw his influence on the side of law and order. At the end of March he accepted an invitation to be the guest of Sir Herbert Samuel, and in a series of conversations with him and with Mr. Winston Churchill, who was then paying a visit to Jerusalem, satisfied them, and through their mediation satisfied M. Robert de Caix, General Gouraud's political adviser (who " happened " to be visiting Jerusalem at the time), that he had no intention of using Transjordania as a base for military operations against Damascus. He would not recognize the French Mandate in Syria, but he would not attack the French. At the Conference held in Jerusalem between the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, the High Commissioner and the Emir, it was agreed that Abdallah should temporarily assume the responsibility for the administration of Transjordania, under the general control of the High Commissioner for Palestine as representing the Mandatory Power. He was to be assisted by a small staff of British officers, was promised a grant-in-aid, and agreed in his turn to keep order and make no attack on Syria.

For some months after the Jerusalem Conference, progress in Transjordania was slow. The Emir, though he did not encourage attacks on the French sphere, failed to prevent some of his partisans, who had fled from Damascus with his brother Feisal, and had since repaired to Transjordania, from organizing a plot against General Gouraud, which nearly cost that great soldier his life, and aroused considerable and very natural Anglophobe criticism both in French Syria and in France. Taxes

came in slowly, and the Emir's authority was defied in several districts. But after the voting by the House of Commons of a grant-in-aid of £180,000, and the appointment as British representative in Transjordania of Mr. H. St. J. Philby, C.I.E., an Indian "political" who has an exceptional knowledge of the literary language and the dialects of the Arabs, of their politics and their chiefs,[1] and has a strong sympathy with Arab nationalism, the situation improved. The Hejaz Railway was repaired, after lying in ruins for three years, over more than 180 miles, and an agreement was arrived at whereby the Palestine Railway Administration worked the Transjordanian sections. A "Defence Force" which is by no means inefficient, has been created in the place of the various gendarmeries kept up by the local governments, and a telegraph system is being gradually extended. Public security has greatly improved, and the Emir maintains good relations with some of the most influential Beduin, notably with the Beni-Sakhr, who can probably put 3,000 riflemen into the field. In 1922 he appointed Ali Riza Pasha Rikkabi, who had been Chief Administrator in O.E.T.A. East in 1918-1919 as his Chief Minister. His system of administration may be described as a much less centralized edition of the Turkish. Local Councils have more power than in Turkish days, and the Government has kept on good terms with the principal Beduin clans, notably the Beni-Sakhr. In fact there is rather a tendency among the settled inhabitants to criticize the Emir on account of his frequent remissions of taxes owed by Beduin sheikhs.

The Emir Abdallah has considerable personality. Good-looking, bearded, with a merry eye, olive-skinned, trim and with the air of breeding that all the members of his ancient house possess, he is emphatically an out-

[1] Mr. Philby is the first European to cross Central Arabia since Sadleir (1819–1820). His account of his travels should be read by anyone who desires to understand recent Arabian history.

of-door man. He spends a great part of the winter in camp in the Jordan Valley below Salt ; is a good rider, and a first-rate judge of horses and camels. His critics call him lazy ; to a certain extent this is the case, but it is perhaps fortunate that he does not interfere in the Turkish fashion in the details of administration,[1] and those who know him agree that when he cares to work he can transact business rapidly and well. His enemies accuse him of being a tyrant and cruel on occasion. I have never heard any evidence of this, and his British friends describe him as a good-natured cheerful man, with a taste for innocent pastimes such as blindman's buff, and mild practical jokes, and for field sports. If he has been too easy-going with the Beduin chiefs, he can be severe on occasion, as he showed when the redoubtable Auda abu Tayi, the famous chief of the Huweitat, one of Colonel Lawrence's principal allies, and a warrior famed throughout the Arab world, refused to obey his orders, and sent him an insolent message. Auda was, to his great surprise, arrested by the Defence Force and lodged in Amman gaol ; shortly afterwards he broke prison, but on reaching his tents, paid his arrears of taxes and sent the Emir a full apology.

At present it is hard to say how far the Emir has the country behind him, in other words, how far the chiefs and notables whom he entertains, and who like him personally, could be relied upon to support him in the event of internal trouble or foreign attack. The absence of any Parliament, and the presence of " foreigners " i.e., non-Transjordanian Arabs in his Government and entourage, combine to make some of his subjects inclined to be critical, and to accuse him of " favouritism." The finances of his realm are not too well managed and, in

[1] I was once disagreeably impressed to hear Hussein Hilmi Pasha discuss at great length, during the crisis that preceded the Turco-Italian war, not the political situation but the question whether a clerk should receive four or four and a half Turkish pounds a month!

[*Photo: American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

AUDA ABU TAYI

CHIEF OF THE HOWEITAT AND "A FIRST-CLASS FIGHTING-MAN"

[*Face page 226*

spite of Mr. Philby's warnings, some of his ministers appear to believe that grants-in-aid will always be forthcoming to relieve financial stringency. Still, he has, on the whole, succeeded in restoring very fair order in a country which had been allowed to " run to seed " and has shown himself a good friend to the British Administration in Palestine.

In the winter of 1922 the Emir visited London, where he entered into conversations with the Government, represented by Sir G. Glayton, with reference to the future status of his country. No decision was reached ; but the discussions were of an amicable character and it seems probable that we shall eventually grant Transjordania practically complete independence, provided that the defence corps and finances of his country are for some time to come entrusted to the surveillance of British advisers. Two months after his return to Transjordania his Prime Minister, Rikkabi Pasha, resigned office, owing, apparently, to a dispute with his ruler over financial questions.

In some quarters the view is held that we might do worse than make Abdallah one day ruler of Palestine. At present, however, he does not aspire to this distinction. His ambition lies rather in the direction of Mecca, where he hopes to succeed his father and eventually to form a loose Arab Federation comprising Hejaz, Transjordania and, if possible, Iraq. His career will be watched with interest, for he is one of the leading figures in the Arab world, and is known to hold strong views concerning the Arab Caliphate.

Beyond Transjordania lies the waste that divides Mesopotamia and Syria, over which roam Beduin tribes, loosely organized and by no means formidable. The Druses of the Hauran, who raided fiercely and far into the grazing grounds of their Arab neighbours in the past, are more dangerous, but it is improbable that they will give trouble now that they have been taken in hand by

the French, who, unless Abdallah commits the error of countenancing raids on their territory, will have no object in encouraging attacks on a British protégé, however much they may dislike him. The Shammar of Hail in North-Western Arabia are now of no account as an independent force ; they are practically the vassals of the one formidable Arab enemy of the Sherifian House, the Wahabi Emir of Nejd and master of all Central and most of Northern Arabia, Abdul-Aziz ibn Sa'ud of Riadh.

The present head of the ancient House of Sa'ud is now in all probability the most powerful of the rulers of Arabia. He is master of an area greater in extent even than that governed by Mohamed ibn Rashid, the great Shammar chief, who made the Emirate of Hail supreme throughout Central Arabia. Mr. Philby's most interesting description of his government and methods shows that his power is based not only on his deserved reputation as a stern, just and capable Prince of ancient lineage and commanding personality, but on the military organization of the "*Ikhwan*" (Brethren), which he has himself created. The "Brethren" are Beduin of various tribes and sub-tribes whom the politic Emir has first weaned from their feuds with the aid of his preachers and then settled as soldier cultivators in colonies among the oases of Nejd. Inspired by the "puritan" Wahabi creed, the Ikhwan are becoming the spear-head of Ibn Sa'ud's army, and are at least as reliable as the settled Arabs of the Nejd oases, who have long been the supporters both of the princely House of the Beni Sa'ud and of the austere and militant Wahabi faith of which that House has long been the champion. They are naturally far more reliable than the Beduin clans, nomads and therefore not always to be found when most needed, undisciplined and still much affected by tribal rivalries. The Ikhwan played a leading part in the successful campaigns waged by Abdul-Aziz ibn Sa'ud against

the Emir of Hail in 1918 and against the Sherif of Mecca's forces led by Emir Abdallah in 1920.

Stern fanatics, regarding other Arabs, Turks and indeed all non-Wahabi Moslems as worse than infidels, the Ikhwan inspire fear and respect among all Ibn Sa'ud's Arab neighbours. Although he permits no inter-tribal raiding within his dominions, and visits disobedience to his orders on this subject with severe punishment, he allows or countenances raids in which Ikhwan as well as Beduin take part against Arabs lying outside his borders. Thus his people have come into collision with the Ruala tribe, who range over a great extent of territory between the Euphrates and the Syrian marches, and are now mostly to be found in French territory. He rules Jauf, is extending his influence along the Wadi Sirhan towards the dominions of Emir Abdallah, and towards the Hejaz from Hail and Khurma. But the Ikhwan, who could effect nothing against aircraft and armoured cars properly handled by intelligent commanders, are not invincible even in Arab warfare, as the story of their recent attack on Transjordania shows.

The attack followed the occupation of the Jauf and Sakaka oases in the Wadi Sirhan last summer. The Wadi Sirhan is a long depression containing several settlements, and running more or less W.N.W. by E.S.E. in the Syro-Arabian desert. This depression can be reached in about seven days' easy stages from Maan, and in less time from Amman. It contains several oases, of which Jauf and Sakaka are the most important. Its settled inhabitants paid an uneasy allegiance to the Sha'lan, the paramount family of the strong Rualla subtribe of the Aneza, most of whom roam about the desert in French Syria. The Sha'lan appear to have established friendly relations with the French. Their people are fairly well armed, and are rich in camels.

Last May a body of perhaps 750 Wahabis under a

sheikh of the Beni-Harb tribe of Beduins worked up from the Western Kasim oasis region round the west edge of the Nefud or dune region of N.W. Arabia, thus avoiding both Hail and Jauf, to the Wadi Sirhan, where they surprised and annihilated a camp of the Shararat Beduin, a wild, poor clan, whose " beat " lies, generally speaking, east of the Hejaz Railway between Maan and Kalaat Mudawara, and thence out to the Wadi Sirhan region. They next advanced on a joint Rualla and Shararat camp near Ithra, failed to effect a surprise, and were met in battle by Rualla and Shararat under Mujhim al Sha'lan, and soundly beaten. Two hundred of them were killed or taken prisoners, their leader being among the latter, and the rest fled into the desert, their fate being unknown. Meanwhile the people of Sakaka north of Jauf, being in revolt against their Sha'lan overlord, sent for help to Ibn Sa'ud, and in July, 1922, both Jauf and Sakaka were garrisoned by Wahabi troops, who are still there.

The occupation of Jauf caused a temporary scare at Amman, and for a week or two the Transjordanians kept a sharp look out for Wahabi raiders, but the scare soon died down and the precautions were abandoned. It had been expected that an attack would be made by the Jauf garrison, but it came from a different quarter. A body of about 1,000 Wahabis and their Beduin allies had been for some time on the march from Dahina near Washm in Central Arabia, a trifle of 800 miles from Amman. They were Ikhwan from Dahina and perhaps from the oasis of Ghat-Ghat, and with them came Harb, Mutair and Ataiba Beduin picked up on the way. Being apparently unprovided with a good Intelligence service, the raiders avoided Jauf, probably because they did not know that their own people had occupied it. They met the Walad Sulaiman tribe during their march. These people, having a feud with the Beni Sakhr of Transjordania, obligingly supplied a guide, who directed the

Wahabis against their enemies. At dawn on August 15, 1922, they fell upon the little village of Tunaib, a mile or two west of the Hejaz Railway, between the stations of Ziziya and Luban. They there massacred every soul they found, man, woman and child, to the number of thirty-five persons. The main body then moved towards Umm el 'Amad, the village of Mithkal ibn Faiz, the chief of the Beni Sakhr, which was surrounded by the tents of his followers. The Beni Sakhr fell upon them, and an aeroplane passing quite accidentally over the scene towards the Ziziya landing-ground so frightened them that they fled and were pursued and slaughtered for twenty miles into the desert. They lost many killed—prisoners do not seem to have been taken—and many must have died of hunger and thirst in their retreat over the waterless waste.

I have described this raid at length for the following reasons. It proves that the Ikhwan when boldly met, even by Beduin no better armed than they, are by no means invincible. The killing of women and children in which they indulged at Tunaib is contrary to the customs of desert warfare, and can only be explained by a fanaticism which regards other Moslems who do not accept the Wahabi tenets as "malignants" to whom no quarter should be given.

The desert frontier of Transjordania is exposed for its whole length to such attacks "out of the blue," and it is therefore much to be hoped that Emir Abdallah will be encouraged to maintain his present defence force under British officers, whose presence and assistance has greatly improved its efficiency. It may also be hoped that the British Government will use its influence with Ibn Sa'ud of Riadh to prevent similar raids being attempted against chiefs with whom we stand on especially friendly terms, and whose territories are under the British Mandate. Otherwise Transjordania, French Syria and Mesopotamia will be exposed to murderous inroads by

primitive fanatics always ready to raid like Genseric the Vandal "against those with whom God is angry."

Note on Transjordanian Finances

A grant-in-aid of £180,000 was voted by Parliament for Transjordania in the Budget of 1921–22. £100,000 was voted in 1922–23. This year's grant-in-aid will amount to £50,000 *plus* £100,000, which the Palestine Government has consented to forgo out of the £1,500,000 promised as the Imperial contribution for 1923–24. Transjordania will thus receive £150,000, after which, it is hoped, no further subsidy will be required.

Note

The independence of Transjordania was formally proclaimed at Amman on May 25, 1923.

CHAPTER 12

Our Present and Future Policy in the Holy Land

WHAT WE HAVE DONE FOR THE ARAB PEOPLES. WHY THE BALFOUR DECLARATION MUST STAND. MISTAKES OF OMISSION RATHER THAN OF COMMISSION. THE ZIONISM WHICH WE CAN HONOURABLY SUPPORT. NECESSITY OF CONTINUED CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION. EXAGGERATED ARAB FEARS. NECESSITY OF PATIENCE WITH THE ARABS. PROTEAN ANTI-SEMITISM. INEVITABLE RESULTS OF EVACUATION. PALESTINE AND THE SUEZ CANAL. WE MUST HOLD THE BRIDGEHEAD.

IN their manifestoes, appeals and propagandist publications the Arabs of Palestine, and not these Arabs only, continually accuse the British Government of having "betrayed" the Arab cause. We have been guilty, according to the more rhetorical of these appeals, of ingratitude towards "a people" which has made great sacrifices on our behalf. But what are the facts? We have supported those Arab chiefs, who assisted us, out of our war-strained Budget, and by political action up to the limits of political and financial prudence. It might, indeed, be urged that we have overstepped these limits, more particularly in making Emir Feisal King of Iraq, when we knew that such a step would only meet with lukewarm approval in Mesopotamia, and would arouse apprehension and annoyance in France. We have striven to promote Arab unity, but Arab action has at times made our efforts appear ridiculously unsuccessful, as in 1920 when the protégé of the India Office, Abdul-Aziz ibn Sa'ud, went to war with the protégé of the Foreign Office, King Hussein of the Hejaz. We have made our mistakes, but we have at least accomplished more in five years than the Turks in 500. By our encouragement of education through the medium of Arabic, we have given Arabic culture a fresh start in Palestine and Iraq, after centuries of stagnation and neglect. We have familiarized the Arabs with a system

of justice which is superior to anything which they experienced under the Turks. We have supported Arab claims to Mosul, though our support involved us in danger of war. Above all, we have aided the Arabs, who could not have succeeded without us, to expel the Turks from the whole Arabian peninsula, and we have expelled them ourselves, with limited Arab aid, except in Transjordania, from the provinces inhabited by Arabs. We have given Transjordania a very large autonomy. We have made extensive political concessions in Egypt and Iraq. We have given Palestine a constitution which some members of the British Labour Party are alleged to find too liberal ! Whatever our mistakes in detail, our general policy towards the Arabs has been creditable to our reputation as a Liberal Power.

Our difficulties in Palestine have been caused less by the Balfour Declaration than by the interpretation thereof. Whether, in view of the events of the last five years, its original wording was ideally perfect, is an " inactual consideration." It might have been better worded ; it might have been worse worded. But one cannot honestly blame the British Government for adopting a somewhat vague and elastic formula at a moment when the future was far from clear. That this formula was not more precise is proof enough, if proof were needed, that the War Cabinet was not acting under Zionist duress when it agreed to the publication of the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists, as " Achad Ha-Am " has pointed out,[1] desired another formula, more precise, more in accordance with the aspirations of political Zionism. But, when the Declaration had been published, it was the duty of the British Government to take the necessary measures to prevent its being interpreted by Arabs or by Jews in a manner contrary to the British official interpretation. The Government's interpretation of the phrase " the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the

[1] *See* Chapter 2.

Jewish People" differed *toto cælo* from that which was at first adopted by the Zionist Organization, and for long inspired the activities of the Zionist Executive in the Holy Land. Why did the British Government wait until June, 1922, before giving, so to speak, a ruling as to what its interpretation was? Why did it fail to intervene at an earlier date and insist that no interpretation but its own must guide Zionist activities in Palestine?

There were two causes of inactivity; some one at an early stage in the Peace negotiations at Versailles suggested to Mr. Lloyd George that "the East could wait." This fatal formula appears to have charmed the opportunist Prime Minister. Within a few months after the Mudros armistice it had become distressingly clear that, except in South Russia, where we were destined to waste energy and wealth which, if expended in Turkey, would have given us a favourable peace, our policy in the Near East was inspired, not by memories of Gladstone or Beaconsfield, but by the considerations which guided Mr. Wilkins Micawber. We waited passively for "something to turn up" to our advantage. Nothing turned up. We then called on Greece to settle the Turkish question, with results that were disagreeable to ourselves and disastrous to her. A positive policy whether Gladstonian or Disraelian would have saved us the humiliation of Lausanne.

Another cause of our silence as to the meaning of the Balfour Declaration was the Government's over-estimation of the strength of the Zionist movement. The Zionist Organization represents what is probably the strongest party in Jewry. It claims to have 1,000,000 subscribing members. But it is not the only Jewish force that counts. Leaving out of account the many Jews in Eastern Europe, who are frankly more interested in the teachings of Karl Marx than in those of the Law and the Prophets, there are a large number of Jews in America and in Western Europe, whom the professionals of

Zionism have sometimes accused of being anti-Zionist, and have sometimes dubbed "assimilationists," who would have shown far more interest in Palestine had they not been alarmed by the political Zionists. If even Dr. Weizmann and other Zionist leaders were obliged, at times, to play to the extremist gallery, and talk "political Zionism," and moderate Zionists, whose ideal was not a Jewish Palestine but a strong and prosperous Jewish community in Palestine, were unable to persuade the extreme element to adopt a more moderate policy, how much more were the non-Zionist, but not anti-Zionist, Jews repelled by the excesses of the extremists. Unfortunately for Zionism, the silence of the British Government was very naturally interpreted as implying a tacit consent to the political interpretation of the phrase "a National Home." By its long inaction the British Government alarmed moderate Jews, who realized the difficulties that stood in the way of the Judaization of Palestine, Arabs who were naturally convinced that it supported the extremists, and many British observers of the situation in the Near East who foresaw what a crop of troubles the extremists in Palestine were sowing for themselves, and still more for the eventual Mandatory. Finally the British Administration in Palestine became seriously alarmed at the results of the conduct of the Zionist Executive. The report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Jaffa disturbances was its first open counter to the political Zionists in Palestine ; it was severely criticized by many Jews in England and elsewhere, who, suffering from the touchiness of their race, read into its pages an anti-Zionism or even anti-Semitism which were not really to be discovered there ; but it opened the eyes of many British Jews, and of still more non-Jews, to the danger of permitting an obvious misinterpretation of the Balfour Declaration to guide the policy of the Zionist leaders in Palestine. Even so, two years more elapsed before the British Government did

what it ought to have done three years previously, and gave its ruling. It had at last realized that the East could not wait indefinitely, and that the Zionist Organization, however strong, was neither so wise nor so wealthy nor so united as to be able to solve the Palestinian problem without guidance and control. But the harm which our rulers' inertia and their mistaken estimate of the power and resources of Zionism had done, persists and will persist for some time to come. Maladies caused by long neglect are not to be cured by a single dose.

One of the most disagreeable results of our errors of omission has been their effect upon public opinion in England. To the real satisfaction caused by our conquest of Palestine and by the Balfour Declaration has succeeded a disappointment tinged at times with anti-Semitism. A noisy section of the Press clamours for our repudiation of the Balfour Declaration, and for the evacuation of Palestine. Pessimism is as illogical as optimism, and to treat the Balfour Declaration as "a scrap of paper" because the late Government's omission to explain what it meant caused it to be misinterpreted in action by many Zionists, and consequently misunderstood by many Arabs, would be a sin against logic as well as against political honesty. One might as well demand the repeal of an originally badly drafted law *after* it had been redrafted because it had been misunderstood in its original form. We have been guilty of so many betrayals in the last few years, betrayals of Irish Loyalists, of Old Turks, of White Russians, of Greeks and Armenians in Turkey,[1] that some of our Press kings perhaps think that another betrayal will make no difference. But we should find if we tore up the Balfour Declaration that we had lost our reputation for fair dealing not only among the Zionists but among great numbers of Jews who do not belong to the Zionist

[1] The French were even more to blame in this case, but this does not completely absolve us.

Organization but regard Zionism of the non-political variety as a desirable ideal. We should lose much American-Jewish support, not to be despised in a country where the Irish and German elements are strong ; we should drive many Eastern Jews, whom the conditions of their existence force to be either strongly nationalist or strongly internationalist, either Zionist or Bolshevist, into the Communist camp. We should gain no prestige among our actual or potential enemies. Would Trotzky or Mustafa Kemal be more ready to come to terms with us because we had repudiated our promises to a minority ?

Our errors have been errors of omission, but they have led to errors of commission on the part of the Zionists. But it is unfair to blame them to the extent to which they have been blamed for mistakes for which they are not alone responsible. The recent improvement in the relations between the Zionist Executive in Palestine and the Administration indicates that they can learn from experience as well as Gentiles, and augurs well for the future relations between the Mandatory Power and the Jewish minority in Palestine. We have no right, after all, to blame them for their frequent lack of political instinct. Mr. Ussishkin has been a sad failure, but the Oriental proverb that " one defeat is more valuable than a thousand words of advice " may prove and, one hopes, will prove applicable to the Zionist Executive in the future, and if some of the reports concerning its future composition are well founded, Palestinian Zionism will at last be led by men of wisdom and moderation. No doubt some of the young men from the East of Europe will not show the civic sense and the affection for political compromise that they might have displayed had they been educated in Manchester instead of Lodz ; no doubt there will be exhibitions of tactlessness on the part of over-zealous young patriots, which will tax the patience of the British official. But so far our officials in Palestine have shown that they possess this most difficult of

the political vitues, and one need not fear that they will take the follies of political youth too seriously, unless they are really dangerous[1] to the public peace. But now that the leaders of Zionism have realized that, by the Balfour Declaration and by the Mandate, Great Britain has committed herself to a very delicate and quite unprecedented political experiment—viz., the partial colonization of conquered country with settlers belonging neither to the conquered nor to the conquering race, in such a manner as not to injure the political and other rights of the native population, and have understood that the British Government means to carry out this experiment on certain lines, from which it will not deviate —there are good reasons for giving them fresh political credit.

The British Empire can honourably work for the realization of " Achad Ha-Am's " hope that Palestine will be

> " A national spiritual centre of Judaism, to which all Jews will turn with affection, and which will bind all Jews together ; a centre of study and learning, of language and literature, of bodily work and spiritual purification ; a true miniature of the people of Israel as it ought to be, so that every Hebrew in the Dispersion will think it a privilege to behold just once the ' centre of Judaism ' and when he returns home will say : ' If you wish to see the genuine type of a Jew, whether it be a Rabbi or a scholar or a writer, a farmer or an artist, or a business man, then go to Palestine and you will see it.' "

We cannot, and it may be hoped that we shall not, support any policy hostile to Arab rights and favourable to Zionist political domination over an Arab majority.

[1] Last spring, when Jerusalem was anxiously awaiting the Nebi-Musa feast and there were fears of a riot, a Jewish kinematograph owner proposed to exhibit a film depicting a " Massacre of Jews in Russia ! "

On this head the Churchill statement of our policy in Palestine and its acceptance by Dr. Weizmann are most reassuring. Though of late the Zionist Executive in Palestine has given no ground for the suspicions which its former policy naturally aroused both among British officials and Arabs, it will be necessary, in view of what has occurred, to keep a vigilant watch upon the activities of Jewish extremist elements. At present there is little or nothing to fear from even the wildest of their Labour men, but one cannot help feeling nervous as to the possible results in Palestine of the formation of a Labour Government in England as a result of the next elections. If such a Government followed the line already taken as regards immigration, that is to say, continued to limit it to the numbers which the available land and the local labour market could absorb without difficulty, then well and good ; but if it were to abolish all restriction on Jewish immigration in deference to pressure from American and European Zionists, among whom many are trades unionists and Socialists, a couple of bad harvests, a few Arabo-Jewish incidents, the entry of even small numbers of Communists from Russia determined to wreck the Palestine experiment by provoking religious riots—and there is no country where such riots can be more easily provoked—might cause a serious political disaster. No doubt it would be easy enough to suppress an outbreak on the part of Jewish Bolshevists or Arab fanatics by the appropriate military measures, but the moral injury to our reputation in the East and to our world-wide prestige as Mandatory of the Holy Land, would be impressively disastrous.

The Arabs, in their turn, must realize that it is only through co-operation with moderate Zionism that they can hope to see Palestine prosper both economically and culturally. Only Jewish capital is likely to enter Palestine in any abundance and, although the country can become far richer than it now is, it will never be an Egypt.

[*Photo: American Colony Stores, Jerusalem*

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, SIR HERBERT SAMUEL AND THE LATE GRAND MUFTI OF PALESTINE AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE

[*Face page* 240

Without Jewish interest in the Holy Land, without Jewish aid, can the Palestinian Arabs play any worthy part in the modern world ?

Again some of their fears seem as baseless as the hopes of the extremer Zionists. They are, in general, a healthy race. Now that conscription has disappeared with the Turks, now that malaria, the scourge of their land, is decreasing and will eventually disappear, they are a prolific race. Their rate of increase is already at least 13 per 1,000 annually—a high figure in these days of birth control and stationary populations. And do they and, for that matter, do the political Zionists realize what it would cost the Zionists to import and settle 50,000 families, or 200,000 souls, on the land in Palestine ? At present, assuming that the country could receive and feed them, which it cannot, it would cost £60,000,000 and even then the Jewish population would be less than half as numerous as the Arab. So self-evident is this to anyone who takes the trouble to study the facts that one is sometimes tempted to take an abominably cynical view of the Arab agitation and ascribe it to a deep-laid scheme of blackmail ! But this is unfair to the Arabs. They are moved in some cases by unworthy motives, but they cannot be blamed for having made certain deductions from the long silence of the British Government and from the policy of the Zionist Executive in Palestine during that long silence and for being for the present disinclined to take our assurances as to the meaning of the Balfour Declaration at their face value. And we must be patient with them even if the Islamo-Christian party still continues to boycott the elections. We must remember that certain arguments in favour of Zionism do not appeal to the Moslem mind, least of all the argument which justifies the opening of Palestine to Jewish colonization by citing Israel's historic right. Moslem peoples have very little historical sense, and take extraordinarily little interest in the history of non-Moslem

communities. For them the history of the world begins to be important in the year of the Hegira (A.D. 622) and nothing that preceded that date matters much to the true believer.[1] Much time must elapse before the Palestinian Arabs, who are not the most advanced of their race, accept such arguments as valid, and we—and the Zionists—will be well advised to lay more stress on the material advantages to the Arab of Zionist co-operation than on the rights or claims of the Jew to a share in Palestine. And in this connection may I suggest that we have neglected propaganda among the masses. The Arab peasant generally derives such political ideas as he possesses from the local notable, who is not always qualified to play the part of Sir Oracle to the public advantage. Cannot we compete with him ? Meanwhile we have no right to be impatient with the Arabs, whether Moslem or Christian, because some of their propaganda is outrageously mendacious and because they have become distrustful of our policy. The errors, not of the Colonial Office nor of the local Administration, but of the last Cabinet, have aroused this distrust, and we cannot blame a people, whose experience of foreign government has been uniformly bad, for saying to themselves " Well, after all, let us wait and see whether the English mean what they say." Of course, if the turbulent elements again riot, we must suppress these riots by force, but one may hope that they will not repeat the stupidity of 1921.

But in the long run it is the British people that will count most in the solution of the Palestinian problem ; its chief danger at the present moment arises out of its war-weariness, which renders it more liable than in the past to be stampeded by a political or Press agitation. It is also affected to a slight extent by the anti-Semitic attitude of certain political groups, and by a vague idea

[1] I have never heard of a Turkish, Egyptian or Indian Moslem who has written any valuable account of any non-Moslem people's history, ethnography, archæology, or social life.

that Zionists, being Jews, may also turn out to be Bolshevists. It is unfortunate that the political crimes or financial misdeeds of Jews who have nothing whatever to do with Zionism should be visited on Zionists by unreflecting or prejudiced opinion. It is singular that some of our die-hards, who are furiously anti-Catholic when Ireland is concerned, should be so ready to absorb Catholic propaganda when it is directed against Zionism and should raise no outcry when the Vatican suggests that the majority of the Commission to be appointed to study the question of the Holy Places (*see* Chapter 3) and the rights of religious communities therein should be representatives of various Catholic communities. Do the Greek and the other Eastern Churches no longer count in the world ? But anti-Semitism, like Bolshevism, is a protean force and, like Bolshevism, attacks war-weary organisms. One need not expect it to be a permanent factor in our political life.

But this malady should be watched while it persists, for none produces more curious political hallucinations among its subjects.[1]

The cry for the evacuation of Palestine by Great Britain is, of course, raised on grounds of economy. We are gravely informed that our poverty is such that we

[1] By anti-Semitism I do not mean criticism of Jewish failings, such as their tendency to unreflecting Messianism, the curious tactlessness which leads obvious Jews and Jewesses to take the lead in propaganda against markedly non-Jewish institutions, customs or beliefs—e.g. the activity of Jewish propagandists of "feminism," which is so contrary to Jewish custom and tradition—and the clannishness which too often leads them to defend unworthy Jews against Gentile criticism. I mean by anti-Semitism political action or propaganda arising out of the belief that the Jew can in no circumstances be a good citizen of a non-Jewish State or/and that he is the cause of "World Unrest." Thus in England one hears much nowadays of the Jews, generally unanglicized newcomers, who profess Communism and teach in Communist Sunday-schools, but not nearly enough of the Jews belonging to families long established in the country who risked or sacrificed their lives in the Great War beside their fellow-citizens.

cannot pay for the honour of guarding the Holy Land and the most sacred shrines of the Western world. Those who raise this cry appear inaccessible to those sentimental considerations which so moved the common man when Jerusalem was liberated from the Turk and which still, in spite of war-weariness and disillusion, have the power to move our people. They cannot therefore respond to the appeals of the sense of religious or historical decency or of the emotion of national pride. But do they realize what would be the material results of evacuation?

Is it probable, to begin with, that France or Italy would remain passive spectators of the confusion which would follow and perhaps accompany our retreat? Can we expect Signor Mussolini to adopt a detached attitude towards a state of affairs which would speedily jeopardize the interests and the lives of Italian subjects and congregations? For, let there be no mistake about this, the evacuation of Palestine would speedily be followed by disorders, which in their turn would degenerate into racial and religious strife. Such strife might be less violent had we not made ourselves responsible for the Balfour Declaration but *litera scripta manet.* The first aim of any Arab administration would be the expulsion of as many Jewish officials and Jewish settlers as possible, and the blackmail of those who remained. None of the Arab leaders has power outside his own township; it is doubtful whether any of them could keep the turbulent elements in order for long. Sooner or later the country, unable to maintain a decent gendarmerie, penniless, a prey to feuds, would get out of hand, and the Jews would be generally attacked. And how long would the relatively wealthy Arab Christians be immune? And would European protests protect European residents and the shrines of Jerusalem against plunder and outrage? "Emir Abdullah might intervene"; he is not yet fully master in his own house and is exposed to

Wahabi attack ; and what of his finances ? Where would he find the funds for the pacification of Palestine ?

Again, it is argued that the League of Nations would obligingly relieve us of the burden and responsibility of Palestine. What force does the League of Nations possess ? What does a League of Nations without Germany, Russia and the United States represent in Christendom ? And how can a League, mainly composed of non-Moslem and generally strongly Christian states, expect to carry any more moral weight in the Moslem world than a mainly Moslem League would carry in Christendom ? Be it remembered too that the League has committed itself to a support of Zionism and would therefore be as suspect to the still dominant anti-Zionist element among the Arabs as we have become —owing to our long failure to explain what our support of Zionism involved and what form of Zionism we supported—and would have less power by far to maintain order.

Should we evacuate, it is far more probable that after a period of anarchy and bloodshed, French, Italians or Turks would establish themselves in Palestine than that the League of Nations would take over a task which it is not organized to fulfil. What then would be our position on the Suez Canal ? We have pledged ourselves sooner or later to withdraw our forces from the Lower Valley of the Nile into the Canal Zone. Until the world becomes safe for peace we shall need a better background for those forces than the arid waste of the Sinai. And what of our air-line through Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia to India, perhaps farther, to which, strangely enough, some of our advocates of the policy of withdrawal attach such importance ? How are we to maintain a British air-route to India and one day to Australia, if we surrender its stages ? By treaties with which of the Arab kinglets or " kings with opposition " who would pullulate in the Middle East, if we withdrew prematurely

—or with their eventual supplanters, Wahabis, Turks or Bolshevists? We may yet have to face a threat against the Canal, which is the spinal cord of our Empire, and the troops, who will guard the most vital point on our line of communications with our Eastern Empire and our Australasian fellow-citizens of the British Commonwealth, will need to have a land behind them, not a sandhill. We cannot allow any potentially hostile power to establish itself in Palestine within easy air distance of the Suez Canal. Palestine is necessary to us until the League of Nations represents America and all Europe, until it has acquired the moral support of Islamic Asia and can guarantee, as far it is humanly possible to guarantee, that there will be no more war in the Near East.

So we must have a land behind our Canal garrisons. But it must be a quiet land, a moral and military and financial asset, not a liability. By supporting moderate Zionism we may gain the one. By supporting political Zionism we shall be saddled with the other. By abandoning moderate Zionism we shall gain nothing, not even financial relief, for, quite apart from the moral loss which we shall incur by taking such a step, we shall be burdened with the support of a country which has lost one of its chief sources of revenue. By abandoning Palestine altogether we shall cause an international scandal. We shall go down to history as the people who, to save a million or so a year for a few years, broke all our promises and allowed the Holy Land, barely redeemed from an incompetent tyranny, to fall back into a worse disorder than even the Turks created. We shall also discover too late that an economy in the hand is not always worth a war in the bush.

Our course is surely clear. We must plod on, patiently and perseveringly, on the road which we seem to have at last discovered, realizing that more haste spells less speed in the East, but also realizing that even

the East is no more " unchanging " ; aiding all moderate men of good will, whether Hebrew or Arab, to combine their efforts for Palestine and working for that Semitic synthesis in the Holy Land in which the Jew will play the part to which his most Jewish leaders aspire—the part of intermediary and perhaps one day of mediator between West and East. But let us be honest with our own people and tell them plainly and fully why we are in Palestine and why we must guard the bridgehead.

FINIS

APPENDIX I

What the Balfour Declaration means to Zionism's Chief Philosopher

(From the Translator's Introduction to *Ten Essays on Zionism and Judaism*, by Achad Ha-Am, translated by Leon Simon, pp. xv–xx.)

ACHAD HA-AM is the leading exponent of Philosophic Zionism. His views on the meaning of the Balfour Declaration therefore deserve quotation, the more so as French Catholic anti-Semites have attempted to prove that he is the author of the notorious *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* !

" All the details of the diplomatic conversations in London which led to the Declaration have not yet been made public ; but the time has come to reveal one ' secret,' because knowledge of it will make it easier to understand the true meaning of the Declaration.

" ' To facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people '—that is the text of the promise given to us by the British Government. But that is not the text suggested to the Government by the Zionist spokesmen. They wished it to read : ' the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people ' ; but when the happy day arrived on which the Declaration was signed and sealed by the Government, it was found to contain the first formula and not the second. That is to say, the allusion to the fact that we are about to *re*build our *old* National Home was dropped, and at the same time the words ' constitution of Palestine as the National Home ' were replaced by ' establishment of a National Home in Palestine.' There were some who understood at once that this had some significance ; but others thought that the difference was merely one of form. Hence they sometimes attempted

on subsequent occasions, when the negotiations with the Government afforded an opportunity, to formulate the promise in their own wording, as though it had not been changed. But every time they found in the Government's reply a repetition of the actual text of the Declaration—which proves that it is not a case where the same thing may be put equally well in either of two ways, but that the promise is really defined in this particular form of words, and goes no further.

" It can scarcely be necessary to explain at length the difference between the two versions. Had the British Government accepted the version suggested to it—that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people—its promise might have been interpreted as meaning that Palestine, inhabited as it now is, was restored to the Jewish people on the ground of its historic right ; that the Jewish people was to rebuild its waste places and was destined to rule over it and to manage all its affairs in its own way, without regard to the consent or non-consent of its present inhabitants. For this rebuilding (it might have been understood) is only a renewal of the ancient right of the Jews, which overrides the right of the present inhabitants, who have wrongly established their National Home on a land not their own. But the British Government, as it stated expressly in the Declaration itself, was not willing to promise anything which would harm the present inhabitants of Palestine, and therefore it changed the Zionist formula, and gave it a more restricted form. The Government thinks, it would seem, that when a people has only the moral force of its claim to build its National Home in a land at present inhabited by others, and has not behind it a powerful army or fleet to prove the justice of its claim, that people can have only what its right allows it in truth and justice, and not what conquering peoples take for themselves by armed force, under the cover of various ' rights ' invented for the

occasion. Now the historic right of a people in relation to a country inhabited by others can mean only the right to settle once more in its ancestral land, to work the land and to develop its resources without hindrance, and if the inhabitants complain that strangers have come to exploit the land and its population, the historic right has a complete answer to them : these new-comers are not strangers, but the descendants of the old masters of the country, and as soon as they settle in it again, they are as good as natives. And not only the settlers as individuals, but the collective body as a people, when it has once more put into this country a part of its national wealth—men, capital, cultural institutions, and so forth—has again in the country its National Home, and has the right to extend and to complete its Home up to the limit of its capacity. But this historic right does not override the right of the other inhabitants, which is a tangible right based on generation after generation of life and work in the country. The country is at present their National Home too, and they too have the right to develop their national potentialities so far as they are able. This position, then, makes Palestine common ground for different peoples, each of which tries to establish its national home there ; and in this position it is impossible for the national home of either of them to be complete and to embrace all that is involved in the conception of a ' national home.' If you build your house not on untenanted ground, but in a place where there are other inhabited houses, you are sole master only as far as your front gate. Within you may arrange your effects as you please, but beyond the gate all the inhabitants are partners, and the general administration must be ordered in conformity with the good of all of them. Similarly national homes of different peoples in the same country can demand only national freedom for each one in its internal affairs, and the affairs of the country which are common to all of them are administered by all the

'householders' jointly if the relations between them and their degree of development qualify them for the task, or, if that condition is not yet fulfilled, by a guardian from outside, who takes care that the rights of none shall be infringed.

"When, then, the British Government promised to facilitate the establishment *in Palestine of a National Home* for the Jewish people—and not, as was suggested to it, the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people—that promise meant two things. It meant in the first place recognition of the historic right of the Jewish people to build its National Home in Palestine, with a promise of assistance from the British Government ; and it meant in the second place a negation of the power of that right to override the right of the present inhabitants and to make the Jewish people sole ruler in the country. The National Home of the Jewish people must be built out of the free material which can still be found in the country itself, and out of that which the Jews will bring in from outside or will create by their work, without overthrowing the National Home of the other inhabitants. And as the two homes are contiguous, and friction and conflicts of interest are inevitable, especially in the early period of the building of the Jewish National Home, of which not even the foundations have yet been properly laid, the promise necessarily demands, though it is not expressly so stated, that a guardian shall be appointed over the two homes—that is, over the whole country—to see to it that the owner of the historic right, while he does not injure the inhabitants in their internal affairs, shall not on his side have obstacles put in his way by his neighbour, who at present is stronger than he. And in course of time, when the new National Home is fully built, and its tenant is able to rely, no less than his neighbour, on the right which belongs to a large population living and working in the country, it will be possible to raise the question whether the time

has not come to hand over the control of the country to the ' householders ' themselves, so that they may together administer their joint affairs, fairly and justly, in accordance with the needs of each of them and the value of his work for the revival and development of the country.

" This and no more, it seems to me, is what we can find in the Balfour Declaration ; and this and no more is what our leaders and writers ought to have told the people, so that it should not imagine more than what is actually there, and afterwards relapse into despair and absolute scepticism."

APPENDIX 2

I TAKE the liberty of quoting from the excellent *Handbook of Palestine*, compiled by Messrs. Luke and Keith-Roach, and issued under the authority of the Government of Palestine, the terms under which immigration was permitted (*a*) under the Ordinance of September, 1920 ; (*b*) under the revised Ordinance of June, 1921.

A. Entry into Palestine was authorized to the following categories :—

(*a*) immigrants whose maintenance was guaranteed by the Zionist Organization ;
(*b*) persons of independent means or persons who could produce evidence that they would become self-supporting ;
(*c*) persons of religious occupation who had means of maintenance in Palestine ;
(*d*) members of families at present residents in Palestine.

B. Under the revised Ordinance the old categories were cancelled and the following were substituted for them :—

(*a*) travellers, i.e. persons who do not intend to remain in Palestine for a period exceeding three months ;
(*b*) persons of independent means who intend to take up permanent residence in Palestine ;
(*c*) members of profession who intend to follow their calling ;
(*d*) wives, children and other persons wholly dependent on residents in Palestine ;
(*e*) persons who have a definite prospect of employment with specified employers or enterprises ;

(*f*) persons of religious occupations, including the class of Jews who have come to Palestine in recent years from religious motives and who can show that they have means of maintenance here ;

(*g*) returning residents.

The following table shows the percentage per country of immigrants that have come to Palestine during the period September 1, 1920, to December 31, 1921 :—

Poland	33 per cent.
Russia	15 „
Smaller East European States	11 „
Central Asia	10 „
Rumania	5 „
Great Britain and Dominions	3½ „
Other countries	22½ „

APPENDIX 3

THE following are the principal articles of the Concession on which Mr. P. Rutenberg has secured an option until September 21, 1923. Summaries of the less important articles are also given.

1. In these presents the following words and expressions shall have the following meanings respectively :—

(*a*) "The High Commissioner" means the High Commissioner for Palestine for the time being ;

(*b*) "The Concession Area" means and includes Palestine and Transjordania and such additional territories as shall for the time being and from time to time be under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner other than and except such part thereof as is within the district which is under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Jaffa and is included in another Concession (hereinafter referred to as "the Auja Concession") granted or agreed to be granted by or on behalf of the High Commissioner to Pinhas Rutenberg for the utilization of the waters of the Auja Basin for generating and supplying electrical energy within such last-mentioned district ;

(*c*) "The Undertaking" means the business of generating supplying and distributing electrical energy under this Concession and all buildings works engines dynamos plant machinery wires cables fixtures and other like property which shall for the time being be used by the Company for any of the purposes of this Concession but not money or securities for money ;

. . . . . .

Appendix 3

2. The High Commissioner hereby grants to the Company for the period of seventy years computed from the day of the date hereof an exclusive Concession for the utilization (*a*) of such of the waters of the River Jordan and its basin including the Yarmuk River and all other the affluents of the River Jordan and its basin as are now or shall hereafter be brought within the control of the High Commissioner, and (*b*) of such of the waters of those parts of the River Jordan and its basin together with the affluents thereof including the River Yarmuk and its affluents outside the boundaries of the territories under the control of the High Commissioner as shall under the Anglo-French Convention dated December 23 1920 or otherwise howsoever have been or be determined to be available for utilization for the purposes of Palestine and/or Transjordania for the purpose of generating by power derived from such waters and supplying and distributing within the Concession Area electrical energy and for those purposes or any of them to erect a power house near Jisr-el-Mujamyeh and to employ and use Lake Tiberias as a reservoir for the storage of water in connection therewith and to erect any other power house or power houses (with the corresponding reservoirs if necessary) which the Company may think fit to erect and with liberty for the Company during the said period to produce supply and distribute electrical energy within the Concession Area by any other means than water power and it shall be lawful for the Company to grant licences to others for all or any part of the said term to utilize the said waters or any part thereof for the purpose of generating supplying and distributing electrical energy as aforesaid and to execute and operate all works necessary for that purpose but so always that no such licence shall in any case be granted unless the proposed licensee shall in each case have been first approved of in writing by the High Commissioner.

3. Included in the works to be built erected and set up for the purpose of this Concession shall be :—

(*a*) A dam on the River Jordan near Kerak ;

(*b*) A canal for conducting the water from Lake Tiberias to the Jisr-el-Mujamyeh Power House ;

(*c*) A sufficient number of pressure pipes for the purpose of conveying the water from the said canal to the turbines at the said power house ;

(*d*) The said power house at Jisr-el-Mujamyeh with proper and sufficient engines turbines dynamos machinery plant apparatus and things as shall be capable of producing supplying and maintaining such an amount of energy as shall be sufficient for the electrical requirements of the High Commissioner and the reasonable requirements of all local authorities companies corporations and persons desirous of using the same within the Concession Area ;

(*e*) The high medium and low tension transmission lines and cables necessary for the constant and regular supply of the electrical energy required within the Concession Area ;

(*f*) The necessary transformer stations for the purposes of the said Concession ;

(*g*) The entire distribution system of electrical energy within the Concession Area ;

(*h*) The connection of the electrical system to the consumers' metres ;

(*i*) All other necessary works.

4. It shall be lawful for the Company to dam up the water in Lake Tiberias to a level not exceeding the recorded maximum level of the lake at any time of high water during the period of three years commencing from October 1, 1918 and to conduct the water from Lake

Tiberias by means of the said canal to the said power house.

The Company to make good all damage done to all government roads bridges etc., and at all times keep indemnified the High Commissioner from and against all actions proceedings damages expenses and costs which may be occasioned by any breach of this Clause.

5. It shall be lawful for the Company to divert and use the waters of the Yarmuk River and its affluents either into the canal mentioned in Clause 4 hereof or into Lake Tiberias by means of a dam and a canal beginning near El Hamma and ending in Lake Tiberias and to use the fall of such water into Lake Tiberias for the production of electrical energy if the Company shall so require and to divert and use the waters of the Yarmuk River and its affluents if and where necessary for the purposes of the due execution of this Concession.

6. Provision for protection of existing users of water within Concession Area.

7. Power to Company to erect poles and standards for transmission lines and to lay underground cables.

8. Company to protect against high tension lines.

9. Distribution system.

10. The Company to make over to the municipalities or local councils or authorities the distribution of electrical energy in the various localities on terms and conditions to be agreed between the parties and to be approved of in writing by the High Commissioner.

11. The Company to connect with consumers' meters and to make rules.

12. Power to Company to erect telegraph and telephone system.

13. The High Commissioner to expropriate existing undertakings.

14. The High Commissioner to expropriate lands, buildings or easements in certain cases.

15. Power to Local Authorities to require light between dusk and dawn.

16. The Company may dispose of surplus electrical energy outside the Concession Area.

17. The Company to complete the whole works fit for use within five years subject to a forfeit and should it fail to complete them within six years the High Commissioner may give notice to cancel this Concession.

18. All works to be in accordance with plans.

18A. The Company to be entitled to set up and carry on such factories works and undertakings as may be necessary or convenient for the production of material and machinery required for the purposes of this Concession and to also be entitled to set up and carry on such factories works and undertakings as may be able to utilize large quantities of electrical energy.

19. Subject to the provisions of Clauses 20 30 and 31 hereof the Company shall provide electrical energy to the consumers' meters at rates not exceeding the following that is to say :

(*a*) For electric lighting in private houses three piastres per kilowatt hour ;

(*b*) For street lighting water supply irrigation and for industrial purposes one-and-a-half piastres per kilowatt hour ;

and for large consumers of energy the rates shall be fixed by special agreement between the Company and the consumers and for other purposes such as heating and cooking the rates shall not exceed maximum rates to be fixed in agreement with the High Commissioner.

20. (i) The Company shall be entitled within the period of ten years from the date of this Concession to submit to the High Commissioner for his approval a scheme for a sliding scale of rates to be charged to consumers of electrical energy but such scheme of rates shall not be put in force or charged without the consent in writing of the High Commissioner first obtained and

subject as aforesaid and subject to the provisions of Clause 30 hereof the said rates of charge mentioned in Clause 19 hereof shall not be increased for a period of ten years from the date of this Concession and shall not thereafter be increased except under and in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained ;

(ii) If at the expiration of ten years from the date hereof it shall appear that the Company is unable out of its profits to write off the sums (*a*) for the Amortization of the Capital of the Company, (*b*) for Depreciation, and (*c*) for Reserve indicated in the financial plan set forth in the Second Schedule hereto and to pay a dividend of not less than 8 per centum per annum tax free on its share capital for the time being issued the Company shall have the right to increase the said rates to such an extent as may be calculated in the opinion of the High Commissioner to enable the Company to pay future dividends at such rate per annum. And if in any year the profits of the Company shall be sufficient to enable it to write off the sums (if any) required for Amortization of its Capital Depreciation and Reserve during the same year as indicated in the said financial plan and to declare a dividend of not less than ten per centum per annum tax free and less than twenty per centum per annum tax free for the same year on its capital for the time being issued then one half of the net profits of the company during the same year in excess of the amount which would be necessary to enable the Company to write off the sums aforesaid (if any) and to pay a dividend at the rate of ten per centum per annum tax free shall be paid to the High Commissioner. And if in any year the profits of the Company shall be sufficient to enable it to write off the sums (if any) required for Amortization of Capital Depreciation and Reserve during the same year as indicated in the said financial plan and to declare a dividend amounting to or exceeding twenty per centum per annum tax free for the same year then the whole of

the profits of the Company during the same year in excess of the amount which would be necessary to enable it during the same year to write off the sums (if any) last aforesaid and to pay a dividend of fifteen per centum tax free on its capital for the time being issued shall be paid to the High Commissioner. All sums of money which under this sub-clause are to be paid to the High Commissioner shall be applied by the High Commissioner to the reduction of rates or to such other purposes as shall from time to time be agreed by the High Commissioner with the Company.

(iii) The Company shall at all times perform observe and abide by the rules and regulations as to Amortization of Capital and Depreciation and Reserve contained in the financial plan set forth in the Second Schedule hereto. Provided that no part of the Depreciation or Reserve Funds shall be capitalized but any income derived from such Funds shall be treated as part of the profits of the Company.

21. The said term of seventy years for which this Concession is hereinbefore expressed to be granted shall be extended if the scheme for the Amortization of the capital of the Company is not carried out within the time limited by the said financial plan set forth in the Second Schedule hereto then by two years for every year by which such amortization is delayed beyond the time specified in the said plan ;

21A. If the Company shall absorb, take over or acquire any other concession or concessions for the production supply distribution and sale of electrical energy then the period or respective periods of the concession or concessions so acquired if shorter than the term of this Concession shall be extended so as to be coterminous with the term hereby granted. And the provisions of this Concession shall (so far as the same may be applicable to the concession or concessions so acquired by the Company) apply to the concession or

concessions so acquired and shall be in addition to any special provisions contained in such acquired concession or concessions respectively : Provided always that any rights or powers which the High Commissioner may possess or enjoy under any and every such acquired concession to purchase or acquire the same shall be modified or varied and made exerciseable so as to conform with the powers and provisions herein contained for the purchase by the High Commissioner of the undertaking under this present Concession.

22. Provides for Financial and technical supervision by the High Commissioner over the operations of the Company.

23. If the High Commissioner shall be desirous of purchasing the undertaking at the expiration of the thirty-seventh forty-seventh, fifty-seventh or sixty-seventh year of the said term hereby granted and of such desire shall give to the Company twelve months previous notice in writing then the High Commissioner may at the expiration of the said thirty-seventh forty-seventh fifty-seventh or sixty-seventh year of the said term as the case may be purchase the undertaking and the benefit of all then existing contracts (subject to the obligations thereof) on the following terms and in the event of the High Commissioner deciding to make such purchase the last day computed from the date hereof of the thirty-seventh forty-seventh fifty-seventh or sixty-seventh year of the said term as the case may be for which such notice to purchase shall be so given shall be and the same is hereinafter referred to as " the date of purchase " :

(*a*) The High Commissioner shall pay to the Company any sum or sums necessary to complete so far as the same shall be then incomplete the amortization of the capital of the Company in accordance with the financial plan set forth in the Second Schedule hereto :

(*b*) The High Commissioner shall further pay to the Company a sum equal to the capitalized value at the time of purchase of the estimated profits of the Company for the residue then unexpired of the term of this Concession less an amount equal to interest on the issued capital of the Company for the same period. The said estimated profits shall be computed on the basis of the average annual profits of the Company which shall during the five years immediately preceding the purchase remain available (whether so used or not) for dividend after writing off the sums for amortization depreciation and reserve and the rate of discount adopted in computing the said capitalized value shall be the average rate of discount for three months British Treasury Bills during the twelve months preceding the purchase and the rate of interest aforesaid shall be identical with the said rate of discount provided that in no case shall the deduction in respect of interest exceed the amount due to the Company in respect of estimated profits, nor shall the sum payable to the Company under this sub-clause exceed 50 per cent. of the issued capital of the Company.

(*c*) The High Commissioner shall also pay to the Company adequate compensation for installations and repairs (other than repairs required by ordinary wear and tear) effected during the fifteen years immediately preceding the said purchase in so far as the payment or recoupment for such installations and repairs is not covered by the provision for depreciation hereinbefore referred to and in so far as such installations and repairs have been

paid for out of profits which if not so used would have been available for distribution to the shareholders as dividend.

(*d*) The High Commissioner shall take over the benefits and obligations and keep the Company indemnified in respect of any contracts for fuel materials supplies meters apparatus and instruments.

(*e*) In the event of the purchase of the undertaking by the High Commissioner under this clause then so much of the said reserve as shall be existing at the date of the purchase shall in the first place be appropriated and applied in or towards paying or making good to the Company the deficiency (if any) by which the annual profits of the Company to the same date shall have been insufficient to pay (whether actually paid or not) an average dividend of 12½ per cent per annum tax free from the formation of the Company to the date of purchase. And any balance of the reserve remaining after such appropriation and payment, shall belong to and be paid to the High Commissioner.

(*f*) If at the date of such purchase there shall be outstanding any Debenture or other loan capital of the Company authorized under Clause 22 hereof the High Commissioner shall take over the liabilities of the Company in respect thereof but shall be entitled to the benefit of any existing funds for the amortization of the same.

(*g*) Save as hereinbefore provided the Company shall pay satisfy and discharge all their debts and liabilities in connection with the said undertaking existing on the date of purchase and shall indemnify the High Commissioner

against all proceedings claims and demands in respect thereof.

(*h*) The staff in the employ of the Company at the date of purchase of the undertaking by the High Commissioner shall remain in the service of the undertaking in the hands of the High Commissioner during at least one year after the date of purchase or shall be given adequate compensation in accordance with or on the basis of the conditions of their engagement of service with the Company.

24. Provisions for renewal of Concession if not purchased by the High Commissioner at the expiry of the sixty-seventh year of its term.

25. During the continuance of this Concession, no other installation for the production supply and distribution of electrical energy shall be permitted by the High Commissioner in the Concession Area other than such installations for power and light as are intended exclusively for the use of the person or persons or corporation installing the same and subject as aforesaid and subject to the provisions of the next subsequent clause hereof, the Company shall have the exclusive right throughout the Concession Area for the distribution and sale of electrical energy.

26. During the continuance of this Concession no further Concession shall be granted within or over the Concession Area to any person or Company other than the Company for any of the purposes following viz. : (1) To construct canals dams reservoirs watercourses pumping stations and other works of whatever kind for the generation of electrical energy from water power. (2) To construct equip instal and operate water or fuel or other electric power stations. (3) To construct equip instal and operate overhead lines and underground cables. (4) To instal electric lighting in streets dwellings and buildings of whatever kind. (5) To supply electrical

energy for consumption by docks wharves railways plantations mills factories workshops laboratories offices houses and by all agricultural industrial commercial and public or private establishments and undertakings of whatever kind unless in each instance the Concession shall have first been offered to the Company upon similar terms which shall be fair and reasonable and such offer shall not have been accepted in writing by the Company within six months. Provided always that nothing in this clause contained shall be construed as restricting the carrying out or construction or operation by the High Commissioner or any other person or persons Company or Companies of any telegraph or telephone works within the Concession Area and the provisions of this clause are to be subject and without prejudice to the provisions of Clause 35 hereof.

27. (*a*) If at any time after the completion by the Company of the works provided for under this Concession the requirements of the Concession Area for electrical energy shall be such that the works of the Company for the time being in existence shall be unable to supply the amount required then and in such case and as often as the same may happen the High Commissioner and with the consent of the High Commissioner any and every local authority within the Concession Area requiring the same shall be entitled to give to the Company notice in writing to produce the required additional energy. Should the Company be willing to comply with such notice an agreement to be approved of by the High Commissioner shall be entered into between the Company and the party requiring such energy determining the terms and conditions regulating the supply of such additional energy. If the Company shall refuse to enter into such Agreement or having entered into such Agreement shall be unable or neglect to provide the additional energy within one year after the date of the Agreement aforesaid then the High Commissioner or the local

authority or authorities shall from and immediately after the date of any such refusal or the expiration of the said one year whichever shall first happen be at liberty to obtain such additional energy elsewhere and for the purpose of procuring such additional energy the High Commissioner may empower any other Company firm or person or persons to generate and supply electrical energy within the Concession Area notwithstanding any provision to the contrary herein contained.

(*b*) If the High Commissioner or with the consent of the High Commissioner any local authority or authorities within the Concession Area shall require the building or constructing by the Company of an electric tramway or tramways, railway or railways the Company shall within twelve months from the date of the requisition decide whether or not the Company is prepared to construct the same . . . but if the Company shall at any time within the said twelve months decline to construct such work, or if it shall neglect to comply with the terms and conditions contained in such last mentioned agreement then . . . the High Commissioner or the local authority as the case may be requiring the same shall be at liberty to procure the building and construction of the work required by any other person or persons firm or Company.

28. The Company's undertaking under this Concession to be recognized as a public utility body under Government control.

29. The High Commissioner to annul any valid pre-existing concession.

30. If any taxation shall be imposed in Palestine which would fall upon the profits of the Company in respect of this Concession during the first ten years of its currency any part of the profits of the Company which is actually devoted to the amortization of the capital of the Company depreciation and reserve in accordance with the said financial plan shall for the purpose of such

taxation be deemed to be expenses and not profits so as to be free of tax and during the same period of ten years no tax shall be levied on any profits of the Company over and above the expenses aforesaid unless the Company shall have made profits over and above such expenses sufficient to pay during the year for which the tax is levied, and each preceding year of the said period a cumulative dividend of not less than six per centum per annum tax free. Provided always that after the expiration of the said period of ten years all the profits of the Company in respect of this Concession after writing off amortization depreciation and reserve shall be liable to tax and taxable at the appropriate rates for the time being in force in Palestine whatever the profits of the Company shall have been during the said period of ten years, and the taxes at the appropriate rates for the time being in force shall thenceforth be leviable in respect of all the profits of the Company, and shall be paid by the Company accordingly. If any tax shall be imposed after the date of this Concession upon electrical energy or if any tax or additional tax shall be imposed upon any fuel employed in the production of electrical energy the Company shall be entitled to increase the aforesaid rates of charge to be made to consumers mentioned in Clause 19 hereof by an equivalent amount subject nevertheless to the provisions of Clause 20 hereof.

30A. Subject to the provisions for the benefit of the Local Authorities contained in Clause 15 hereof the Company shall not in making any agreements for the supply of electricity show any undue preference to any company or person but save as aforesaid the Company may make such charges for the supply of electrical energy to any consumer within the Concession Area as may be agreed upon between the Company and such consumer so always that such charges shall not exceed the rates chargeable under Clauses 19, 20, 29 and 30 hereof.

31. All customs duties and import dues for the time

being and from time to time leviable or chargeable upon imports into Palestine shall be payable by the Company upon all machinery or other materials imported by the Company into Palestine but so that the actual payment thereof shall if the Company so request be deferred until the profits of the Company after writing off Amortization Depreciation and Reserve are first sufficient to enable the Company to pay a dividend of at least eight per centum per annum tax free upon its capital for the time being subscribed and thereafter the customs duties and import dues payable by the Company the payment whereof shall so have been deferred shall be paid by yearly instalments not exceeding five per centum of the total amount payable in respect of the customs duties and import dues, the payment whereof shall have been so deferred. And the first of such instalments shall be payable, and paid at the expiration of twelve months from the time when the profits of the Company shall first have been sufficient to enable the Company to pay such dividend as aforesaid and the subsequent instalments at successive intervals of twelve months until the whole is paid.

32. The Company to conform to anti-malarial regulations.

33. The Company to carry on works efficiently.

34. Nothing to prevent generation of electrical energy for Government offices.

35. The Company not to assign concession.

36. The Company to keep accounts and permit inspection by High Commissioner.

37. The Company not to pollute streams.

38. Power to High Commissioner to delegate.

39. Any prospectus or advertisement to be submitted for approval.

40. The High Commissioner not to be personally liable hereunder.

41. Notices.

42. Provisions in case of default. The High Commissioner is entitled to determine the Concession in the event of continued default.

43. . . . Every dispute which shall arise between the High Commissioner and the Company as to the meaning or effect of any of the provisions of the Concession or otherwise in relation to the premises which cannot be settled by mutual agreement to be referred to a board of arbitration consisting of one arbitrator nominated by each of the parties to the dispute together with a third arbitrator agreed between the other two arbitrators or failing agreement some impartial person nominated by the Chief Justice of Palestine and such arbitration to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1889.

44. Marginal notes of the contents of this Concession to be for the purpose of convenience only, and not to affect its construction or interpretation.

45. These presents shall be interpreted and construed according to the laws of England and shall be given effect to accordingly.

FINANCIAL PLAN

1. Amortization.

The Share Capital of the Company from time to time paid up shall be amortized by the establishment of a Fund on the basis of 4 per cent compound interest computed with yearly rests on the amount thereof. Provided that the Amortization Fund shall at no time exceed the amount of the Capital for the time being paid up and provided that any arrears of amortization shall be a first charge on future profits.

2. Depreciation.

The Company shall be at liberty to set aside in each year of the term of the Concession after the first delivery

of electrical energy to the Consumers for the depreciation of :

(i) Canals, dams, penstocks, sluices, pressure pipes, houses, buildings, machinery, transmission lines etc., for 4.5 per cent of cost ;

(ii) Distribution system 7 per cent of cost.

3. Reserve.

The Company shall be at liberty to establish a Reserve Fund by setting aside not more than 10 per cent in any one year of the monies for the time being invested in the Concession provided that the whole of such Reserve Fund shall at no time exceed 50 per cent of such monies but that any depletion of the Reserve Fund from time to time may be made good.

4. The total of the Depreciation and Reserve Funds shall at no time exceed the total amount of the monies for the time being invested in the Concession.

British Policy in Palestine

MR. CHURCHILL'S statement of the policy to be pursued by the British Government in Palestine was published in a White Paper, published in June, 1922, which also contained correspondence between the Colonial Office on the one hand and the two rival bodies representing the majority of the Arab and the majority of the Jewish interests in the country—viz. : the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization. The following letters are published therein :

1. The Arab Delegation's criticisms of the draft Constitution of Palestine, which had been communicated to it by the Colonial Office for its information. (*See* Chap. 3.) This letter is dated February 21, 1922.

2. Mr. Churchill's reply to the Delegation's criticisms and his invitation to the Delegation to discuss with him and with members of his Department " the practical steps which shall be taken to attain the objects " referred to in certain requests made in the Delegation's previous letter. (*See* Chap. 3.) This letter is dated March 1, 1922.

3. The Arab Delegation replies in a letter dated March 16, 1922. (*See* Chap. 3.)

4. In a letter dated April 11, Mr. Churchill expresses his disappointment at the attitude of the Delegation, and again invites it to assist him in the matter of framing legislation for the control of future immigration in Palestine.

5. The following is the full text of the fifth letter addressed by Sir John Shuckburgh to the Zionist Organization.

DOWNING STREET.
June 3, 1922.

SIR,—

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to enclose,

to be laid before your Organization, copy of a statement which it is proposed to publish, dealing with the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. The statement discusses in some detail the means by which it is intended to carry into effect the establishment of a Jewish National Home in the country. Under Article IV of the draft Mandate submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, a special position is assigned to your Organization as an agency authorized to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in this respect. In these circumstances it appears to Mr. Churchill essential, not only that the declared aims and intentions of your Organization should be consistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government, but that this identity of aim should be made patent both to the people of Palestine and of this country, and indeed to the world at large. Mr. Churchill feels sure that you will appreciate this consideration, and will be anxious to do all in your power to remove any misunderstandings that may have arisen. He would accordingly be glad to receive from you a formal assurance that your Organization accepts the policy as set out in the enclosed statement and is prepared to conduct its own activities in conformity therewith.

I am, etc.,
J. E. Shuckburgh.

Enclosure in No. 5.

BRITISH POLICY IN PALESTINE

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has given renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine, with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among certain sections. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine, the following statement has been drawn up.

Appendix 4

It summarizes the essential parts of the correspondence that has already taken place between the Secretary of State, and a Delegation from the Moslem Christian Society of Palestine, which has been for some time in England, and it states the further conclusions which have since been reached.

" The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab, and by sections of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned, are partly based upon exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the Declaration favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on November 2, 1917. Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become ' as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable, and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*. In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at the meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organization, held at Carlsbad in September, 1921, a resolution was passed expressing, as the official statement of Zionist aims, ' the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common Home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of

which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development.'

"It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organization in Article IV. of the Draft Mandate for Palestine imply any such functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the Organization may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its government.

"Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status.

"So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned, it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change.

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs ; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns ; elected councils in the towns ; and an organization for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a

Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has, in fact, " national " characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not of sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection.

" This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews.

" For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive

any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000.

" It is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable are excluded from Palestine, and every precaution has been and will be taken by the Administration to that end.

" It is intended that a special committee should be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of members of the new Legislative Council elected by the people, to confer with the Administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any difference of opinion arise between this committee and the Administration, the matter will be referred to His Majesty's Government, who will give it special consideration. In addition under Article 81 of the draft Palestine Order in Council, any religious community or considerable section of the population of Palestine will have a general right to appeal through the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may consider that the terms of the Mandate are not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine.

" With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place, it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national Government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated October 24, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recog-

nize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge.

" Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine. But they are of opinion that in the special circumstances of that country this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly. The first step was taken when, on the institution of a Civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council, which now exists, was established. It was stated at the time by the High Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self-governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step by the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise. It was proposed in the published draft that three of the members of this Council should be non-official persons nominated by the High Commissioner, but representations having been made in opposition to this provision based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to omit it. The Legislative Council would then consist of the High Commissioner as President and twelve elected and ten official members. The Secretary of State is of opinion that before a further measure of self-government is extended to Palestine, and the Assembly placed in control over the Executive, it would be wise to allow some time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country will have become well established ; its financial credit will be based on

firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government. After a few years the situation will be again reviewed, and if the experience of the working of the Constitution now to be established so warranted, a larger share of authority would be then extended to the elected representatives of the people.

" The Secretary of State would point out that already the present Administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem religious endowments (Wakfs), and of the Moslem religious Courts. To this Council the Adminstration has also voluntarily restored considerable revenues derived from ancient endowments which had been sequestrated by the Turkish Government. The Education Department is also advised by a committee representative of all sections of the population, and the Department of Commerce and Industry has the benefit of the co-operation of the Chambers of Commerce which have been established in the principal centres. It is the intention of the Administration to associate in an increased degree similar representative committees with the various Departments of the Government.

" The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine, and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that spirit of co-operation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend."

6. The Arab Delegation's reply to the above statement of policy, dated June 17, is unfortunately too lengthy to quote in full.

Appendix 4

The following extracts are characteristic :—

IMMIGRATION.—The Memorandum says, further, that in order "to fulfil this policy it is necessary that the Jewish Community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration."

We here ask, "What policy?" and why? The Jewish Community in Palestine is doing well, and does not depend for its existence on immigrants. The Memorandum continues, however : "This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000."

We regret our inability to endorse the veracity of the above statements, since we have always relied on facts, not on words, to prove our point.

By the admission of the Palestine Administration itself we can show that the incoming of immigrants is greater than the country can at present sustain. In his Interim Report the High Commissioner says : "But in any event it was becoming increasingly evident that the flow of immigrants was greater than the country was able to absorb."

At the time this was written—August, 1920—"slightly over 10,000 immigrants had arrived in the country." Their number now has arisen to 25,000. Now, admitting these figures to be correct, has the condition of the country so improved as to allow of 15,000 new immigrants? Where have these people gone to? The Memorandum says that "about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land" ; consequently, the three-fourths have been absorbed by the towns, and are compet-

ing with the townspeople for their daily bread, permanently endangering public security and rioting occasionally.

In this connection it is instructive to mention that telegrams were received by this Delegation on June 9 from Arab railway employees complaining that, under the guise of economy, they are being turned out of their jobs in order to make room for Jewish employees, who lack experience in railway work, and cannot speak the language of the country.

The Memorandum provides for "a special committee to be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of Members of the Legislative Council elected by the people, to confer with the Administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration."

Since the immigration of a foreign element into any country affects the native population of that country—politically, economically and socially—it is only right and proper that the people who are so affected should have complete say in the matter.

The Committee proposed above does not give the people of Palestine control of immigration. Its powers are merely consultative. While we see that in Article 6 of the Draft Mandate the Jewish Agency, which is the Zionist Organization, a foreign body, has been given more powers than the actual inhabitants of the country.

Nothing will safeguard the interests of the Arabs against the dangers of immigration except the creation of a Representative National Government, which shall have complete control of immigration.

The Memorandum then raises the question of the pledges given to the King of the Hejaz, and states that "this promise (to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs) was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope the country lying to the west of the vilayet of Damascus. The vilayet included the whole of the territory of Transjordania, but neither the independent Sanjak of Jeru-

salem, nor those parts of the then vilayet of Beyrout which are now included in Palestine. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge."

To this we reply :—

In the first place the word "district" and not Vilayet was used. In the second place the word "district" and not Vilayet was also *meant*, since the letter says "the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo." Now since Homs and Hama were districts included in the Vilayet of Syria, it would be superfluous to mention "Homs" and "Hama" specifically if the "Vilayet" of Damascus as against the "district" of Damascus were meant.

Moreover, the "Vilayet" said to have been meant was called "Vilayet of Syria," and not "Vilayet" of Damascus, as there was no Vilayet of Damascus.

Palestine thus comes within the scope of the promise.

There is no doubt that the reservation made in the pledge meant the Lebanon, since Sir H. McMahon in a letter dated October 25 says : "In regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered, etc," to which the Sherif replied on January 1, 1916, as follows : "yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that at the first opportunity after this war is finished we shall ask you (what we now avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France."

Since

(*a*) Palestine has been proved to be excluded from the territory west of the "districts" of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo ;

(*b*) Since the occupation of these districts Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of France ;

(*c*) The Sherif reserved his right to the territories

west of the districts above mentioned (Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo) till after the war ;

Therefore Palestine is included in the pledges and is entitled to the recognition of her independence.

No. 7.

THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION TO THE COLONIAL OFFICE.

77, Great Russell Street,
June 18, 1922.

Sir,—

With reference to your letter of June 3, receipt of which has already been acknowledged, I have the honour to inform you that the Executive of the Zionist Organization have considered the statement relative to the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine, of which you have been good enough to furnish them with a copy, and have passed the following resolution :—

" The Executive of the Zionist Organization, having taken note of the statement relative to British policy in Palestine, transmitted to them by the Colonial Office under date June 3, 1922, assure His Majesty's Government that the activities of the Zionist Organization will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set forth."

The Executive observe with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government, in defining their policy in Palestine, take occasion once more to reaffirm the Declaration of November 2, 1917, and lay it down as a matter of international concern that the Jewish people should know that it is in Palestine as of right.

The Executive further observe that His Majesty's Government also acknowledge, as a corollary of this right, that it is necessary that Jews shall be able to increase

their numbers in Palestine by immigration, and understand from the statement of policy that the volume of such immigration is to be determined by the economic capacity of the country from time to time to absorb new arrivals. Whatever arrangements may be made in regard to the regulation of such immigration, the Executive confidently trust that both His Majesty's Government and the Administration of Palestine will be guided in this matter by the aforesaid principle.

The Zionist Organization has at all times been sincerely desirous of proceeding in harmonious co-operation with all sections of the people of Palestine. It has repeatedly made it clear both in word and deed that nothing is further from its purpose than to prejudice in the smallest degree the civil or religious rights or the material interests of the non-Jewish population. The Zionist Organization will continue on its side to spare no efforts to foster the spirit of good will to which His Majesty's Government have pointed out as the only sure foundation for the future prosperity of Palestine. The Executive earnestly hope that the statement of policy which His Majesty's Government propose to issue will once and for all dispel such misapprehensions as may still exist, and that, loyally accepted by all parties concerned, it may mark the opening of a new era of peaceful progress.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) Ch. Weizmann.

No. 8.

THE COLONIAL OFFICE TO THE PALESTINE ARAB DELEGATION.

Downing Street,
June 23, 1922.

(Extracts.)

The comments which you were good enough to offer upon the proposed statement in the course of that inter-

view (which have since been recapitulated in your letter of the 17th June) were carefully considered by the Secretary of State, who decided to make a modification in the draft on a point of fact. On the 3rd of June the draft was communicated formally to the Zionist Organization, and the Secretary of State has since received from them a formal assurance that they accept the policy as laid down in the statement, and are prepared to conduct their own activities in conformity therewith.

Mr. Churchill considers that this fresh definition of the policy of His Majesty's Government, coupled with the formal assurance that has been obtained from the Zionist Organization, should finally allay the apprehensions which you have mentioned on more than one occasion during your visit to London as being entertained by your friends in Palestine as to the scope and purport of British policy.

The correspondence is now being laid before Parliament, and copies will be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

I am, etc.,
J. E. Shuckburgh.